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Abstract
Media Globalisation and Irish Youth Identity
Liam Cosgrave
Traditionally, studies of youth culture have focused on solving the 'problem s tha t young people are 
seen to have, o r to create. I t  has been usual for social research to view youth as a relatively 
unim portant developmental stage between childhood and adulthood. Recently however, this view has 
begun to change, most notably in the UK and Scandanavia, w here youth is now more commonly 
being studied as an im portant and distinct stage of life in its own right.
Irish research has been slow to change from  the more established problem -centred view of youth. 
There is a danger tha t the opinions of Irish  decision-makers such as politicians, parents and teachers 
are form ed largely in relation to research and reporting of unusual (problem ) youth. This study is 
step tow ards creating a more accurate picture of the social realities of young Irish people. In  addition 
to com paring the media use of Irish  young people in 1985 and 2000, this w ork investigates the 
relationship between a sample of contem porary Irish youth and the increasingly globalised mass 
media which they consume.
To this end, 373 students aged between 15 and 17 (average age 16.0) completed a questionnaire 
designed to discover w hether there was empirical evidence for two hypotheses: Hypothesis A - That 
the m edia-related socialisation patterns of Irish  youth have changed significantly over the past 15 
years. Hypothesis B - That Irish  youths' cu rren t patterns of media consum ption are independently 
correlated with ideological modes of thought.
Both hypotheses were supported. Com paring the group surveyed in 2000 to  the 1985 sample, several 
changes in patterns of media use emerged. A num ber of these were predictable, coinciding with the 
technological advancements th a t had occurred between the time of the two surveys, bu t there were 
also some results which were not directly related to new technology. M ost notable of these was an 
increase in the percentage of respondents who attended the cinema weekly, from 3.1%  in 1985 to 
24.1% in 2000. These results correspond with Eurostat (2001) figures showing tha t Irish people now 
attend the cinema more than any other nationality in the EU. There was also a relative increase in 
the popularity  of commercial radio and an increased autonomy in television viewing patterns.
A num ber of trends emerged with certain media uses being correlated  with subjects having 
particu lar views of their social world. G roups labelled 'M usic lovers', 'R eaders' and 'Cinema-goers' 
where found to have m easurably distinct views on issues such as gender representation and 
m ulticulturalism .
All o f the results are discussed in the contcxt of a detailed review of lite ra tu re  which defines the key 
concepts used in this work, both for the curren t study and for any fu tu re  research which draws on 
the results presented herein.
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 O verv iew
1.2 Ideology an d  g lobalisa tion
1.3 Id e n tity  a n d  late m o d ern ity
1.4 Y o u th
1.5 E m p iric a l re sea rch
I
There can be little doubt that the globalised media affect the socialisation of young people 
throughout the Western world. Ireland is no exception. An understanding of the relationship 
between young people's socialisation and the mass media they use, is therefore crucial in 
developing an accurate picture of the factors affecting the development of Irish youth culture.
This area is currently under-researched, and there is a danger that the 'accepted wisdom' or 
common sense of those who make decisions on behalf of young people (such as government, 
school or parents) might involve inadequate or incorrect assumptions. The current study is a step 
towards mapping the life-world of Irish youth such that these decisions can be made with a 
clearer view of the realities of the social interaction between the globalised mass media and 
young people in this country.
Historically, much of the writing about youth, particularly in Ireland, has concentrated on solving 
problems that young people either have or cause (eg. Forde, 1995; Hannan and O'Riain, 1993). 
While such research is useful, there is little writing about young Irish people who are not 
perceived to be, or have, problems.
In an attempt to begin to redress this imbalance, funding was made available to conduct research 
that "open[s] up an anthropology of Irish youth[,] foregrounds the media-driven cultural sphere 
... [and focuses] attention on understanding the life-world of Irish youth ... This mapping of 
youth culture will lay the foundation for sustained investigation concentrated on the impact of 
globalisation on Irish youth in all its aspects " (see Appendix A for full text).
The detailed review of literature provided in the following chapters serves two purposes. It 
contextualises the terms used by the empirical research described in chapters 5 and 6, in
1.1 Overview
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investigating the media use and related 'modes of thought' in a sample of contemporary Irish 
youth. It also defines a number of key terms, under the broad headings of ideology, globalisation, 
identity, late modernity and youth, to facilitate a sustained investigation into the effects of media 
globalisation on the socialisation of Irish youth.
1.2 Ideo logy  a n d  g lo b a lisa tion
More specifically, chapter 2 explores the concepts of ideology and globalisation. The historical 
development of the term ideology is discussed, as are its uses by political and communications 
theorists including Marx, Weber, Althusser, Hall and Hartley. Ideology is defined for the current 
work as 'those bodies of thought which serve to position and reify one's social place'.
Historical globalisation processes and academic writing about the globalisation of trans-national 
corporations, particular the global media industry (eg. by Schiller, Stevenson, Fiske, Thussu and 
Ferguson) are then discussed. There is a discussion about the processes by which mass media 
organisations can be seen to establish and maintain a hegemonic relationship with their audience, 
whereby the individual consents to their own relatively powerless position. The chapter then 
moves on to arguments about the ideological trends and impact of trans-national media 
corporations, and pressures on local product in the context of dominant capitalist-driven media 
product produced for a global market. Strengths and weaknesses of Schiller's (1989, 1991, 1998a, 
1998b, 1969, cited Thussu, 1998) cultural imperialist model, which asserts that 'American pop- 
culture sweeps the world' (Schiller, 1998b), are discussed in some detail. Chapter 2 concludes that 
despite the limitations of certain theories of the domination of the cultural sphere by global 
corporations, that there must be a significant effect of people's world-view being formed within 
frameworks determined by trans-national media corporations.
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1.3 Identity and late modernity
Chapter 3 is a continuation of the review of literature appropriate to studying the effects of media 
globalisation on the socialisation of young Irish people. Identity and late modernity are defined 
historically and in terms appropriate to such a study.
Identity is described as complex and multi-dimensional, and impossible to delimit or precisely 
define for any individual or a group. Each aspect of identity is formed in relation to social 
institutions such as family, church, nationhood, and increasingly the mass media. Bourdieu's 
(1984, 1990a) 'habitus' is presented as a useful tool for describing identity in terms of an 
individual's organisation of her/his social life within a larger social hierarchy. In particular 
habitus is a way of explaining ideological behaviour, especially behaviour that supports one's 
own domination.
The development of the concept of modernity as a 'transition from fate to choice' (Thompson,
1992) and late modernity as 'the current phase in the modern era' (Fomas, 1995) are discussed 
with a view to describing the time in which contemporary Irish youth have developed their 
identity or habitus. A combination of factors, including the globalisation of mass media, have led 
to what Jameson (1984) sees as a 'depthless' culture. This is often linked with the perception of a 
public desire for things to be less challenging or 'dumbed down' (Graef, 2000). A number of 
possible consequences of these features of contemporary Western society on identity formation in 
Irish youth are explored.
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1.4 Youth
Chapter 4 traces the origins of the current social condition of 'youth', from ancient times, to the 
repeal of child labour laws, the furthering of education and the emergence of young people as a 
distinct and significant earning and spending demographic after World War II. Irish youth can, in 
many ways be seen to have developed as a distinct group along similar lines to those from the US 
or UK, although there is a common perception that Irish young people were less 'liberated' or 
rebellious than others in the Western world.
Youth research is also discussed in some detail. Traditionally, 'troubled' or 'at risk' young people 
have typically been the subject of sociological study, with 'normal' youth being viewed as merely 
a transitory stage between childhood and adulthood. In the mid 1990s this started to change. 
Swedish researchers such as Fomas and Boethius, for example, moved away from viewing young 
people, solely in relation to social problems, or in the context of the development from childhood 
to adulthood. Such researchers began to see the study of the socialisation of young people as 
important and distinct. In Ireland at this time, studying problems with young people, or studying 
youth as merely a 'pathway to adulthood' was still very much the norm (eg. Hannan and O'Riain,
1993). The current work moves away from the traditional approaches that are still evident in 
Ireland, and investigates the socialisation patterns of 'normal' Irish young people in their own 
right.
1.5 Empirical research
The goal of chapters 2, 3 and 4 is to develop an understanding of the forces that affect the 
frameworks of socialisation and identity development for contemporary young Irish people. 
These chapters establish a theoretical base for chapters 5 and 6, which detail an investigation into
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the correlation between a sample of young Irish people's patterns of mass media use and their 
'ideological modes of thought'.
Because of the multi-dimensional and ever-changing nature of identity, youth, the mass media 
and the other frameworks of socialisation in contemporary Irish society, the mass media-related 
socialisation of young Irish people is constantly evolving. Therefore, it would serve little purpose 
to attempt to comprehensively describe every aspect of the relationship between Irish youth 
identity and the media at any point in time - before such a survey was complete, it would begin to 
lose validity as that which it measured is constantly changing. Rather, the current work has the 
purpose of situating Irish young people's media use historically, highlighting how it has changed - 
particularly over the past 15 years. It encourages further research to examine future cohorts of 
Irish youth (perhaps five years after the present study), and to continue to map the direction of 
change of the media use of Irish young people.
Just as patterns of media use would be expected to change over time, so too the investigation of 
the link between contemporary young Irish people's media use and their 'ideological modes of 
thought' is time-limited. The study detailed in chapters 5 and 6 of this work examines any 
significant correlations that are found between ideologies and patterns of media use. These are 
discussed in terms of the current generation of Irish youth, and will act as a signpost for future 
research investigating the patterns of media-driven socialisation in young Irish people.
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2.1 Ideology
This work is an investigation of a number of the factors that affect the creation of identity in 
contemporary Irish youth. It explores the nature of the communicative experience that results in 
young people's sense of self in relation to their 'life-world'. The study maintains that this 
communication takes place on an ideological level.
Ideology however, is a problematic term with a variety of non-static meanings. To arrive at a 
definition of ideology appropriate to the investigation of the contemporary Irish young people's 
identity, the history of 'ideology' is discussed in this chapter, as are its various uses by political 
and communications theorists. In the context of the evolution of thinking about ideology for 
communications theorists, this chapter defines ideologies for the present work as "those bodies of 
thought which serve to position and reify one's political and social place".
The chapter then goes on to discuss the hegemonic relationship between individuals and trans­
national media corporations, drawing on the work of Marx, Althusser, Gramsci, Hall and Hartley. 
The processes by which the consent of the individual to the dominant methods of information 
delivery is achieved and maintained are described briefly, in the context of defining ideology. The 
chapter also discusses how the professional practice of media production works to maintain this 
state of hegemony and consent.
2.1.1 Introduction to ideology
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2.1.2 A brief history of ideology
In general, the problem of using the term 'ideology' is one of definition. It is difficult to define a 
term that has many unavoidable political insinuations and, historically, many non-static uses. 
Another problem in defining ideology is that by many definitions ideologies are almost never 
present in a single pure form (Hall, 1983).
In attempting to come to a useful definition of ideology, in terms of social consciousness and 
cultural values, it is pertinent to look at historical and contemporary uses of the term by political 
and communications theorists such as Marx, Althusser, Gramsci, Hall and Hartley.
2.1.2.1 Marx
Ideology is described by Williams (1983:153) as having "first appeared in English in 1796, as a 
direct translation from the new French word idéologie which had been proposed earlier that year 
by philosopher de Tracy. For de Tracy, ideology was 'the philosophy of the mind'". Later, Marx 
and Engels suggested that the ruling ideas of an epoch "are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as 
ideas" (Williams, 1983:155). The failure of the individual to realise this, produced for Marx and 
Engels, an upside-down version of reality which they termed 'ideology'. For Marx and Engels the 
ideological thinker is unaware of the so-called 'right' or 'real' reasons or motives for their 
thoughts. To be aware of these was to not be a part of ideological processes.
Marx refers to another, more neutral view of ideology, closer to de Tracy's eighteenth century 
definition. This view sees ideology in terms of how one thinks about one's surroundings (although 
Marx is still talking in economic and political terms) (Williams, 1983). The Marxist conception of
9
ideology can, then, be divided into two main categories, the restrictive and the inclusive (Seliger, 
1977; Carlsnaes, 1981). Restrictive ideology confines the concept to specific political belief 
systems. Inclusive ideology is applied to all political doctrines. "In the context of social and 
political theory and science, this usage means that the concept covers sets of factual and moral 
propositions which serve to posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, 
especially political action" (Seliger, 1977:1). Such definitions of ideology are relevant to the 
study of media organisations which institutionalise and normalise social action by broadcasting 
(and therefore explaining and justifying) what is seen as normal by or for the consuming public.
Marx's restrictive and inclusive ideologies both assume that capitalism has always been involved 
in the commodification of labour power in class relations, separating workers from control of 
their means of production (Giddens, 1990).
Seliger (1997:1) recognises that ideology has historically had a multitude of meanings, and 
attempts to define the term for the purposes of dealing with The Marxist Conception o f Ideology. 
He contends that definitions of ideology are "defended rather by assertion than demonstration".
Central to Marx and Engels' thinking was the dependence all socially relevant thought had on the 
economic and social condition (Seliger, 1977). Lenin further developed the concept of ideology 
as a set of ideas which arise from one's position in a class or group, producing a definition 
appropriate to his own purposes. He described ideologies as the system of ideas held by each 
class in society, so there existed for him a 'proletarian ideology', a 'bourgeois ideology' and so on 
(Carlsnaes, 1981).
Historical context is implicit in Marxism, as Marxist determinism underlies a theory of historical 
development in distinct stages - economic, social, political, and cultural. To attribute interests,
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systems of values and ideologies to a social class in a certain stage of historical development, is to 
make inferences about the unique characteristics of a given era. In this sense, a discussion of 
ideology can take place only if the groups or classes under discussion are placed historically. This 
is especially true in areas as dynamic as youth culture, and the media. "Marxist theorists tend to 
emphasize the role of the mass media in the reproduction of the status quo, in contrast to liberal 
pluralists who emphasize the role of the media in promoting freedom of speech" (Chandler, 
2000b). The current work will place contemporary Irish youth historically by highlighting the 
differences in attitudes and media use between current youth and previous generations.
2.1.2.2 A lth u sse r
Althusser attempted to develop the concept of ideology as a science, and was a major figure in the 
'structuralist' tradition. Although he explicitly uses Marx's writing as the basis of his work, 
Althusser rejected Marx's 'essentialist' theory that ideology was dependent on existing economic 
or 'humanistic' determination (Lapsley and Westlake, 1988). Instead, Althusser saw ideology 
itself as a determining force shaping consciousness and embodying the material signifying 
practices of the formative functions of institutions such as religion, family, school and arts. 
Althusser (1971) calls these institutions 'ideological state apparatuses'.
Ideology, for Althusser, "represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence" (Stevenson, 1995:37). Althusser (1971:146) sees ideology as 
transforming people into subjects, who believe themselves to be self-determining agents when 
they are in fact shaped by ideological processes, "unified, despite its diversity and its 
contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class".
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A common criticism of Althusser's theories on ideology is that they assume all social action 
reifies the dominant ideology and that there is little or no scope for the individual to operate 
outside of this, or for the dominant ideology to be altered by the resistance of those not in the 
ruling class (Bennett, 1982). This 'functionalism' of Althusserian thinking conflicts with later 
theories, such as Hall's separation of production and reception in the ideological communication 
of a mass mediated product (see below) and Bourdieu's 'habitus', which sees modes of thought as 
being transposable (see chapter 3). Despite this, Althusser's development of seeing the individual 
as being the embodiment of ideology has proved useful for the development of Hall's and 
Bourdieu's social theories.
2.1.2.3 Gramsci
Gramsci (1971) developed Marx's ideas about ideology for his own purposes by addressing some 
of the problems he felt Marx left unsolved. In particular Gramsci looks at how those involved in 
an ideological relationship communicate in establishing and accepting their position as either 
predominant or powerless. That is how a state of 'hegemony' is created and established.
Hegemony is "a concept which attempts to capture the complex nature of authority, which 
according to Gramsci is both coercive and dependent on the consent of those who are coerced 
into submission" (Holub, 1992:45). Hegemony involves communication between classes, and 
consenting to one's position. The principle differences between Gramsci's hegemony and 
Althusser's sense of consenting to one's social position is that hegemony allows for resistance to 
the dominant ideology, and for the relatively powerless class to influence the make-up of the 
dominant, capitalist system.
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Ill his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci (1971) examines the ways in which political society (the realm 
of state power and authority) manipulates systems of belief and attitudes in civil society. That is, 
how the predominant class creates not only hegemony, but also a 'spontaneous' consent from the 
masses. "This consent is carried by systems and structures of beliefs, values, norms and practices 
of everyday life which unconsciously legitimate the order of things" (Holub, 1992:45). When 
discussing ideological hegemony, to optimise objectivity, one should concentrate, not on what 
could or should be, but what is (ibid.).
The resulting definition of the ideological is thus more flexible than Marx's. It invites specific 
practical study into the arenas of ideological struggle where consent to one's social position is 
sought, and won. The mass media can certainly be seen as such a site. Media institutions 
broadcast how and what they see as appropriate, giving the potential audience a perception of 
consent by having the (limited) opportunity of feedback to the station and the option of 'tuning 
out',
Holub (1992:103) describes how Gramsci looks at the ways in which the dominant class operates. 
"A predominant class produces and maintains power or, as Gramsci puts it, hegemony, via civil 
society, where a set of ideological practices guarantees the status quo anchored in political 
society, ultimately legitimating certain economic practices".
Most accounts of hegemony regard the concept as describing where the predominant class 
"manages to assure 'spontaneous' consent to its dominant operations precisely because 
domination consists not only of institutions, traditions, coerced ideas, beliefs and ideologies, but 
of practices that involve the most minute operations and expectations of everyday life" (Holub, 
1992:103-104). This is a valuable observation. Even the most mundane practices in everyday life 
serve to reinforce, or ensure consent to, the predominating powers. More simply, the media
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contribute to the hegemonic state by in part determining how one defines one's social position. 
When this study investigates the ideological effects of the globalised media on Irish youth, it will 
be appropriate to look at how they set up and affect what is accepted as normal, everyday life; 
what Hartley (1982) calls 'workaday'.
Gramsci's critical value lies in the emphasis he gives to the complex structures of seemingly 
'naïve' forms of communication. He interrogates cultural practices in terms of consumption or 
reception, but also in terms of production or directed production for a specific consumption 
(Crasnaes, 1981). The press, according to Gramsci, "is one of the most dynamic parts of the 
ideological structure, but not the only one. Everything which influences or is able to influence 
public opinion, directly or indirectly, belongs to it" (Holub, 1992:103). Holub thus reiterates 
Gramsci's acknowledgement that there are innumerable social experiences and practices 
confirming hegemony, and suggests studying them individually, not with a view to exploring 
them all, but rather with the aim of gaining a fuller understanding of the variety of factors 
producing the state of hegemony at any given time.
2.1.2.4 H all
Hall (1980, 1983) developed the concepts of Marxist ideology and Gramsci's hegemony, using 
the mass media as his primary point of departure. It is Hall's shift of focus towards a discussion of 
the ideological based largely around the mass media and their relationship with the public that 
makes his work particularly appropriate to the current study.
Before he begins to talk about the communication of ideologies, Hall defines the term for his 
purposes. "We talk of ideologies, usually in the social sciences, for example, when we're talking
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about well-established, fairly coherent or systematic bodies of thought. Usually, bodies of thought 
which have a political character" (Hall, 1983:23).
For Hall, whenever one says "of course", one is operating within an ideological kernel of a 
framework. "It is these frameworks of interpretation and understanding which I mean when I use 
the word 'ideologies'" (ibid.:24). Hall uses 'ideologies', the plural, because he believes that in the 
real, 'functioning' world, it is almost impossible for one ideology to operate independently. His 
explanation of what is ideological looks at how particular sections of social life 'work' and how 
they affect one's account of their social world. Ideologies then, have a sense of logical plausibility 
about them, because they are how one makes sense of their social surroundings. One's position in 
the world is meaningless if not for one's ideological perspectives. There is an element of consent 
in this conception of ideology that is not unlike Gramsci's hegemony. Hall (1983) believes that 
the particular sense of the ideological appropriate to an individual or class is never inevitable: it 
can only be defined in an historical context, and is necessarily the site of continual struggle and 
renewal.
Having established a theoretical environment for his work, Hall discusses how these 'ways of 
making sense of the world' are encoded in our everyday lives. When one watches television, 
listens to radio or reads a newspaper, and understands what is being communicated "you not only 
understand and share the language in a literal sense but you understand and share the frameworks 
of interpretation which the person who wrote or made the program established. You are able to 
understand the account this offers to the world you live in because, to some extent, your 
frameworks are similar" (Hall, 1983:26).
One may not have to agree with what is being broadcast. An individual's ideologies provide 
frameworks wide enough in which to disagree or to make exceptions within them (Hall, 1980).
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Either agreement or disagreement serves to reinforce an individual's sense of place in her/his 
social world.
Hall, like Marx, is interested in the relationship between ideology and class. "The notion of a 
dominant ideology and a dominant class is intended to explain something ... They are intended to 
explain what is a common sense understanding ... [T]he ways in which people choose to act are, 
to some degree, determined by the frameworks of understanding which they have" (Hall, 
1983:31).
Hall (1983) sees the sphere in which the media function as principally an ideological one. Much 
of what one knows about the world, one leams through the mass media. While they appear to 
reflect reality, the media can, in actuality, be seen to construct it (Eysenck, 1994). "The media 
provide access to expressions and experiences which open up the local living environment to the 
outside world" (Fomas et al., 1995:256). Identity development then occurs in relation to this -  
either conforming or otherwise. Bourdieu's 'habitus', discussed in chapter 3, explores the 
multiplicity of contexts, ideological by Hall's definition, within which identity is created.
The way that knowledge is structured, packaged, shaped, selected and presented, offers particular 
definitions and interpretations of the world and it leaves out a vast number of alternative 
definitions and interpretations.
Mass media are the most developed form in which interpretations and frameworks for definitions, 
or the 'borders of argument', are produced - one does not feel for what one does not know. It is 
through the mass media that decisions are made concerning how people think about their world. 
These frameworks are produced, generated, distributed throughout society and transformed.
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Those with influence over what the media broadcast will, then, define the frameworks in which 
ideologies are consumed.
2.1.2.5 Hartley
Holub (above) stresses that in the interests of objectivity, ideologies should be discussed in terms 
of what is, as opposed to what should or could be. Hartley (1982) however, who like Hall is 
primarily a communications theorist, is concerned that 'what is' is itself difficult to discern. 
Agreeing with Hall that the mass media work to create reality, not just reflect it, Hartley 
concentrates on what the mass media -  especially television -  present as real.
Hartley (1982) sees ideologies as forces that reduce the potential antagonism resulting from the 
unequal divisions of labour and capital. He suggests that the supposed 'due impartiality', and 
'relative autonomy' of the media, far from making them ideologically inert "are the necessary 
conditions for the production of dominant ideological meanings" (Hartley, 1982:55). The 'climate 
of opinion', as Hartley puts it, is contributed to by media output. Opinion about social position or 
class must exist, as these classes must also exist. And these classes exist, in actuality if not in 
name, because imbalances, or unequal relationships are unavoidable in a consumer society 
(Slater, 1997).
Hartley (1982) sees a neutralisation of the inequalities between work and capital. Wages lessen 
the tendency for the individual to see these unequal relationships as antagonistic, or exploitative. 
Thus the relatively powerless (working classes) consent to their position.
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2.1.3 Hegemony and consent
American media analyses of the 1940s and 1950s typically belong to the 'effects' school, which 
attempted to establish the measurable impact of the media of mass communication on 
socialisation. In general, this research concluded that the media are relatively harmless, 
reinforcing the norms and values held by a pluralist society. "The rediscovery of ideology in 
media studies, however, has reintroduced a notion of power and more critically addressed the 
construction of the real" (Stevenson, 1995:37).
Consent implies acknowledgement of the social forces shaping identity. In the case of youth and 
media, this consent comes in the form of a sense of 'ownership' of certain media and peer-group 
or sub-cultural habits of involvement with different aspects of the media. Crucial to the current 
research will be an investigation into its subjects' attitudes towards the trans-national media forces 
defining the limits of their social space.
An important part of the definition of ideologies (particularly since Althusser) is that "they 
provide frameworks wide enough in which to disagree or to make exceptions within them" (Hall, 
1983:26). However, if an individual chooses to continue listening, watching or reading, the mass 
media consumer is consenting to being subject to the accompanying ideological communication.
As Hall points out, the dominant definitions "are hegemonic precisely because they represent 
definitions of situations which are 'in dominance' " (Hall, 1980:137). In this sense it would seem 
that the mass media are behaving as would be expected of Althusser's (1971) Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs) - serving to ensure the ideological dominance of the ruling class. Schudson 
(1993) describes news in particular as a cultural product which has the effect of arming a 
population to be vigilant citizens, in their social place, to serve society and those of a higher
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social standing. These 'citizens of the media' feel they have won their position instead of being 
prescribed it.
Hegemony, says Hartley (1982:58), is the process of winning consent. "The exercise of power in 
the interests of those who 'rule'... is achieved not by direct coercion ... but routinely by seeking to 
win the consent of subordinate and powerless groups". Dominance is not justified by reference to 
power, "rather it is justified by appeals to the apparently neutral and all-inclusive authority of 
government, law and ideology which 'represent' the general public and the nation" (ibid.:58). 
Consent is won by taking the ways and conditions under which people live their lives, and 
representing these in ways that make sense in a hegemonic context.
As it does for Gramsci, hegemony for Hartley (1982) acts to make people subscribe to their 
position of powerlessness. Differences between hegemonic levels and acceptance of these are 
produced and reproduced in 'the cultural sphere', and emerge as differences in taste, competence, 
status and personal preference.
It is important that these differences are seen by the people involved as 'natural distinctions', 
rather than constructs defining and enforcing social relations. Hartley's position is that especially 
what is broadcast as ordinary or normal contributes to the climate of opinion and to the process of 
marking the limits of acceptable thought and action. Along these lines, patterns of young Irish 
people's sense of taste and media use would be expected to reflect differences in hegemonic 
levels, between groups of youth and between youth and other sectors of society.
What is deemed as acceptable to broadcast by media institutions is assessed by reference to 
public 'interest'. The fact that this interest coincides with the interests of the dominant economic 
and political forces is a reflection of their power (Hartley, 1982).
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The second part of this chapter discusses how globalisation or 'cultural imperialist' theory is often 
viewed as appearing dominated by US interests, because so much of the appropriate capital is 
located in the USA. It is possible, however, to conceptualise the globalisation process as being 
removed from reliance on, or allegiance to, any culture or group of cultures and evolving in 
response to the myriad of market, national and technological forces. Similarly, the hegemonic 
implications of deciding to experience a mass media product do not imply that the viewer is 
submitting to an organisation's ideologies. Rather, the frameworks within which one constructs 
one's 'life-world' are altered by the processes of experiencing the cultural product. Whether one 
agrees, disagrees or even noticeably interacts with the ideological content of the product is 
another matter entirely.
That mass media messages are a contributing factor in the acquisition of knowledge is 
unavoidable. So too is it inevitable that what is presented acts to define, for many topics, the 
limits of public argument - one can only contest on the basis of one's knowledge. Cultural values 
determine what makes a mass mediated cultural production, but equally this production helps to 
create cultural values. In other words there is a two-way system of ideological communication.
The mass media form the main ideological institution of contemporary capitalism, providing the 
communication system by which the manufacture of consensus is possible, and the frameworks of 
identity formation are created (Anderson and Miles, 1999; Corcoran, 1998). Thus, it is these 
media that the current work will concentrate on when discussing the formation of Irish youth 
culture's identity.
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2.1.4 Definition of ideology for the study of globalisation and Irish youth culture
Meyers (1992:85) suggests that "ideologies are represented, perceived and realized as 
components, rather than in their entirety. The notion of a dominant or oppositional ideology is 
thus idealized existing only as reified endpoints on a continuum". This compositional view of 
ideology would suggest that change occurs as a result of the composition of the existent or 
prevailing ideology being challenged and replaced, subverting in some way the present 
compositional ideology and replacing it in part with a slightly altered version.
Along these lines, the current work's definition of ideology shall be close to Hartley's and Hall's. 
Ideologies will be those bodies o f thought which serve to position and reify one’s social place. 
For the current work, ideologies determine the composition of the climate of opinion in a social 
context. In discussions about cultural imperialism, youth, consenting to an identity and the 
globalised mass media, ideologies will refer to those modes of social thought which help to set up 
and maintain a state of hegemony by promoting consent and acceptance of social knowledges and 
cultural values.
2.1.5 M ed ia , lan g u ag e  a n d  ideology
"The experience of unmediated reality is symbolically constructed through language" 
(Stevenson, 1995:38).
The body of writing about the power of language in establishing and maintaining class divisions 
and placing people within them is substantial (eg. Burke, 1945; Foucault, 1986; Crowley, 1987). 
Decisions about linguistic choices and style of the delivery of a mass mediated cultural product 
contribute to Hartley's (1982) 'cultural sphere'. If, for example a radio station was targeting a
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youthful audience, its product would contain more examples of the language use and preferences 
of this group. James (1995) asserts that and many groups of young people do have a distinct 
'language use', so the station would have to decide which parts of'youth' language it should adopt.
The methods used to communicate thoughts delimit ideological argument. That is to say that one 
cannot argue in words or manners of speech which are not recognised by society. Similarly, 
describing a person's identity, such as this work is attempting to do, must be done in language, 
which will always be inadequate. One's ideological formation or identity is a composite of 
countless forces that cannot be accurately described using language.
The consent seen as so important to the maintenance of a hegemonic state is procured by the 
'powerless' listener having the choice of tuning into whichever station they want to. A person can 
either subject themselves to what Jalbert (1983) calls a mass media institution's 'ideology-as- 
presented', or not consume (listen to/watch/read) that institution's product.
Commercial media institutions must, to remain viable, produce a profit. They must have a certain 
attraction to potential advertisers. To achieve this they must have a working perception of their 
audience. The delivery of ideologically encoded messages, or establishment of hegemonic levels, 
which may be unavoidable in any communication, are perhaps multiplied by the institutionalised 
style of delivery. Even non-commercial media producers must justify their programming 
decisions to the government or a public funding board. These institutions must, then, also have a 
target audience and justify their content in relation to this audience (Tiffen, 1989).
The mass media are, in many ways, analogous with language -  they are social tools of 
information delivery. Thus, much of what can be said about language and ideology can be also 
said about media with its 'language' of pictures, sounds and texts which are expressed through
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television screens, computer monitors and magazine covers. The current study is concerned with 
the media being a vehicle for delivery of ideologically encoded information, much the way that 
language is, although a few writers contest the notion that there is any reason to believe that the 
media are a site of ideological struggle (such as Keiran, 1997).
When talking of the connection between language (or media) use and the maintenance of social 
divisions there is often a sense of a dominating power enforcing a mode of thought on the masses 
(for example the enforcement of the use of the English language in Ireland and other countries 
well into the 20th century). The current study is not concerned with whether any of these things 
are 'good' or 'bad', or whether or not the class system and the ideologies are in the public interest. 
Instead it will investigate the effects of contemporary forces in shaping the life-world of Irish 
youth, to understand the construction of their social space. This does not involve passing 
judgement on the relative worth of these forces.
2.1.5.1 Creating a context
"Meaning does not depend on how things are but more on how they are signified" (Stevenson, 
1995:39).
Media organisations create a context for the delivery of ideologically encoded cultural product. 
Although this work is not specifically concerned with studying them, news broadcasts are useful 
for exemplifying the ideological impact of the mass media, as they are presented as delivering 
'fact' as opposed to simply entertainment. Although young people are not typically associated 
with news broadcasts, Buckingham (1996) believes that assumptions that young people rarely 
watch, or are unlikely to understand them, should be questioned. Buckingham (ibid.) cites a
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number of young people in the age range under investigation in the current study (15-17 year 
olds) who obviously engage with, and are ideologically influenced by, news broadcasts.
In news media, there is a tendency for media organisations to use language that lends to an 
appropriation of a 'neutral stance' -  as a neutral third party 'simply reflecting reality'. This works 
ideologically to make the organisation appear 'above the fray' (Lemke, 1984). It seems as if they 
are presenting hard facts' rather than commenting on a reporter's often second- or third- hand 
account. At the start of almost every news service for example, the announcer states that what is 
being presented is the station's news, for example; 'XX FM news, sport and weather', 'YY FM 
news', 'From the world-wide resources of CNN, this is channel ZZ news'. Through doing this the 
station establishes a context from within which decoding of the message must take place. Hence 
there exists the opportunity to establish a hegemonic position for the organisation, and those 
decoding what it broadcasts.
Media organisations must broadcast messages 'encoded' by the rules of language and the physical 
processes of creating the media product. These processes are influenced by a number of factors, 
from international broadcast law, to the corporate goals of the organisation. Messages must be 
'decoded' upon reception. It is this encoding and decoding that allows the opportunity for, and 
indeed makes unavoidable, the communication of not only obvious 'denotative' meaning, but the 
'connotative' truths of the culture that the message was created in (Hall, 1980). It is the set of 
decoded connotative meanings that serve to communicate the societal relevance of the cultural 
production of mass media.
Hall (1980, cited Stevenson, 1995:78) "argues that there is a basic distinction between the social 
processes that encode and decode media texts. Cultural forms can be said to be encoded through a 
specific historical mix of institutional relation, professional norms and technical equipment. The
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decoding strategies employed by the audience are similarly dependant upon social structural 
relations, political and cultural dispositions and access to the relevant technology".
2.1.5.2 C re a tin g  consensus
Hall (1977) has argued that mass media news works ideologically to create a consensus that 
appears to be grounded in reality or common sense. "[T]he 'preferred reading' of a text, produced 
by codes through language represents the dominant meaning that is the basis of popular 
consensus" (Meyers, 1992:77). The creation and adherence to this consensus acts to legitimise 
any ideologies presented as societal norms.
Corcoran (1984) suggests that ideology implies a process of 'compensatory exchange' whereby 
the media consumer is offered specific gratification for consenting to their hegemonic position. 
By establishing a consensus based around the 'least objectionable programming' (LOP as 
described below), audience members' feelings of expectation and satisfaction are focused on 
familiar offerings. This overuse of unchallenging material is seen by many policymakers as 
harmful to audiences. As they are being given a larger choice of which media to consume, more 
people are tending to choose that which is 'uneducational', unchallenging and 'unstimulating'. In 
turn there is a tendency for media organisations seeking to capture this audience to produce the 
unstimulating content which has been shown to generate a large audience share (Brown, 1978; 
Webster and Phalen, 1994).
The creation of this consensus and its consequences are evidence of the decoding of the cultural 
product being not just an individual act, but one in which socially structured meanings will also 
be created. The consensus influences societal norms among those who 'stay tuned'. That is to say 
the decision about whether or not to tune out from a broadcast is evidence of the ideological
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representations a person subscribes to. Ideologies can, in this sense, be seen as imposing 
themselves as socialised structures and in the individual's unconscious acceptance of these (Heck, 
1980).
The social structures of consensus and the aggregate of individual choices and consensus will 
create a climate of opinion whereby dominant or prevailing ideas or conditions will emerge. In 
the main, the dominant ideas will help to create a consensus, defining and securing the position of 
individuals in relation to their social position or class. The state of hegemony and thus the 
position of any elite class will likewise be defined and secured as imbalances or unequal 
relationships are unavoidable in a consumer society (Hall, 1980, 1983; Hartley, 1982).
As the spending power of young people has increased over recent times, they have become an 
important group in the hegemonic structure of capitalist trans-national media corporations and 
can, in many respects be seen as a distinct 'powerless' class who consent to their position as does 
any other class according to Althusser's hegemonic model.
2.1.5.3 Opportunities for resistance
Jalbert (1983:282), sees media organisations as embodying "certain devices which enable us to 
see just what ideology-as-presented involves". These devices, he continues, in situating the 
broadcaster and the media consumer "not only serve to reify the people in power, but they also 
serve to mystify the power relationships" (ibid.:290). The degree to which the consumer can 
affect the hegemonic structure of mass media communication and thus their ideological position 
is a subject of ongoing academic debate.
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Fiske (1989a, 1989b, 1998), drawing on the work of Hall, argues strongly for a 'bottom up' view 
of cultural hegemony. He asserts that the audience, or receiver of the cultural product, not only 
'decodes' the mass media message as appropriate to her/himself, but also ultimately controls the 
ideological impact of the message.
Fiske (1989b) is critical of examinations of culture that focus on the dominating influence of 
capitalism in reifying existing hegemonic structures. He suggests that all media consumers, 
including the relatively powerless, or subordinated groups, appropriate the cultural resources 
available to them in a way which affords them more power, and that this personalised decoding is 
ultimately a determining influence on the make-up of the cultural product. A youth orientated 
radio station, for example, would build up a relationship with its listeners, and that as the 
ideological outlook or cultural space (or habitus -  as described in chapter 3) occupied by this 
target audience changed, there would necessarily be an impact on the programming of the station 
if it were to remain to be viable. The ideology of the target audience might change for a variety of 
reasons; as young people age, their interests might change, or a new generation of young people, 
with different experiences might be included the station's target age demographic.
Thus, Fiske (1989b) distinguishes between what he sees a less productive 'radical' method of 
theorising about cultural practice and the 'progressive' thesis, which he adopts himself. For Fiske, 
proponents of the more traditional 'radical' method of social enquiry fail to comprehend the 
possibilities for oppositional readings of a cultural text by the receiver or the variety of possible 
oppositional practices that can be employed by the media consumer. These practices can 
undermine or limit the power of the dominating groups, though they need not challenge them 
directly.
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The popular, according to Fiske's (1989b) 'progressive' model, has the potential to challenge the 
dominant consumerist ideologies of the mass media. While this potential may not always be 
fulfilled, for Fiske, individuals produce meanings according to a personal agenda, not a corporate 
one. Thus he believes dominant ideologies of a culture are ultimately reliant on the progressive 
forces of those often considered less powerful: the consumer. "Culture is the constant process of 
producing meanings of and from our social experience, and such meanings necessarily produce a 
social identity for the people involved" (Fiske, 1989a: 1).
Fiske (1998:195) reiterates the ideological power of the individual over the 'elite', contending that 
"[m]eaning is as much a site of struggle as is economics or party politics, and television attempts 
(but fails) to control its meaning in the same way that social authority attempts (but fails) to stifle 
voices and strategies of opposition. It is the polysemic of television that makes the struggle for 
meaning possible and its popularity in class structured society that makes it necessary".
Ang's (1985) work supports Fiske's assertion that mass media product is polysemic, and that the 
variety of meanings which may be decoded by the receiver of the message is dependent on the 
individual's existing cultural experiences.
2.1.5.3.1 C ritic ism s o f F isk e 's  'p ro g re ss iv e ' m odel
Fiske's 'progressive' model has a number of critics. Turner (1990) cites Fiske as an example of 
one of a number of writers within cultural studies who have taken the 'bottom-up' thesis against 
hegemonic dominance too far. Seeing Fiske as giving the individual's pursuit of 'pleasure' an 
untenable position removed from ideological domination, Turner (1990:221) claims that "it is 
important to acknowledge that the pleasure of popular culture cannot lie outside hegemonic
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ideological formations; pleasure must be implicated in the ways in which hegemony is secured 
and maintained."
More strongly, Curran et al. (1996, cited Chandler, 2000a) criticise Fiske's work as "the prime 
example of the 'regrettable' 'inanity' of cultural studies' 'uncritical (or 'pointless') populism' in 
celebrating 'rituals of resistance' which are ... 'no more than over-romanticized celebrations of an 
illusory form of consumer sovereignty'
Stevenson (1995:94-95) argues that the writing of Fiske is "irredeemably flawed" citing, among 
other faults, that Fiske pays insufficient attention to the institutions that structure the reception of 
symbolic forms. Stevenson (1995), as detailed in the second half of this chapter, believes that the 
power of institutions to define the limits of ideological argument cannot be ignored. He accuses 
Fiske of doing just that. Stevenson also believes that Fiske forecloses on the theory of ideology, 
which although it has faults, remains extremely relevant in mass media debate. "More 
interpretatively sensitive investigations should both open out the space for the responses of the 
audience, while positioning them within unequal social relations. This is precisely what Fiske 
fails to do" (Stevenson, 1995:101).
"[T]he codes that represent the real are gathered from a limited field of dominant discourses 
drawing on a restricted range of social explanations. The preferred codes achieve their affect by 
appearing to be natural" (Stevenson, 1995:38). Gans (1979) believes that those with economic or 
political influence over the mass media are influential in the development of the frameworks in 
which personal thought/argument/ideology is created. In countries with strong economic or social 
links with the Western capitalist ideologies this manifests itself as what Gans (ibid.) calls the 
'unquestioned values' of ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, 
individualism and moderatism.
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2.1.6 Summary of ideology
Through looking at how historical and contemporary theorists have used the term, ideology was 
defined for the purposes of the current work as "those bodies of thought which serve to position 
and reify one's social place". The mass media were described as providing an arena for the 
creation and reification of hegemonic class structures and the opportunity for feelings of 
opposition to the dominant institutionalised ideologies.
As the above discussion about the validity of Fiske's 'progressive' theory of ideological decoding 
highlights, there is an argument among cultural theorists, centred around the degree to which the 
individual receiver of the mass mediated cultural message can negotiate their hegemonic position 
and contest the dominant capitalist ideology of Western late modernity. The current study will not 
attempt to definitively answer this debate. Instead, it will concentrate on establishing if there is 
empirical evidence of a link between the 'modes of thought' of the (young Irish) individual and 
her/his media use. The study will recognise that even if such a link was to be found there are 
many schools of thought regarding the extent to which the nature of the ideological decoding of 
such cultural events is regulated by the individual, their social circle and/or the capitalist driven 
ideologies of globalised media institutions.
The next section expands on the theme of institutional ideologies, exploring the consequences of 
the globalisation of the mass media sphere.
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2.2 Globalisation
2.2.1 In tro d u c tio n  to  g lo b a lisa tion
This section focuses on the academic debate about the effects (ideological or otherwise) of the 
increasingly globalised mass media cultural sphere. After briefly discussing the history of 
globalising forces in general, key issues in the various arguments about the effect of the US led 
dominance of broadcast media production are highlighted, both in terms of actual content and the 
'style of delivery' of indigenous productions.
2.2.2 H is to ry  o f  g lo b a lisa tion
'Globalisation' has been variously used in recent years across government, media, business and 
academia to refer to the growing internationalisation of economic and cultural spheres. 
"Globalisation refers essentially to that stretching process, in so far as the modes of connection 
between different social contexts or regions become networked across the Earth's surface as a 
whole" (Giddens, 1990:64). The major contemporary change in globalisation is the recent 
acceleration of the processes involved in the elimination of traditional barriers to communication.
Historically, as people developed the means to travel between cultures, so too ideas, values and 
ideologies travelled with them. In the wake of establishing intercultural communication, the 
prevailing thoughts and customs of all groups involved (be they conquerors, vanquished or 
neither of these) are challenged and adapted, the 'fittest' set of ideas surviving. This could well 
mean a number of diametrically opposed systems of thought existed side by side, but each would 
now exist in the context of the other.
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The spread of Christianity from Europe to much of the rest of the world through various Christian 
missions is an obvious example of such interaction and adaptation. With the arrival of 
missionaries and their ideological 'baggage', local ways of thinking would exist in the context of a 
more global perspective, regardless of whether the missionaries' ideologies were adopted.
As with the dominant theories of biological evolution, the evolution of the globalisation process 
has been neither linear nor consistent. The progress of globalisation has typically paralleled 
advances in communications, military and/or transportation technology, effectively bridging the 
physical gap between cultures. The advent of the Spanish caravel in the 16th century made 
possible the 'Conquest' of Latin America. In the years that followed this there was an 
unprecedented flow of ideologies and modes of thought (albeit mostly one way, motivated by the 
desire for wealth and enforced by military force); a giant leap of globalisation, if by means 
abhorrent by contemporary standards (Parekh, 1997).
Just as the caravel had done hundreds of years before, new travel and communication 
technologies in the 20th century (especially in the last 50 years) worked to redefine cultural 
barriers. People and ideas moved across barriers that were, until the advent of these technologies, 
impassable. At the start of the century it would have taken (for most Western people) one's life 
savings or more and many months to travel around the world. It has now become possible for 
more and more people to do this, and at a much faster rate. Similarly a letter would have taken 
many months to travel from one part of the world to another. Such information can now be 
transmitted instantly via the Internet.
Imperialist nation-states are often seen historically, as being insensitive to other cultures, 
sometimes to the point of cultural (if not literal) genocide of relatively powerless cultures in 
favour of dominant, powerful ones. It is a dangerous extrapolation to suggest that the current
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trend toward trans-national corporations' (TNCs') control of the mass communication sphere will 
lead to cultural genocide. There are many who say that it is allowing for the opposite, giving 
people the opportunity for a myriad of cultures to co-exist and interact without the restriction of 
physical distance (these arguments are discussed below). Those fearful of TNC control of the 
cultural sphere could point out however, that previous technological domination was well 
meaning and had the support of the ruling elite. It is poignant to make such historical 
comparisons, if only to re-assure oneself that things are indeed different now from when 
prevailing thought supported the destruction of cultures despite stated principles of equality of all 
and denouncing violence (Parekh, 1997).
Giddens (1990) suggests four pervasive dimensions of globalisation -  the world capitalist 
economy, the nation-state system, the international division of labour and world military order. 
This work, while acknowledging the historical significance of all of these, deals primarily with 
the first two in a contemporary context.
Historically, nation-states have been the principal 'actors' within the global political order. 
Recently however, TNCs have become increasingly dominant within the world economy. It is 
possible to draw parallels between the effects of the declared aims of TNCs and the imperialist 
nations states whom they can be seen as replacing as the principle actors in the globalised 
economy of late modernity.
The impact of the intensification of world-wide social relations in terms of nation states, TNCs 
and global mass-communication on the sociological framework of the individual is the focus of 
the current study. Young Irish people have a social environment created of friends, family and 
other social institutions, each of which is intrinsically involved with the globalised 
communicative realities of the late modem world. The local transformation of peer- and sub-
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cultural groupings is as much a part of globalisation as the increased internationalisation of 
nation-states and TNCs (Giddens, 1990).
2.2.3 G lo b a lisa tio n  a n d  c u ltu ra l  im p eria lism
The effects of the increased globalisation of large trans-national media corporations have been 
debated for more than 30 years. In his seminal work Mass Communication: an American Empire, 
Schiller (1969, cited Thussu, 1998) introduced the concept of media imperialism to sociological 
debate. Schiller voiced a concern that because of the high proportion of US owned capital and 
product, especially in the Anglophone geo-linguistic region, trans-national media corporations 
were imposing certain ideologies on much of the rest of the world. Ireland, with no language 
barrier, a relatively small media industry and strong historical links with the US and UK is an 
example of a country Schiller (1998b:2) would cite as susceptible as "American pop-culture 
sweeps the world".
As detailed below, there are three main criticisms of Schiller's work; definition, over­
simplification and evidence. Cultural imperialism is difficult to define for academic debate as 
there are many perspectives and assumptions about what the term itself means. Also, many 
writers (eg. Ferguson, 1992; Liebes and Katz, 1993) argue that Schiller's writing is overly 
simplistic, ignoring individual and cultural differences in the reception of the media product. 
Finally there is concern about a lack of evidence to support Schiller's theories.
The following description of the cultural imperialist debate serves to define the current work's 
position in relation to the concept. In short, as Schiller (1998a) in his later work stresses, he 
agrees with many of the criticisms levelled against his thesis, but despite any shortcomings in it, 
Schiller insists that there must be a significant social effect of such a high percentage of the
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Anglophone mass mediated cultural product being created by a small number of companies, with 
similar production methods and similar capitalistic goals. It is not just the export of cultural 
product, but also the methods of creating mass mediated cultural product which have been 
globalised and thus have an effect of the socialisation of the consumer (Herman and McChesney,
1997). The current study comes from a similar view - that there must be a significant effect of the 
globalisation of media product and production methods on the socialisation of Irish youth as 
"[f]or most people it is the media (and not especially schooling, work or family upbringing) 
which is used to understand and rationalise their position in, and experience of, the social world" 
(Hall, 1983:6).
2.2.3.1 T h e  c u ltu ra l im p e ria lism  d eb a te
"[Capitalists control the media and they do so to maximize profits" (McChesney, cited Peterson,
1997).
Before discussing how this debate has evolved, it is pertinent to contextualise the arena in which 
it takes place. As stated above, the end of the 20th century saw the emergence of trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) with capital infrastructure and the accompanying social impact previously 
only present in nation states (Thompson, 1997). National governments and international 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) can be seen to work increasingly in the interest of global capitalism (Herman, cited 
Peterson, 1997). Schiller (1998a:18) believes that the increased interest (in terms of both attention 
and capital) and global ascendance of TNCs has impacted on the authority of nation states to the 
extent that a "free flow of communication doctrine which has, more than once been used to 
undermine national sovereignty".
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Since the consolidation of Hollywood studios' power in the 1920s and the subsequent domination 
of the English speaking world's film industry, there has been concern about the US control of so 
much of the western world's mass-media production (Brown, 2000). hi 1998, for example, in the 
relatively capital-rich UK although 103 films were produced, the 195 US imports commanded 
82% of ticket sales, which is in fact down on the 91-93% of the early 90s (Boyd-Barrett, 
1998:160; Eurostat, 2001).
There is also a US led, Anglophone domination of the computer and Internet markets. In 1998, 
96% of Internet sites were located in the 27 OECD nations area with English as its primary 
language. Global manufacture of personal computers is almost entirely in the hands of one 
corporation -  Microsoft -  the world's fourth largest corporation in 1998, while the production of 
computer chips is largely controlled by Intel -  the world's seventh largest corporation in 1998 
(Boyd-Barrett, 1998).
With the late modem acceleration in technological advances in communications and the ever- 
increasing control of this by fewer and more powerful, mainly US based companies, there have 
been fears of an emergence of "a worldwide standardized homogenized' consumer culture, 
emanating from western (particularly American) capitalism ... [representing] a form of global 
regulation" (Thompson, 1997:5).
2.2.3.2 T h e  g lobal in fluence  o f  T N C s
Schiller (1998b) and Thompson (1997) voice an academic and political concern that public post, 
telephone and telecommunications entities are being eroded, replaced by private multi-national 
enterprises. Habermas (cited Stevenson, 1997:66) argues that the public sphere has become 're­
feudalised' or 'colonised' by private enterprise. Matters which would have previously defined by
36
public institutions are 'stage-managed' according to a capitalistic agenda. Through growth in 
capital and technological advances, large media corporations can be seen to have unheralded 
access to the living rooms of the public. This, according to Schiller (1998b), weakens the 
influence of local leadership, and increases national and global instability.
Further, Thussu (1998:3) believes that TNCs have moved economies beyond the authority of the 
state to 'superstate' bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organisation. "The policies enunciated by such organisations, especially the World Bank 
often in alliance with the TNCs have eroded the economic powers of the states, particularly in the 
southern hemisphere."
George and Sabelli (1994, cited Thussu, 1998:3) argue that being removed from the nation-state 
has assisted in making the World Bank into a 'secular empire' which, through its influence in the 
creation of the environment in which multi-national media corporations must work, has managed 
to make its own view of the world the norm. "Its real success has been not so much economic ... 
as cultural [and] ideological" (Thussu, 1998:3).
The now defunct UN Center on Transnational Corporations, designed to ensure consistencies in 
international trade had its role description changed in 1992 to "strengthen the move to market 
forces" (Schiller, 1998b:9). It is this level of impact of transnational corporations which Schiller 
is concerned with when he talks of cultural imperialism. Schiller (1998b) argues that, despite the 
flaws in his cultural imperialist model (which are discussed below), the fact that the 'watchdog' 
charged with ensuring multi-national trading practices are kept in check is essentially toothless, 
must impact on the social frameworks defined by trans-national media corporations. Further, 
Herman (cited Peterson, 1997) believes that " [a]s global capital has strengthened, more and more
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institutions are bent to serve its interests, and an organisation like the WTO ... is explicitly 
designed to serve the needs of global capital."
Some countries, notably Canada and France, have expressed concern at culture being regarded as 
merchandise, subject to de-regulation on an international (EU/GATT/WTO) level. "Contestation 
over the regulation of culture includes struggles over meanings and interpretations as in debates 
about what constitutes national heritage" (Thompson, 1997:1).
2.2.3.3 T h e  US a n d  c u ltu ra l  im p e ria lism
Central to cultural imperialist theory is the thinking that with cultural production being driven 
primarily by market forces there is an unavoidable effect on what is produced and how it is 
consumed. A Marxist perspective would assume that the underlying capitalist nature of the 
environment dominated by the trans-national media corporations would work to commodify 
labour power in class relations and separate the working class from controlling the (cultural) 
production (Giddens, 1990).
Schiller's (1998b) view of media globalisation is based on what he sees as stateless businesses 
undercutting local decisions made throughout the world where information and communication 
technologies provide the instrumentation for world-wide businesses to market their 'media- 
cultural' product. Schiller (ibid.) continues that in controlling the capital used for information 
transferal, TNCs are attempting to command and rationalise economic activity and extend the 
reach of corporate marketing to every comer of the earth. Thompson (1997) calls this process, by 
which the media are increasingly and significantly organised to mediate the transmission of 
symbolic forms, the 'mediazation of society'.
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Schiller (1998b) cites Wriston (1992), the ex-CEO of the global bank Citicorp, as seeing no 
distinction between the networks of news, money and data in 1992. "Global notions of what 
constitute freedom, individual choice, a good life, and a desirable future come largely from these 
forces" (Wriston, 1992, cited Schiller, 1998b:4). The trend, says Schiller (ibid.), is towards a 
reduced and more TNC controlled national cultural product, leading towards a more normalised 
cultural output.
Schiller (1998b) stresses that it is not just the media product itself, but also the professional 
practiccs producing media product that are becoming increasingly globalised, even if 
organisations are competing locally. In addition to its direct ideological influence, the legacy of 
the USA in world TV and radio production is substantial. In the creation of indigenous stations 
and programming it is usually the US model which is used (Shoemaker et al., 1991; Cunningham 
et al., 1998). For example an Irish youth oriented radio station would be expected to adopt the 
successful 'formula' of youth stations internationally. Globalised professional practices are 
discussed in more detail below.
The US dominance of global coverage of the 1990 Gulf War exemplified the arguments for the 
homogenisation of globalised media. Schiller (1998b) talks about the 'chilling signal' of how 
orchestrated and concentrated information supply had become, "though press interpretation of the 
war may have varied from country to country, the vivid broadcast images of ... combat were 
identical worldwide" (Schiller, 1998b:3). Boyd-Barrett (1998:168) cautions that with so little 
variation or contestation in the points of view presented in the global media "in an age of 
democracy we have media tyranny".
Schiller's basic American cultural-imperialist premise is based on the following assumptions 
(Thussu, 1998; Schiller, 1989, 1991, 1998a, 1998b; Thompson, 1995):
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• The commercialised US model of broadcasting exemplifies the way in which 
communications media globally have commercial interests determining their programming 
structure.
• There is a concentration of capital and an increasing privatisation of the communications 
industries under a neo-liberal ideology. "[I]n the late 1990s ... [there was] a strong insistence, 
in governing, and academic circles, that the market is the solution to all problems" (Schiller, 
1998a: 18)
• The successful globalised model of fewer, larger controlling interests has served as a 
blueprint for media systems throughout much of the world. For example English language 
press ownership, while largely 'local', is heavily influenced by a small number of capitalist 
concerns such as Murdoch (USA, UK, Australia, Ireland), O'Reilly (South Africa) and Black 
(Canada) (Boyd-Barrett, 1998). The total number of media agencies has decreased.
• The dependence on American communications technology and investment, coupled with the 
new demand for TV programmes and the sheer cost of domestic production, have created 
enormous pressures for the development of commercial broadcasting systems which rely on 
American programming or copying American production practices.
2 .2 .3 A  C ritic ism s o f  S ch ille r a n d  c u ltu ra l  im p e ria lis t th e o ry
There are a number of criticisms of Schiller's model of US cultural imperialism (for example 
Ferguson, 1992; Thompson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1997; Cunningham et al., 1998). Before discussing 
these, it is important to reiterate that Schiller (1998b) himself emphasises that his thesis is far 
from perfect and that a number of his critics (eg. Tomlinson, 1997) agree that Schiller's basic 
cultural imperialist premise cannot be ignored, despite the shortcomings it might have.
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2.2.3.4.1 Over-simplification
C ritic ism  o f  S ch iller
Schiller is perhaps subject to most criticism for over-simplifying the complex realities of 
reception analysis and the late modem world in general. Schiller's (1998b) assumption, that US 
patterns of commercial hegemony are likely to gradually be extended over the entire globe, seems 
tenuous. Giodamo (1998) criticises Schiller (1989) for making "many general sweeping 
statements, giving a few supportive examples but without a lot of detail."
Schiller is also accused of ignoring findings that have shown that audiences engage the media in 
different ways (Thompson, 1995). Davis and Mares (1998), Liebes and Katz (1993) and Fiske
(1998) have argued that for young people, non-Westem (Israeli) cultures, and in general 
(respectively) reception of the mass media cultural product is an individual concern that involves 
a complex social and cultural dialogue with the material. "In short, Schiller's argument ignores 
the hermeneutic process of appropriation which is an essential part of the circulation of symbolic 
forms (including media products)" (Tomlinson, 1997:158). Ferguson (1992) believes that a 
fundamental flaw in Schiller's method is that he assumes that US based capitalistic values are 
necessarily exported and decoded with the mass mediated message.
S chiller's defence
In reviewing and updating his 1969 thesis, Schiller (1989, 1998b) makes no assumptions that any 
individual or group will necessarily interpret a mass mediated message in any particular way. The 
consumer will not automatically agree with, or accept, the image presented by the media 
organisation. Rather, the image presented will have an effect on all communities and subcultures 
where it is experienced as defining the limits of consent or resistance. Here Schiller (1998b) is not
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entering the debate about the nature of the ideological implications of globalised media (he does 
this later in the same work), he is simply saying that ideological frameworks of interpretation can 
be delimited by the capitalist mass media.
Schiller (1989) reacts against criticisms of the active audience theorists (or 'new revisionists'). He 
feels that it his critics who are simplistic and reductionist, equating individual interpretations of 
texts (which Schiller agrees exist) with an equality in power relations between media producer 
and consumer.
2 .2 .3A .2  D iv e rs ity  in  p ro g ra m m in g
C ritic ism  o f  S ch iller
Another criticism of Schiller is that he perceives globalising forces as being all-encompassing and 
malevolent, for example that "indigenous creative forces are swamped and inevitably crippled by 
the relatively cheap cultural product offered by big producers" (Schiller, 1998b: 11). The highest 
price, says Schiller (ibid.) of cultural imperialism is the loss of the idea that the underlying reason 
for cultural production is public good and social accountability. Tomlinson (1997) accuses 
Schiller of being too idealistic in these views, saying that if the mass media, and especially the 
broadcast media, were ever primarily about public good and accountability, it was in a brief 
period before commercial viability was an option. Although altruistic ideals of 'the public good' 
might not be the primary goal of mass media it is possible that they succeed in performing an 
adequate job of providing a forum for public debate and social accountability. It could be argued 
that with public access and multi-channel broadcasting, and the resources available to produce 
diverse programming, the broadcast media as a whole are fulfilling a role in this regard better 
now than ever.
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Tomlinson (1992) believes that Schiller's concentration on consumerist themes neglects the 
enormous diversity of images and representations available through the broadcast media. 
Ferguson (1992) also sees problems in Schiller's thinking which assigns satellites, multi-channel 
access, VCRs and other hardware a causal role in increasing economic interdependence and 
decreased political sovereignty. She says that there is simply no evidence of this.
S ch iller's defence
Schiller (1989) refutes the argument that the increased volume of media content equates to a 
broader range of ideologies in broadcasting. He asserts that, not only is the actual content very 
similar on stations, but that commercialism and consumerism are omnipresent and that new 
television stations, for example, have "been swallowed by the big information-cultural combines" 
(Schiller, 1989:147). "Seemingly autonomous decision makers still have to bring a profit" 
(Schiller, 1998a:25). Though not necessarily directly interventionist or manipulative, media 
produced, ostensibly for the public good, must nevertheless be fashioned to guarantee that profit.
This omnipresence of commercial thinking carries over to globalised youth programming. "[I]f 
this audience [youth] had no market power, no programming for them would have emerged" 
(Mody, 2001:5).
2.2.3.4.3 'U S  to  th e  r e s t ' v e rsu s  'C o n tra -f lo w '
C ritic ism  o f  S ch iller
There is a body of authors who comment that over the past 15 years, major communications 
systems, such as television, have been developed outside of the US and produce local product 
with a local, or regional cultural identity (Corcoran, 1998). Cunningham et al. (1998) caution 
against talking about a one-way flow from the US (or West) to the rest of the world, or indeed
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that the West must be involved in the globalisation process at all. One of countless examples is 
Hosokawa's (1999) discussion of the dynamics in the globalisation of popular music, citing an all- 
Japanese salsa band as an example of the transgression of ethnical, geographical, linguistic and 
national boundaries of Latin-American music. This is a non-west to non-west example of cultural 
globalisation.
Cunningham et al. (1998) advocate the adoption of a non-geographical view of the complex inter­
relationship of the multi-dimensional flows of television across the globe. They are concerned 
that Schiller's cultural imperialist model implies very little opportunity for local communities 
(whether geographically, electronically or geo-linguistically 'local1) to have an impact on the 
reception and ultimately the production of media product.
In arguing against the cultural imperialist model, Cunningham et al. (1998) suggest that there is a 
'contra-flow' of locally produced product. This acts to enhance local product and thus local 
culture in a globalised context. International product, continue Cunningham et al., is often only 
successful when there is no local equivalent. International styles are incorporated with a local 
flavour. "Within the anglophone world, Australia, Canada and even the UK produce programmes 
which have assimilated the genre conventions of US television but with their own look and feel" 
Cunningham et al. (1998:181).
S chiller's defen ce
Cunningham et al. (1998) suggest that despite the US dominance in terms of amount of content 
produced, smaller nations and communities continue to have retained a significant amount of 
cultural autonomy. On the one hand this implies a certain resistance to globalising forces, but on 
the other it suggests a kind of 'globalisation of genre' if not of completed product. This is
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especially obvious in the case of news making and soap operas, where successful formulae are 
copied and adapted for local audiences.
Latin American soap operas, or 'telenovelas', are often presented as a 'test case' for the contra­
flow debate. They are typically produced in South America, are hugely popular in their home 
countries and are exported to traditional cultural imperialist powers including the USA. Biltereyst 
and Meers (2000) found little reason to consider telenovelas as supporting the contra-flow 
argument, finding on the contrary that telenovela exports - even to countries with no language 
barrier such as Spain and Portugal - lost out to more expensively produced mainly US 
productions. Biltereyst and Meers (2000:409) conclude that "[ajlthough international television 
flows no longer f i t ... it is important to emphasize that they are still culturally influenced and both 
politically and economically regulated".
It was the dominance of capitalist ideologies rather than the role of the US per se that was the 
central issue in Schiller's early writing, and that, he says, has essentially remained unchanged as 
"private giant economic enterprises pursue ... historical capitalist agendas of profit making and 
capital accumulation in continuously changing market and geopolitical conditions" (Schiller, 
1991:20-21).
One can criticise, on two counts, Cunningham et al.'s (1998) confidence in the ability of smaller 
anglophone countries to produce product 'adapted beyond recognition' from that which is 
imported. Cunningham et al. (1998) cite soap operas as a genre in which this adaptation 
successfully takes place in the Anglophone geo-linguistic region. While it is true that soap operas 
have developed differently in different countries, they have not been adapted beyond 
recognition'. Cunningham et al. (1998) argue the fact that there is an increase in television
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product made outside the US (although there is also an increase in US product) is evidence of the 
growing autonomous nature of local producers.
It could be argued that the fact that more product is being produced outside of the US is support 
for the theory that as media becomes more globalised there is less need for it be produced in one 
geographic region. While the output of television, cinema and print media in the anglophone geo- 
linguistic region may be originating from more sources, the income from these products is going 
to fewer and larger trans-national companies. Regardless of its geographical origin, the 
programming is produced in accordance with TNCs' capitalist ideologies.
2 .2 .3 A A  E v idence
C ritic ism  o f  S ch iller
Like many arguments influenced by Marxism, Schiller displays what Tomlinson (1997) calls a 
'fallacy of intemalism1, inferring what the individual interpretations of media messages are by 
analysing the organisation of media industries. Tomlinson is concerned that such inferences are 
speculative, disregarding the complex, varied and contextually specific ways in which individuals 
interpret and incorporate messages.
Ferguson (1992) voices a concern that typical indicators of cultural imperialism ignore important 
cultural effects of globalisation. Economic indicators showing the increasing wealth of a few 
TNCs and the world-wide availability of a small number of capitalistic media organisations are 
often presented as evidence of global media imperialism. Ferguson (1992:72) contends such 
assumptions roundly ignore historical systems based on caste, class or party, ethnic cultures or 
religious and kinship traditions which some research has shown to be "stronger than any claims 
for the reductionist power of global media".
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Citing Indian, Chinese and Indonesian government sponsored resistance to the influence of 
Western media, Chadha and Kavoori (2000:428) found that "Asia seems to present relatively 
little evidence of the wholesale destruction of its indigenous cultural subjectivities and media 
production by what Michael Tracey has called the lava stream of programming from the mouth of 
the volcano that is Hollywood."
There is a call for more particular and empirical ways in which to study the effect of the mass 
media on the cultural world than traditional cultural imperialism offers (Tomlinson, 1997). 
Schiller (1998a) agrees with this criticism and invites similar work himself.
Schiller's defence
In its simplest form, the US cultural imperialist model would have no explanation for facts such 
as almost every Arab state having its own satellite channel and the existence of over 40 Arabian 
commercial channels. Schiller however, might point out that not only is much of the content 
carried by these channels produced by capitalist trans-national media corporations, but also the 
production methods and equipment used in seemingly autonomous productions conform to a 
standard which has been developed by the same few TNCs.
Ferguson (1992), while accusing Schiller of being too simplistic seems to be wanting in this area 
also. Ferguson believes that the strength of historical ethnic and kinship relationships helps local 
communities resist imperialist forces, and that many communities, which would otherwise have 
trouble retaining their identity are flourishing in the context of new technologies. While this may 
be so, one could contend that communities and relationships that are not as strong, as far removed 
from the US 'mediazed' culture, or that do not have sufficient financial resources to invest in 
media production would be more 'at risk1 from imperialist forces. The mere fact that large capital
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rich countries such as China, Indonesia and large Arab states that have cultures radically different 
from the US are used as examples of being 'at risk' implies that smaller, less distinct cultures 
(such as Ireland) would be the current sites of the major cultural imperialist 'colonisation' if such 
existed.
Ferguson (1992:73) believes that "[o]ne of the more striking contradictions of the structural 
transformations associated with so-called globalization is the extent to which its linkages are 
confined to one-third of the planet's population and the nations of the OECD and G7 member 
countries". This seems to be a naive criticism of Schiller. Apart from the fact that one third of the 
world's population being subject to such forces is extremely significant, Schiller, as cited above, 
recognises that there are powerful forces in places such as South America and Asia that have 
international media influence. He stresses however that these TNCs still operate according to a 
globalised corporate structure and it is this that is the basis of his imperialist thinking.
Schiller (1989) is dubious of the methodologies of many of those whose research is presented as 
an argument against cultural imperialism. He criticises Ang's (1982/1985) research, which is 
often heralded as an important text in demonstrating the 'active-audience' thesis in opposition to 
theories of cultural imperialism (for example by De Bens and de Smaele, 2001 and Stevenson, 
1995). The reliability of Ang's (1985) research is questionable. Her 'empirical material', for 
example, consisted of forty-two letters from subjects who were chosen from responses to 
advertisements in a magazine (Schiller, 1989).
A strength of Schiller's argument is that despite its limitations, it highlights the global character of 
electronic media and emphasises the interweaving of communications, financial, military and 
political power (Thompson, 1995). Perhaps the strongest evidence in support of Schiller, 
however, comes from the acceptance and discussion of cultural imperialism by powerful
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professionals outside of academia. These people advise and make decisions affecting millions of 
people based on cultural imperialist concepts. A number of examples of non-academic support for 
Schiller's theories are given below.
2.2.3.5 R ecog n itio n  o f  c u ltu ra l  im p e ria lism  in th e  p u b lic  sp h e re
Former Clinton senior official Rothkopf in In praise o f Cultural Imperialism roundly accepts the 
process of the power of TNCs as 'progress', and promoting global integration (Thussu, 1998). 
Thussu (1998:5) cites Talbot, a former journalist and serving (in 1998) under-secretary of state 
who talks of " 'the birth of a global nation' in which collective action on a global scale will be 
easier to achieve in a world already knit together by cables and airwaves".
Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, donated one billion US dollars to the UN in 1997 to fund 
educational projects (Thussu, 1998). Such sums of money are significant on a global scale, and it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the UN would spend this money and otherwise act in relation 
to the educational sector globally, in such a way that it might, in the future, receive similar 
donations. The financial link between this media conglomerate and globally education, and thus 
social fabric, if unmeasurable because of its infinite complexity, is undeniable and undeniably 
significant.
Schiller (1998a) quotes the ex-Prime Minister of Canada (Turner, 1997) who was concerned 
about resisting 'American cultural imperialism' and challenging (in words if nothing else) a US 
insistence on dominating the world community.
Examples like these, citing people in power who act in accordance with a belief that cultural 
imperialism is a reality, give credence to Schiller's writing. They exemplify exactly what Schiller
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(1989) is talking about when he says that the nation states are finding their autonomy eroded by 
the enlarged capabilities of TNCs, which are deciding independently how vital resources will be 
allocated.
2.2.3.6 R e fo rm u la te d  m ed ia  im p eria lism
Boyd-Barrett (1998) argues that a reformulated media imperialism thesis needs to encompass 
'neo-colonialisms' of inter ethnic, inter cultural, inter gender, inter generational and inter class 
relations. By incorporating some key concerns of Schiller's theory, such as globalised hybridity 
and subsequent weakening of the nation state, the concept can be modified for application to the 
present (ibid.).
Anderson and Miles (1999:107) suggest that if accompanied by important qualifications taking 
into account the complexity and heterogeneity of the audience, as is the case with reception 
theory, the cultural imperialist model can be seen to being especially valid in small anglophone 
countries where there are relatively few opportunities for resistance to US and UK cultural 
dominance. Ireland is an example of such a country, with its small population, lack of a language 
barrier, and strong historical and cultural links with both the US and UK. Fahy (1978, cited 
Tovey and Share, 2000) found evidence of US dominance of the Irish media in 1978, even before 
many of the more recent changes in the Irish media industry, such as cable television, the 
Internet, the adoption of the US 'multiplex' cinemas and the proliferation of commercial radio 
licences.
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2.2.3.7 Youth radio as an example of globalised cultural imperialism
The cultural power of the mass media is further enhanced by its ability to define and present its 
own role to the public. The authoritative voice of the organisation is presented as objective, 
dedicated to the public interest and alleged vulnerability of the cultural industries (Leitner, 1983). 
A language construction common to many of the mass media is what Lerman (1983) calls the 
'Institutional Voice' (or IV). The institutional voice exists, says Lerman, whenever an T is 
missing from a media organisation's account of fact; that is where the position or view seems to 
come more from an organisation rather than an individual, as is the case with many news 
broadcasts as discussed above. An institutional voice has a number of consequences. It is difficult 
to question because of its impersonality. It therefore creates a position of authority for the author 
of the voice, and it disperses responsibility throughout an institution, rather than on an individual.
Morris (1999) explores the reasons for the frequent choice of using US institutional voices, or a 
US 'style of presenting' on youth orientated UK commercial radio. Equivalent studies have been 
conducted with regard to the US influenced 'rationalisation' of radio programming in Australia, 
Canada, France, and Sweden, by (respectively) Turner (1993), Berland (1990, 1993), Miller 
(1992) and Wallis and Malm (1993) (all cited Ahlkvist, 2001). Morris (1999) calls the US 
institutional voice 'international pop speak', which bypasses the class distinctions that UK voices 
have for UK listeners, and is often used for impersonal identification announcements such as 
saying the name of a station or a segment (news, sport etc.), while local voices are used for the 
more personal presentations -  such as announcing songs, talk-back and weather (Morris, 1999).
Much as there is for other globalised production methods, there is a concern that this 
'international pop speak' will undermine and marginalise local cultures in some way. Morris
(1999) concludes that there is no evidence of this saying that the local cultures he studied defined
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themselves in the context of the global while very much retaining their distinctiveness. This 
would seem to be the case for local populations large enough to make a financial impact on media 
organisations. Smaller, less commercially significant populations would not however, be included 
in such programming strategies.
US voice-overs are more frequent on youth orientated radio stations in the UK (Morris, 1999). 
Following the logic that this must be because it is more commercially viable to broadcast in such 
a manner, one could extrapolate that the youth audience do not have the same demands of local 
cultural specificity as older audiences. From this one could postulate that as this generation grows 
older the 'local' will have become more globalised in the radio sector. Such a theory may be 
impossible to prove, certainly in the short term.
"A particular style of radio delivery -  brash, emphatic and male -  was perceived to have 
originated in the US and thought best achieved by US voices" (Morris, 1999:46). An English 
radio station executive (cited by Morris, 1999:44) talked of concerns over the station's 'average 
listener' and is concerned that this person might be "afraid of different". This prompts stations to 
deliver a consistent format, similar to other commercial stations with a similar average listener.
Another executive cited by Morris (ibid.:44) sees an American voice as "something to pick it [a 
radio show] up a wee bit more." Across the UK, and particularly for youth oriented radio, Morris 
found that US accents are seen taken for granted as a part of commercial radio. They are used to 
set station identifications apart from the rest of the programming and evoke favourable 
associations with US popular culture (ibid.). Station executives cited by Morris have a perception 
of a US style that is forceful and exaggerated. They describe the dominant US style using such 
words as 'great big', 'attitudinal', 'punchy' and 'butch'. "US accents ... seem to transcend 
nationality" (ibid.:53). With Fomas et al. (1995) describing adolescence as a second birth or entry
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into language, it would seem to be a time when the language use of those surrounding adolescents 
would have a significant effect on the nature of their language development.
In the UK, regional accents lack appeal for the 'average listener', which makes US accents more 
attractive by default. US accents are perceived to appeal to younger listeners, as is the US style of 
delivery and the popular culture it is linked to. "Using this 'international pop-speak' rather than 
local voices ... was for interviewees [UK youth oriented commercial radio station executives] a 
way of plugging into youth culture that is seen as global" (Morris, 1999:54).
Morris (ibid.) found that the occurrence of US voices on UK radio was not present to nearly the 
same degree on TV, supporting the view that different media possess their own 'genre' of 
language. The current study will also investigate whether media uses correlate with ideological 
ways of thinking.
Local culture remains conspicuous in UK radio, but just as the global can be localised, so too the 
local must be globalised -  as even while staying local, cultural practices change within the 
context of the globalised media, as is evidenced by Morris's investigation of youth orientated 
radio in the UK.
Irish youth orientated radio stations are heavily influenced by both the predominant US style' and 
UK radio directly. This is highlighted in the description of SPIN FM in chapter 4 of this work and 
by an executive from one of the most popular stations in the current study, who was asked (in 
correspondence with the author) if he agreed that Irish radio, like UK radio was incorporating 
more of a US style of delivery'. He said that the fact that it was a US style did not matter, he was 
only interested in the style that worked for his station's audience. This ties in with Ahlkvist's 
(2001) findings that it is primarily larger radio stations that tend to adopt such rationalised
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programming strategies. Smaller stations, continues Ahlkvist, with a more specialised 
programming structure are far more likely to have different programming structures, as 
appropriate to their listeners. There is a trend towards economic and technical rationalisation, and 
smaller stations are having trouble competing against large rationalised stations, but Ahlkvist 
(2001) insists that they continue to make up a significant (and under-researched) sector.
2.2.4 M ed ia  g lo b a lisa tio n  a n d  ideology
Globalisation can be seen to be (almost by definition) inclusive of regional peculiarities. It is the 
process by which the evolution of the cultural industries around the world is given a more 
homogenous direction. That is to say that the globalisation of the media industry can be seen as 
referring to the idea that more media product around the world has a larger number of similarities 
and interaction on a conceptual level with other media. It is becoming more removed from any 
dependence on a geographical or geo-linguistic region. The fact that a high proportion of the 
content and production techniques (especially for the anglophone geo-linguistic region) is based 
in one country, while significant when looking at the specific effects of the influence of this 
country, is largely irrelevant. The conceptual process of globalisation can be seen as being 
removed from the physical realities that for much of the world (and particularly Ireland) the 
direction of cultural flow is inbound from a limited number of sources. Tovey and Share (2000) 
cite wealthy, but small Anglophone countries such as Ireland, Australia and Canada, and poor 
countries as being on the 'periphery' of the globalisation process. They believe that "[a] world 
media system characterised by cultural imperialism will be found to be markedly asymmetrical; it 
will contain far more information flows from the centre to the periphery than the other way round 
... Moreover different peripheries will learn very little about each other" (ibid.:371)
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Arguments about opportunities for 'contra-flow' and the 'active audience' seem reactionary to 
Schiller's basic argument that there must be some effect from the power of TNCs. "The capability 
of the private, resource rich conglomerates to transmit or shift messages and images, capital 
currency, production and data -  almost at will -  constitutes the true levers of contemporary 
power" (Schiller, 1998b). Two common fears of the increased commercialisation and 
internationalisation of the globalised media are that national regulation is becoming less effective 
(Tomlinson, 1997) and that globalised media are losing their local specificity (Morris, 1999). 
Along these lines, the current study will view media globalisation as a force with its basis 
ideologically in capitalism, rather than geographically in the US or any other place. Cultural 
imperialism will be viewed as 'capitalist imperialism' rather than 'US imperialism'.
Much of the analysis of the ideological impact of mass media focuses on the individual's response 
to (or decoding oi) media content. Stevenson (1995:84) argues that more attention must be paid to 
the encoding of the message in its creation and delivery. Before looking into the ideological 
consequences of the professional practice of constructing the mass media product, it is pertinent 
to discuss the late-modern globalised environment that trans-national media corporations operate
There are a number of factors that are central to the creation of this environment:
• Not only must one own the appropriate capital and live the appropriate lifestyle, but one must 
situate oneself in relation to that which is broadcast and broadcast to, to effectively use the 
mass media.
• The sheer scale of the operating budgets of major trans-national media corporations is such 
that annual turnover often exceeds the GNP of many smaller countries that they operate in, 
including that of Ireland (Boyd-Barrett, 1998).
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Morris (1999) suggests that in spite of the need to position oneself socially in relation to 
globalised mass media, recent analyses have supported the notion of contra-flow and that local 
communities are not becoming homogenized but are adhering to their own traditions and devising 
local versions of international style.
The globalisation of the media sector should not be seen as removed from the local. Each 
individual considers her/himself to be local (although definitions of 'local' will vary enormously). 
To be successful, therefore, media organisations of any size must appeal to the local. Many local 
communities must to be catered for if large media organisations are to remain commercially 
viable with a relatively limited range of content. Each of the communities that the globalised 
media product is delivered to will have the opportunity to decode this product in a unique cultural 
context. So while local culture still remains conspicuous in specific media contexts, such as UK 
radio, just as the global can be localised, so too the local must be globalised -  as even while 
staying local, cultural practices change within the context of the globalised media.
2.2.4.1 T h e  e lec tro n ic  n ew sro o m
The process of the 'globalisation of the local' is perhaps best exemplified in the 'electronic 
newsroom', where the opportunity exists for programming that encompasses news from around 
the world, In practice, an inordinate percentage of news reporting is conducted from a Western 
perspective (Liebes, 1992; van Zoonen, 1991). This is a direct consequence of the concentration 
of capital, of both media organisations and the consumers of their product, and of the underlying 
commercial agendas of the trans-national media corporations.
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Assumptions made by the media professionals from their own, and their professional cultural 
standpoint (that which is a result of the institutional relationship with their perceived audience) 
will be normalised and reified.
Liebes (1992) describes how the coverage of conflict has the potential to be propaganda in so far 
as propaganda promotes and normalises the cultural assumptions that are most beneficial, or 
flattering to the culture ascribed to by those producing the news. Since the majority of news 
gathering world-wide is conducted by news organisations from Western countries (and thus is 
produced with the interests of broadcasting to these countries), the ideology of the electronic 
newsroom, instead of being nationalistic, is decidedly Western-capitalist. Any non-Westem 
coverage must have a sufficient independent source of capital to exist separately to this.
The driving force of profit underscores Western capitalist cultural production, no matter how 
altruistic or fair-minded in intent (Thussu, 1998). In terms of the effects on individual and group 
identities in the post-modem Western world, Thussu (ibid.) sees the crucial question about media 
control and delivery as concerning whether the realities of the globalisation of the communication 
sphere helps or hinders the public space for debate.
2.2.4.2 P ro fessio n a l p ra c tic e
"It is not necessary to construct a theory o f intentional cultural control. In truth, the 
strength o f the control process rests in its apparent absence. The desired systemic result 
is achieved ordinarily by a loose though effective institutional process. It utilizes the 
education ofjournalists and other media professionals, built-in penalties and rewards for 
doing what is expected, norms presented as objective rules, and the occasional but telling
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direct intrusion from above. The main lever is the internalization o f values." (Schiller, 
1989:8)
The institutionalisation of the global capitalist ideologies has permeated all levels of media 
production. This section discusses how the act of producing the media product happens in an 
environment where 'success' is equated to fulfilling institutional goals globally, or competing with 
product which is produced on such a scale. The present research is concerned with youth culture, 
and much could be written on this topic about media produced for a youthful audience (such as 
the 'international' appeal MTV). It is, however, in the production of programmes ostensibly made 
to inform, rather than entertain, that the capitalist motives which permeate media professionals 
are most striking. This section explores the effect that global, capitalist motivations have on the 
presentation of 'truth' in the mass media. It will then discuss implications of the globalisation of 
mass media professional practice for contemporary Irish youth.
"[T]here is no ideologically neutral way to hold the camera" (Fowler, 1991:26). That is to say that 
any cultural product must reflect the social situation in which it was produced, it cannot be 
ideologically neutral. Comment on culture can similarly never be ideologically inert. 
"Interpretation is never unbiased" (Fomas et al., 1995:15). The factors affecting the myriad 
decisions made by media professionals in the construction of the media-cultural product are the 
underlying determinants of the ideological context in which the product is delivered.
The young audience have significance in their own right as media consumers, but also as 
potential adult consumers. Cosgrove et al. (1999) see brand association, and delivering 
'tomorrow's audience today' as becoming an increasingly important aspect of the media 
organisations in ensuring their own longevity. To attract and maintain such an audience the 
institution needs to understand its target audience's needs, interests and motivations.
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Ultimately, the role of all people employed by a media organisation is to fulfil the aims of that 
organisation. Although this need not involve a conscious decision to produce product that will 
result in communicating one ideology over another, training to work for such institutions and the 
professional knowledge of what sort of programmes and practices will be successful in achieving 
the institution's aims, will tend to produce a definition of successful programming that promotes 
the ideals of the station or organisation.
Executive producers, journalists and other employees of media organisations, tend to conform to 
modes of professional practice which have been moulded by institutional concerns about 
commercial survival. Measurement of the consumers of media product leads to media consumers 
being seen in terms of VALs (values and lifestyles) or ratings. Nelson (1996) is concerned that 
viewing people in terms of ratings acts to distance media organisations from actual members of 
society consuming their media/cultural product.
Hartley (1982:57) looks at ways in which what the media broadcast as truth affects common or 
'acceptable' thought. He maintains that the media help to define the boundaries of political 
thinking and social assumptions, and that "it is in the practical workaday context of newsmaking 
that ideology is produced".
But it is not just in 'newsmaking' that ideologies are produced and presented. The desire to 
maximise 'audience share', which underlies almost all mass media production can lead to a style 
'least objectionable' production ethos.
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2.2.4.2.1 Telethon television
'Telethon television' is a term used to describe a once-off or annual lengthy television programme 
to raise funds for a specific cause or charity. Originating in the US in the 1960s, and since 
becoming popular throughout the Western world, the telethon style of programme is an example 
of a professional media practice that can be seen as establishing and legitimating a hegemonic 
structure between media organisations and their audience. This structure acts to alienate groups 
outside of the institution's image of whom it is broadcasting to and for.
Devereaux (1996) looks at how the telethon, rather than achieving its stated aims of helping to 
highlight and alleviate the problems of those with low social capital actually works to alleviate 
the 'problem of the problem' for the relatively well off. That is to say that telethons have little or 
no impact on the social problem they highlight, but work to relieve feelings of guilt or burden of 
inaction from those who watch and donate money. The problems being highlighted are in fact 
being rendered invisible. Donations to the telethon are inevitably extremely insignificant when 
compared to the amounts needed to provide long-term solutions. The fact that media 
organisations are charged by viewers with a responsibility to help solve problems as opposed to 
report and inform about them is a significant shift in late modernity that distances the individual 
from direct social responsibility. By ascribing to a media institution's 'ideology as presented', in a 
manner analogous to believing a government or religious organisation has responsibility to 
uphold societal values and moral, media organisations are now powerful actors, directly (as well 
as indirectly) maintaining these values. With the telethon, television does this by presenting 
charity as a solution to social problems. In attempting to solve social problems the telethon 
reiterates the message that capitalism and big business are part of the solution (with donations to 
charities etc) rather than part of the problem.
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Poor and disadvantaged youth are often the focus of telethons, and are presented as a source for 
societal concern. Devereaux (1996) cites one such telethon which represented the 'realities' of 
homeless youth in Ireland, for the national broadcaster. The telethon's producer, of his own 
volition, decided that certain activities should be shown in the programme for 'maximum effect'. 
Following the professional practice of telethon production, scenes were 'acted out' and broadcast 
as real. "He maintained that the centre's founder realized that if he wanted to find young boys 
glue sniffing or drinking spirits he could easily do so out in the streets, so instead he filmed some 
boys from the centre in a reconstruction of these activities". He decided not to reveal it was a 
reconstruction as that "enters into the realm of disbelief on the part of the viewer" (ibid. :56).
A tendency exists in telethons to speak for people in need. Emphasis is often on care workers 
rather than the disenfranchised people themselves. The disempowered remain socially distant, 
The Irish telethon, cited by Devereaux, can be seen as transforming the "Devil's poor" into "God's 
poor" by focusing on the 'rescuing' acts of organisations, which can, often by their own admission 
help only a few (Devereaux, 1996:62).
The telethon, by dividing the poor into those that deserve charity and those that do not, and 
legitimising charity as a solution to social problems, further disenfranchises the majority of 
'victims'. The telethon does this by having the appearance of offering a solution, which for 
spurious reasons (laziness, lack of desire) it appears the victim refuses. So while the telethon 
might indeed improve the lifestyle of a very few, "the remaining poor are not only ignored but 
also further demonized and excluded" Devereaux (1996:65)
There are similar trends in other forms of media dealing with the socially powerless. For example 
by news or magazine style programmes highlighting specific cases of homelessness the person 
highlighted may have their immediate situation addressed more quickly by the authorities, but
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often nothing at all is done to alter the realities for the homeless. The only societal change is the 
relief of responsibility of the media institution and the individuals ascribing to the institution's 
ideological point of view. The politically powerful, the comfortable and the relatively powerful 
are vindicated in terms of their responsibilities.
2.2.4.3 L e a s t O b jec tio n ab le  P ro g ra m m in g
"In a market research-led context, the issue, put bluntly, is not what will make good drama 
(whatever that might be) but what maximizes sales in a competitive market-place" (Nelson, 
1996:681). As the recent proliferation of 'fly on the wall' television 'docu-dramas' testify, there is 
a tendency for executive producers to attempt to review past successes and create post-modern 
hybrid productions "in the hope of netting a bigger catch with a wider trawl" (ibid.:677).
The image created by the broadcast media has the ultimate purpose of ensuring the survival of the 
institution, for which "ratings are the currency in which advertisers buy audience" (Nelson, 
1996:678).
Focus groups help to develop a promotional strategy to target the widest possible likely viewer 
group, paying little or no regard to who is left marginalised by the ideal of maximising audience 
size and share. The non-profitable extremes are excluded from the institution's image of the 
audience, leaving a profitable core whose viewing and spending habits make program production 
viable.
"The market seems to demand something light, unchallenging and evocative of a pre-industrial 
past" (Nelson, 1996:679), what Altheide and Snow (1979) refer to as 'least objectionable 
programming' (LOP). LOP has the intention of creating an environment whereby once someone
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has 'tuned in', there will be as little motivation as possible for them to 'tune out'. While the 
listener/watcher might not engage with what is broadcast s/he will be less likely to decide to listen 
to/watch another station or turn of the radio/television.
A consequence of this LOP is that the presentation of information challenging to a listener/viewer 
is discouraged. Thus, according to Altheide and Snow (1979:40) "[a]t the public level, we are 
dealing with what members of society have in common - namely the ideal norms of society's 
institutions". 'Society' in this sense would be used to describe the perceived audience - that is the 
people that the institution sees as making up its ratings.
The media industry, and discussion of it, has changed enormously in the twenty years since 
Altheide and Snow published their thoughts about LOP. Arguments about the plurality possible 
through the increased number of media channels and outlets available seem to outdate LOP. The 
ever-increasing number of (especially commercial) television, radio and Internet channels 
available however can be seen as competing for a niche of this same core of consumers. If niche 
markets (such as youth) are found to be profitable, then LOP for that niche market will be 
employed with the same consequences of the content tending to be unchallenging and consumers 
who are outside of the 'imagined' audience excluded.
As Altheide and Snow (1979:108) remark, "[bjasic to all these statements is the realization that 
news is an organizational product used to promote organizational concerns rather than a fuller 
understanding of complex issues". As an organisational concern, news is no more important than 
any other part of its programming (Stein, 1974) except in the capacity that it is considered by 
many consumers to be at the core of the reasons for listening/viewing (Bell, 1991).
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Constructing and maintaining a functional image at most major media institutions is the full-time 
concern of a team of professional staff. An organisation's image is deliberately constructed from 
the choice of content, style of delivery and external promotion. An image or 'brand' is created and 
maintained in the interests of achieving the aims of the institution and to establish a mode of 
communication between the media organisation and those that consume its product. Normalising 
this relationship where there are such clear distinctions in power serves to situate both the 
organisation and the consumer hegemonically. The organisation, through its historically defined 
technical practices, professional ideologies and its institutional knowledge, in achieving its 
organisational aims, sets the stage for ideological communication (Hall, 1980; Arena, 1996).
Hartley (1982) draws parallels with fictional narratives, while the protagonists may change, the 
function of an institution's 'image producing product' is constant. The details are almost 
redundant, more important to the organisational concerns which underpin the 'construction' of 
cultural product is telling the imagined listener what she wants to hear, in a familiar format.
LOP is particularly prevalent in youth broadcasting. "[B]y their very nature the media are 
concerned with standardising young people's consuming habits, notably in order to maintain 
ratings for youth oriented TV programmes" (Anderson and Miles, 1999:108). In the words of an 
executive at an Irish radio station which relies heavily on its youth listeners, "I want people to 
know what they'll get when they tune in to [station X]" (in conversation with the author, 2001).
In producing LOP for young people, media institutions attempt to maximise their youthful 
audience. In doing this however, each young person must position themselves in relation to the 
'ideologies as presented' by the institution. The choice to identify with, or distance oneself from, 
the presented ideologies might be seen to separate groups of young people ideologically, in 
accordance to which mediated messages they ascribe to. The current study seeks to establish
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whether there is evidence of Irish young people's ideological ways of thinking and their patterns 
of media use. If there is such evidence, there may be cause to conclude that Irish young people's 
ideologies are correlated with their use of certain media, or identification with particular media 
institutions.
2.2.4.4 M e a su rin g  au d iences
"[The mass media present] a never-ending spectacle to audiences assumed to be lacking in 
subtlety, private depths and intensities, and who are totally incapable of being serious" (Higgins 
and Moss, 1982:216).
Having discussed the trend for mass media productions to maximise profits by being 'least 
objectionable' to the highest possible number of the consuming public, the following section 
discusses the relationship between the imagined audience and the people who actually consume 
the mass mediated product. For the purposes of most media institutions, the youthful 
demographic are viewed as a sub-set of the total audience and what is said of the total audience 
will apply equally to the youth market.
The usual way in which broadcast media organisations establish who is listening to or watching 
them is by means of ratings surveys, conducted by 'independent' ratings companies (the 
independence of these companies is discussed below). Typically, hundreds of residential phone 
numbers are selected and surveyed at random. From the responses a representation of listening 
habits is produced in accordance with the demographics requested by the organisations (eg. age, 
gender, income). These figures are then used by commercial organisations as determinants of the 
costing structure for potential advertisers, and/or justification of the expenditure of public funds. 
There are more sophisticated measures of who is tuning in and what their motivations for doing
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so are, but the fact that most of this research is conducted with a view to maximising audience 
share ensures that the audience is viewed in a capitalist context.
There are problems associated with measuring audiences in this way. It is tempting to see the 
large numbers produced by measurement companies as a mass, but importantly they are not (Hall, 
1983). The degree of interest that the commercial media industry have in the interaction of the 
audience with their message is determined by the sophistication of the market research which 
their advertisers conduct or demand.
There is an intrinsic role of social forces at play in audience measurement. Audience estimates, or 
the image one constructs of an audience, emerge from the actions and interplay of several groups 
including measurement companies, clients and respondents. "Human interests, greed, failings and 
collusion pollute what ought to be an objective empirical project" (Miller, 1994:57). More 
specifically, measurement firms need buyers of their service, so they must offer something 
attractive to their potential customers. What is attractive to media institutions are ratings that will 
attract advertising revenue or continued government support. This will influence decisions 
regarding which aspects of the audience are studied, which must in turn affect how the audience 
is seen.
Most of today's audience research is at least part-funded by media institutions. Although this 
means more research takes place than otherwise would, having funding originating in a body with 
a vested interest in it severely restricts the validity of such research (Twyman, 1994).
There are a variety of ways that people experience the media. For example, people might listen to 
the radio for atmosphere or engage fully with what is broadcast. The amount of attention people 
pay militates against an accurate measurement of the audience activity. Ratings at best can
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measure the number of sets tuned into a station or program, but have no way of measuring what is 
digested or how this is interpreted (Neuman, 1992; Twyman, 1994). This is a major flaw of 
ratings as "[m]edia audiences are active in the ways in which they use, interpret and take pleasure 
in media products" (Ang, 1990:165).
2.2.4.5 In s titu tio n a l im age o f  th e  au d ien ce
Institutions have a view of their audience constructed by themselves and measurement companies 
(Verwey, 1990). The day-to-day decisions regarding what to broadcast and how, are determined 
by an organisational desire to provide this 'audience of ratings' with the least possible opportunity 
to tune out (LOP, as discussed above). For young people, choosing not to identify with a 
capitalist media organisation's 'ideology as presented' might lead to feelings of alienation from 
one's peers and associated stress or disempowerment.
In the interests of presenting a consistent format, assumptions about who an institution is 
broadcasting to (or writing for) "require the construction of an image of the audience to which the 
journalist and broadcaster can work on an everyday basis" (Hartley, 1982:93). This is necessary 
so that all of the people involved in the production have a common image of what the finished 
product will be.
It is standard practice for producers and presenters to have in their 'mind's eye' one 'listener' for 
whom the message is constructed and to whom it is delivered (Hausman, 1991). Evidence of 
communicating to this imaginary person can often be heard in the language used by presenters 
addressing the consumer (listener/viewer/reader) personally.
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The 'imagined listener' must have a composite of those values which have been found by the 
institution to best suit its purpose of presenting LOP to its target audience Altheide and Snow 
(1979) call these the 'ideal norms of society's institutions'. By communicating to this 'person', the 
organisation repeatedly reifies the spectrum of cultural assumptions that it attributes to this 
idealised listener.
Previously, research has focused on the semiotics of the language as communicative of the 
dominant ideology through signification and representation (Meyers, 1992). More recent work 
has started to look more closely at the creation of meaning by the listener decoding the 
information. How one understands or decodes a text depends on their discursive decoding 
strategies that are shaped by background and experience (Hall, 1980). Just as the numbers 
produced by ratings do not make a mass, the audience as a group "are not a great many things that 
as individuals they may be" (Hartley, 1982:94).
While acknowledging that it is inappropriate to speak of generalised effects on an audience it is 
sufficient to say that ratings do not equate to a measure of society and that since media 
organisations produce product to communicate to and maximise ratings there is an important 
difference between the idealised listener and the actual people consuming the product.
2.2.5 S u m m a ry  o f  ideology a n d  g lo b a lisa tio n
Having discussed both sides of the cultural imperialist thesis and concluded that, despite its over­
simplification and lack of measurable evidence, this work supports the premise that the enormous 
concentration of capital and market share must have a significant impact on culture, particularly 
in the Western world. Corporate and political acknowledgement of globalisation and US 
domination of the anglophone cultural sphere underscores the reality of the cultural imperialist
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theory in common thought outside academia, while not confirming it as a measurable scientific 
phenomenon.
The effect of media professionals being trained to work for the capitalist enterprises that are 
media corporations competing in a global market place, was discussed. The tendency exists to 
view the audience in terms of ratings and standardise media product in the interests of 
maximising market share. This leads to programming that is unchallenging and inoffensive to the 
largest, most profitable group of people. This 'least objectionable programming’, excludes those 
who cannot or do not subscribe to the demographics of the 'included' audience.
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3.1 Introduction to chapter
In this chapter the concepts of ideology and globalisation, as defined in the preceding chapter, are 
applied to a discussion of identity formation in contemporary society. Using Bourdieu's habitus 
as its theoretical basis, the chapter defines identity and late modernity appropriate to the study of 
youth culture generally and Irish youth culture in particular.
3.2 Id e n tity
"[Industrial societies unquestionably introduce a rate of social change previously unparalleled in 
history" (Giddens, 1973:17).
Identity is not one thing. Often studies of identity first distinguish numerical and qualitative forms 
of identity and then proceed with personal, social, political and other factors as appropriate to the 
study at hand (Wood, 1997). Identity is continually revised; "[i]n the post-traditional order of 
modernity, and against the backdrop of new forms of mediated experience, self-identity becomes 
a reflexively organised endeavour" (Giddens, 1991:5).
Lemke (1998) defines identity as an articulation of one's evaluative stance towards interactions; 
what one is inclined to believe or doubt, desire or dislike, expect or find surprising. As beliefs, 
desires and expectations change, so too does a person's or group's identity. Thus, identity for the 
purposes of this work, while defined by consistencies in how one interacts, is constantly 
reformulated as one's (conscious or sub-conscious) decisions about how it is appropriate to act in 
certain situations change. Lemke (1997) refers to this behaviour as 'identity-sustaining practices'.
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In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1984) has found that participation in activities typical to a social class 
creates dispositions or 'habitus' that can be linked to one's life-prospects. As traditions lose hold, 
an individual's habitus (which is discussed in more detail below) or sense of self, is continually 
reformed in terms of the global cultural sphere. What one sees as normal and real is based on a 
negotiated lifestyle and set of attitudes that are influenced by a broader set of choices than has 
existed previous to the contemporary era (Giddens, 1991).
Cunningham et al. (1998) talk about a person's identity being constructed on many levels so that, 
for example, a person might concurrently consider themselves to be Glaswegian, British, 
Islamic/Arabic, and 'world citizens'. At every level that an individual might identify themself as 
Glaswegian, British, Muslim etc., the definitions of each identity being ascribed to are defined, to 
some extent in the context of the globalised, capitalist media. Each identity is partly defined by 
institutional concerns that, while they might have the viewers' best interests at heart, also have 
other (commercial) concerns. Habermas (1994) believes that these concerns of identity tend to be 
more personal than was previously the case, as individuals form their identity in relation to many 
social institutions that have little or no inter-relation with each other. The current work, in 
exploring the identity formation in a group of Irish youth will look for evidence, and possible 
consequences, of this increasingly individual identity creation.
3.2.1 H a b itu s
The major theoretical concept used by the current work in talking about identity, or the concept of 
ascribing to a social space is Bourdieu's habitus'.
Bourdieu (1984, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, 1998a, 1998b) developed the term habitus' to explain how 
daily life for the individual is organised in a social context. Using one's own assumptions about
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their social place as its point of departure, habitus can be defined as the "system of schemes o f ... 
perception, thought, appreciation and action which are durable and transposable" (Fowler, 
1997:18). Rogers (1998) describes habitus as the result of the totality of cultural conditioning in 
the construction of an individual's 'life-world'. The concept of habitus challenges traditional 
'structuralist' research designs as is it presumes a mutable, constantly changing self-identity of the 
individual that cannot be measured discretely (Fowler, 1997:18-19).
Habitus is, in many ways, analogous with a physical habitat. A fish, for example, lives in a habitat 
composed of water. One could theorise that the fish might take water for granted as water is 
everywhere that the fish is; the limits of the water are the limits of the fish's world. Similarly, 
Bourdieu suggests that habitus is composed of that which is taken for granted and that people lack 
significant conscious awareness of the social forces that structure their lives. "The schemes of the 
habitus, the primary forms of classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that they 
function below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective 
scrutiny or control by the will" Bourdieu (1984:466).
An individual's decisions about their social behaviour is regulated by their habitus, similar to how 
a player is regulated in a game (Bourdieu, 1990b). The expected outcomes of one's actions, and 
thus one's behavioural choices are, says Bourdieu (1990b), dependent on the 'rules' appropriate to 
the individual's habitus. Since everyone operates within a unique habitus, the 'rules' that each 
individual sees as applying to her/himself are different, as are the criteria for 'success'. Success in 
the social game of habitus involves not only behaving in accordance to the rules, but also being 
able to act creatively beyond the specific injunctions of them (Fowler, 1997). The specific 
construction of an individual's habitus is a result of one's position in the social formations they are 
part of, each of which is based on the material and mental (symbolic) economic and cultural 
capital one has access to (Reimer, 1995). The reward for success in the game of habitus involves
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feeling that one occupies an appropriate social space and has the opportunity for social 
advancement.
3.2.1.1 H a b itu s  a n d  id en tity
Each individual's habitus will be affected by a number of unique and a number of shared factors. 
These can be discussed in terms of social institutions. Typically, for the young Irish person, the 
institutions of family, school, media, church and peer groups will impact on the construction of 
their social environment. The current study is an investigation of these influences and a step 
towards mapping them.
Habitus is where and what one socially is, reflected in the choices that one makes. For an 
individual, habitus determines one's perception of one's position within a social hierarchy 
(Bourdieu, 1984). Notwithstanding this, a person may be seen as being a product of his/her 
habitus. There is an ever-present interconnectivity between habitus and individual identity in 
Bourdieu's writing, so that at once habitus is a product of an individual's sense of identity, while 
an individual's sense of identity is a product of their habitus.
3.2.1.2 H a b itu s  a n d  ta s te
Because it orientates practice, habitus embeds what might (mistakenly according to Bourdieu 
(1984)) be called 'values' in the most automatic of gestures. For example, ways of walking or 
blowing one's nose and ways of eating or talking will be determined in the context of one's 
habitus. Thus, habitus engages the most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of 
the social world. Bourdieu sees these automatic behaviours as an expression of 'taste' -  the 
discriminatory judgement or knowledge of cultural capital which enables one to classify cultural
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goods (Featherstone, 1990). Taste, according to Bourdieu is determined by habitus. "Habitus are 
generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices -  what a worker eats, and especially the 
way he eats it, the sport he practices and the way he practices it ... [b]ut habitus are also 
classificatory schemes, principles of classification, principles of vision and division, different 
tastes. They make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and 
what is wrong ... but the distinctions are not identical" (Bourdieu, 1998b:8).
3.2.1.3 B ecom ing  aw a re  o f  h a b itu s
Bourdieu (1998b) theorises that a person can become aware of their own habitus when they leave 
familiar social situations or when one comes into contact with people operating within different 
habitus. Returning to the analogy above, the fish might only become aware of operating in a 
watery habitat if it was removed from it, or on encountering a SCUBA diver, who required air to 
live. Similarly, the limits formed by what one takes for granted create a person's cultural habitat, 
or habitus. If, for example, a young person had never met or heard of someone of their age who 
did not attend school, s/he might be unable to consider the social place that school has in her/his 
life. If s/he was then told of, or met, people her/his own age not going to school, s/he would have 
the opportunity to reflect on the social consequences of her/his own schooling.
Fowler (1997) believes that successful practice requires the actor to operate both within a specific 
habitus and to act creatively beyond the specific injunctions of its rules. The habitus supplies a 
regulated set of perceptions and actions inside which individuals improvise. Much like a football 
player who gets a 'feel for the game' such that in the heat of the moment' s/he will make the right 
moves or calculations, an individual will have a 'feel' for their habitus so that they can make 
decisions in relation to it without having to be consciously aware of doing so (Bourdieu, 1990b).
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3.2.1.4 Habitus and consent
"In order for us to 'willingly' participate in activities and institutions such as school, work, family, 
shopping and vacationing, those activities have to 'make sense1 to us. None of these activities 
'make sense' in and of themselves-they make the sense they do only in the context of a particular 
habitus" (Rogers, 1998).
Bourdieu (1984) theorises that individuals place themselves according to a perceived 'social 
hierarchy' where every person subscribes to a mutable social place, as a result of the multitude of 
social communication they have experienced in their life up to that point. Bourdieu supposes that 
knowing how to act in such a volatile social environment is akin to the 'game' referred to above, 
being played on an 'uneven playing pitch', with different rules for each player. Each individual 
must reconcile her/his position in the 'social hierarchy' -  the choices an individual makes about 
everything from the most automatic gestures to decisions about where to live contribute to a sense 
of consenting to one's social space. This consent, which is similar to the consent required for 
ideological hegemony, can only exist within the framework of the experiences and choices 
available to the individual. So, while an individual's habitus is a result of choice, to have a sense 
of social place one is compelled to make choices which can only be made in the framework of the 
options available to each individual.
Bourdieu believes that the 'rules' of habitus are made available in relation to one's position in the 
social formation, based on the material and mental (symbolic) economic and cultural capital one 
has access to (Reimer, 1995). It is extremely difficult to study this quantifiably because of the 
individual nature of reading the 'status' or 'rank' of commodities.
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As he does with much of his writing, Bourdieu uses the working classes to explain his theory. 
The habitus is bom out of choices, it is only when these choices involve the consumption of what 
is seen as necessary that it becomes obvious that the production of habitus is unavoidable. "The 
fundamental proposition that the habitus is a virtue made of necessity is never more clearly 
illustrated than in the case of the working classes" (Bourdieu, 1984:137). According to Bourdieu, 
in the working classes, the choices available to people regarding taste will be limited and defined 
by being working class. If there are a certain few areas of a city where working class people live, 
or a certain few types of clothing working class people typically wear, a working class person 
would have her/his choices regarding the necessities of clothing and accommodation restricted by 
the cultural and economic capital of her/his habitus, and it would be very unusual for such an 
individual to not operate within the parameters of the working class habitus.
A young Irish person then, would place themselves in relation to peers, teachers, family etc. as a 
result of the interaction they have had with these people and other factors defining their social 
condition (such as television, comics, graffiti and countless others). The combination of all of this 
cultural communication would result in the definition of the person's habitus. To achieve what 
Bourdieu refers to as 'success' in the 'game' of social perception and interaction, each young Irish 
person would act in such a way that s/he saw as both consistent with her/his social position, and 
allowing for a continual transformation. For example, as they got older, the ways that peers, the 
media, school and family communicate with a young person change. To be 'successful' by 
Bourdieu's definition, the young person's view of their social place would have to be sufficiently 
mutable to allow them to accept their new place.
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3.2.1.5 Habitus, the world capitalist economy, and the media
Habitus operates before and outside of conscious thought and is, to a significant degree, a product 
of the social environment of one's social place (Bourdieu, 1993). "[H]abitus is the principle of a 
real authority with respect to the immediate determinations of the 'situation'. But that does not 
mean it is some kind of a-historical essence, of which the existence is merely the development, in 
short, a destiny defined once and for all" (ibid.:87).
Much of one's habitus is determined by communication and interaction with communications 
media. How people talk, what they talk about, newspapers, magazines, television, films, 
billboards, bumper stickers and clothing styles all affect consciousness and an individual's sense 
of their place in the world. The effects of these media are rarely acknowledged by the general 
population, which contributes to the lack of conscious awareness that Bourdieu refers to.
Habitus has been described above as an essentially un-measurable, sub-conscious phenomenon 
which is constantly being re-defined for each individual. If this was all that habitus was, it would 
seem to be a concept set up to militate against the study of social behaviour. On the contrary, 
Bourdieu (1998b) uses habitus as a way of explaining action -  in particular that action which 
supports one's own domination. While acknowledging that there are an immeasurable number of 
differences between individuals, groups of people who have shared habitus, also share 
'underlying logics' or structures. As alluded to above, these underlying logics are based around 
shared experience, as a congregation at a church or a student body at a school might experience. 
Commonly, Bourdieu (1984) believes that the underlying structure of habitus is primarily 
determined by the capitalist structure of Western late modernity. Consumer behaviour can thus be 
seen as individuals (and groups with shared habitus) consenting to their position in the social 
hierarchy by acting in a way which is consistent with the dominant capitalistic logic. The
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consequences of the late modem trend toward market-led identity formation, especially in youth, 
are further discussed in chapter 4.
Just as he sees the acceptance of the world capitalist economy as determining so much in the way 
of Western socialisation, Bourdieu sees television, with its enormous penetration in the social 
world of people globally, as being the mass medium with the most influence in determining 
habitus.
Dominating other media through its greater power and market share, Bourdieu (1998a) sees 
television as imposing a distorted, 'profit-hungry vision' of the world by 'stealthily secreting 
consensus' through a relentless, distracting 'dripfeed' of selective news and views that only serve 
to reinforce received established opinion (Rogers, 1998). In 'manufacturing consent', the 
television dominated media induce what Bourdieu (1998a) calls 'permanent amnesia'. Bourdieu 
suggests that people have forgotten that as recently as the mid 1980s it was commonplace that 
democracy and free-market capitalism were essentially in conflict. By now, continues Bourdieu 
(1998a), through ever-increasing media attention, the free market has become such a familiar 
symbol of everyday Western life as to be equated with democracy. Bourdieu (1998a) encourages 
resistance of this equation by highlighting what he sees as its devastating consequences, namely 
the limits of social identity being determined by large corporations with a capitalist agenda.
3.2.1.6 H a b itu s  a n d  ideology
Bourdieu and Althusser, though they disagree on many counts, both see the individual as the 
embodiment of habitus and ideology. Also, ideology for Althusser (1984, cited Stevenson, 
1995:37) "represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence". This is similar to Bourdieu's sense of habitus representing the relationship of
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individuals to the 'rules' of the 'game' in which social identity is created. The definition of 
ideology as 'modes of thought' used by the current work, is complementary with habitus as 
neither attempts to answer philosophical questions of right or wrong, but attempts to describe and 
explain the behavioural choices people make and the activities in which they partake.
3.2.1.7 H a b itu s  a n d  I r is h  y o u th  cu ltu re
Late modernity has seen a tremendous increase in the number of interactions requiring cultural 
communication and classification in relation to one's habitus. As with many others in late 
modernity, globalised media, technological developments in communication and an increase in 
purchasing power have ensured that Irish young people have a clear sense of taste or 
Featherstone's (1990) discriminatory judgement of cultural capital. This enables people to classify 
new goods as appropriate to their habitus, which is vital to 'success' in the 'game' of habitus.
As the social world becomes more globalised and Irish young people have the opportunity to 
experience cultural behaviour far removed from their own, a number of consequences of this 
might be expected, including:
• That individuals will tend to experience a wider variety of habitus.
• That this will result in an awareness and a constant re-definition of their own habitus.
• That young people might develop a habitus removed in part from traditional institutions.
• That new social institutions which contribute to habitus formation might be seen to emerge -
for example young people who don't share similar school, family, peer (in the traditional 
sense) or church groups might develop a similar sense of social space, due to having similar 
mass mediated or electronic social activities or interests.
80
The current study will investigate the effects of habitus being formed in relation to less traditional 
social institutions such as television and the Internet. Specifically, the current study will examine 
new and developing sites of social practice used by young Irish people in the development of 
their habitus.
3.3 P o st- a n d  la te  m o d e rn ity
"Modernity is the transition from fate to choice" (Thompson, 1992:327).
This work is concerned with describing the ideological effects of mass media globalisation on the 
identity formation, or habitus of contemporary Irish youth. Ideology, identity and globalisation 
have been discussed (above) in some detail. The next section will define youth historically and in 
a contemporary context. Before that can be done however, the contemporary or 'late modem' time 
period must be defined.
Giddens (1990:1) approximates a definition of modernity as referring "to modes of social life or 
organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which 
subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence". Post-modernity refers to the 
much more recent social system which presumes the capitalist/industrial conditions of modernity 
are less dominant in determining the social structure of society, moving to a system more 
centrally concerned with information.
Post-modernity has previously referred to the state of a shift from capitalism to socialism. This is 
rarely if ever the case now. The 'shift' more commonly referred to now is from the institutional 
clusters of modernity, so that "[p]ost-modemism, if it means anything, is best kept to refer to
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styles or movements within literature, painting and plastic arts and architecture. It concerns the 
aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity" (Giddens, 1990:45). Nelson 
(1996:681) proposes that there are two common definitions of postmodernism and that "different 
texts have varying potential to encourage ironically detached or contestatory readings, and that 
there is a need to distinguish between a critical and a popular postmodernism"
For Giddens (1990) and the current work however, post modernity refers to a new and distinct 
type of inherently globalised and globalising social order, one that sees pre-existing 
epistemologies to have been unreliable and projects a lack of faith in teleology.
There are a number of features of Giddens' (ibid.) post modernity which highlight how one's 
place in society has become more individual as the modem era has progressed.
• Post-modernity focuses upon the centrifugal tendencies of current social transformations and 
their dislocating character.
For Irish youth culture, this would refer to the dislocation from traditional social bonds such as 
those found in church and extended family groups. The groups that young Irish people belong to 
would be more disconnected from each other, with fewer common members and more divergent 
ideologies. For example, fifty years ago it would have been common for groups of Irish teenagers 
to meet the same people at church, school and at sporting/leisure events, More recently, there 
would be a wider variety of sporting/leisure events, and the people who a young person would 
interact with would commonly attend different schools, ascribe to different religions and even 
come from a wider variety of countries than was previously the case.
• Post-modernity theorises powerlessness which individuals feel in the face of globalising 
tendencies.
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Previously, threats to one's wellbeing have typically been visible, for example pollution could be 
seen and employment opportunities in the local area, while possibly limited, were obvious and 
decided at a young age (for instance by apprenticeship). More recently there has been an 
increased awareness of threats which individuals feel they have no control over (for example 
nuclear war or a world economic recession).
• Giddens (1990) sees an 'emptying' of day-to-day life as a result of the intrusion of abstract 
systems.
This ties in with the previous point. With a scientific 'cause and effect' mentality becoming more 
common in post-modernity, many religious or superstitious 'sureties' have been replaced with a 
lack of meaning. This leads to a further segmentation of society. As ideologies become more 
individual people have less in common with each other. Thus Giddens defines post-modemity as 
the end of epistemology.
For the current work, the term 'post modernity' is used to refer to the factors leading to the social 
conditions under which Irish youth live; the current era or historical period of time, definable by 
various movements as described above.
3.3.1 R ad ica lised  m o d e rn ity
Giddens (1990) suggests a more recent 'radicalised modernity' which refers to the social 
environment which is 'now' and sees the self as more than just an empty site of intersecting forces 
as is suggested by post-modemity. With radicalised modernity, active processes of reflexive self- 
identity are made possible by the features discussed above. In terms of Irish youth, there is a 
chance for self-reflection as young people learn of other ways of living, and have a chance to 
define themselves in terms that were previously impossible. Until very recently it would have
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been almost impossible for a young person living in Ireland to decide that Australian Rules 
Football was her/his favourite sport, for example. Now however, with access to television stations 
which show the sport regularly, the young Irish people have a broader range of sports to choose 
their favourite from, and thus develop an aspect of their identity in a way which would have 
previously been impossible.
Giddens' radicalised modernity sees day-to-day life as an active complex of reactions to abstract 
systems, involving appropriation as well as loss. That is to say that the uncertainty of the post­
modern trend against relying on religious teleology, while producing the stresses described above, 
also has benefits such as a feeling of increased opportunity for the individual to be able to achieve 
on a larger scale.
3.3.2 L a te  m o d e rn ity
The current work will define 'late-modemity' as referring to that period of post-modernity during 
which the subjects of its investigation have formed their identity, what Fomas (1995:4) refers to 
as "the current phase of the modem era."
"The overproduction of signs and reproduction of images and simulations [in late modernity] 
leads to a loss of stable meaning, and an aestheticisation of reality in which the masses become 
fascinated by the endless flow of bizarre juxtapositions which takes the viewer beyond stable 
sense" (Featherstone, 1990:7). Jameson (1984) sees the postmodern (or depthless) culture since 
World War II as indistinguishable from consumerism, and that everything in social life can be 
said to have become cultural. Nelson (1996) and Graef (2000) go further to suggest that late 
modernity is linked with a desire for things to be less challenging. This notion of 'dumbing down',
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as well as having found its way into common parlance, ties in with the concept of least 
objectionable programming (LOP) as discussed in chapter 2.
The late modem era is characterised by extremely rapid modernisation processes that are 
saturated by the communications media (Fomas, 1996). Theories attempting to understand the 
ideological forms of late modernity such as the 'mediazation' of culture and 'culturalization' of 
media, must themselves be mutable, as that which they attempt to explain is constantly changing 
(Fomas, 1996). "Culture involves communicative encounters between interacting subjects and 
symbolic texts within contextual frames" (ibid.:3). That is to say that the values presented in any 
media content are the values that 'work' to achieve the objectives of the organisation that is 
providing the service. The delivered message must undergo scrutiny at a number of levels, from 
parental control, to independent/governmental classification (such as the IRTC in Ireland) to the 
organisational objectives of the company. When a study such as the current work discusses the 
late modem media, it is possible to see this as referring to the representation of reality resultant 
from all of these contributing factors. For example a youth orientated television quiz programme, 
in addition to information about trivia, would also communicate fashion, language use and inter­
personal social information as each of these is represented on-screen. If the broadcasting 
institution's research was to show that a change, within its remit, in any of the programme's 
criteria would make it more 'successful' (by the broadcasting institution's definition) these 
changes, would take place. Thus, the social communication of the programme would be altered in 
some way.
The degree to which different ideological frames from different socio-cultural positions affect 
meaning and interpretation varies tremendously and is extremely difficult to measure (Fiske,
1998). It is however significant that "Disney's overriding objective [for example] is to create 
shareholder value by continuing to be the world's premier entertainment company from a
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creative, strategic, and financial standpoint" (The Walt Disney Company, 1999). At the same 
time, the independent monitor in Ireland, the IRTC, requires that "[advertising [during children's 
programming (such as Disney produce)] shall not exploit the special trust minors place in parents, 
teachers or other persons" (IRTC, 1999). Media product from the Walt Disney Company screened 
in Ireland (for example) would have to satisfy both of these criteria, which would affect the 
nature of the product's construction and thus the manner in which it represents 
ideological/cultural information.
As discussed in chapter 2, in accordance with Hall's (1980) concept of the individual nature of the 
encoding and decoding of the mass media message, to some extent each individual will construct 
meaning for her/himself depending on her/his life experience. So, in addition to the influence of 
institutional goals and independent monitoring organisations such as those described above, there 
will be, for each media consumer, unique influences from a number of sources such as family and 
peer/sub-cultural groups. Therefore, for each individual making up the spectrum of Irish youth 
there would be a different set of changeable factors influencing the ideological framework within 
which s/he decodes the 'ideologies as presented' in the media. Each individual constructs meaning 
in the context of a unique combination of social institutions (such as family, school and media). 
As one of these institutions (media) becomes increasingly globalised, the Irish young person's 
habitus is still Irish, but within a more globalised perspective.
3.3.3 L a te  m o d e rn ity  a n d  re lig io n
Religion, for hundreds of years was a major standardising influence on personal identity creation, 
in Ireland and much of the rest of the world. During the modern era, religion has been moving 
steadily from the public sphere to the private. Thompson (1992) refers to this as the secularisation
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of the public sphere. In this secularised public sphere, individuals are still standardised to a great 
extent, but more so by capitalist and materialist commodification.
The theme of secularisation has remained constant in reflections on modernity. Marx, Weber and 
Durkheim have all, in their various ways, discussed how the trend of demystifying of the world 
has led to a rationalisation of more and more areas of life (Holub, 1992; Durkheim, 1964). As 
religion has moved from the domain of the state towards the private sphere there has been an 
associated increase in the differentiation of religion, as the nature of one's practice of religion has 
become a more personal decision. People who identify themselves as belonging to the same 
religion may have vastly more divergent religious practices and beliefs than would have 
previously been the case. Thompson (1992) sees a similar increase in the cultural variations 
between and within many late modem social spheres, which he believes to be a progressive 
rationalisation of more areas of life.
3.3.4 L a te  m o d e rn ity  a n d  tra n s -n a tio n a l m ed ia  c o rp o ra tio n s
Individual construction of meaning is not a primary concern for multi-national corporations. 
Creating 'shareholder value' is concerned with being able to predict consumer behaviour on a 
'macro' level. There is an inconsistency between construction of popular cultural product on the 
institutional side and interpretation by an individual. Hall (1981, cited by Fiske, 1998) sees this 
construction of popular culture as being organised around this contradiction of the popular forces 
(media consumers) versus the 'power bloc' (media organisations and their share holders).
One could argue that this power-bloc serves (overtly or otherwise), to control the struggle 
between, and thus maintain the hegemonic positions of, the elite and the subordinate classes. It 
can be argued that it is in line with the capitalistic ideologies that determine the nature of trans-
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national media corporations' produce, to create an acceptable 'alternative' or an arena for 
'controlled' or struggle. That is to say the people making up the less powerful masses would have 
the feeling of consent that Gramsci (1971) sees as necessary for the maintenance of hegemonic 
order without there actually being a real struggle that could overthrow the ruling elite. In the case 
of youth culture this concept is exemplified by 'alternative' music charts, which provide an arena 
for 'alternative' sub-cultures and resistance. This provides participants with a feeling of rebellion 
while actually providing profit for the same corporations that produce 'mainstream' music. This is 
not to say that there is no possibility for 'genuinely' alternative youth culture, for example many 
bands remain outside of the trans-national recording industry. What is clear, is that the 
commercially driven mainstream and 'alternative' cultural space for young people's social activity 
define important sites of identity formation.
Those who identify with, or are 'included' in the capitalist driven, mainstream or 'alternative' will 
tend to feel 'included' in the mass media communication that they consume. For example a young 
person who identifies with the latest pop music, will feel included listening to the pop music 
programmes on a station like SPIN FM (described in detail in chapter 4). Those who identify with 
'alternative' music will feel included listening SPIN FM's 'alternative' music programming. Those 
however who do not identify with either of these music genres will not be included in SPIN FM's 
(or any similar station's) communication of music and 'lifestyle information', and may feel 
alienated by the medium.
One can draw a number of parallels between the position previously occupied by the church and 
the position trans-national corporations occupy in late modernity. While offering the possibility 
of emancipation, modem institutions create mechanisms of suppression of self (Giddens, 1991). 
This results in popular concerns having a self-centred deterministic logic producing concerns 
founded in capitalistic thought.
Sachs (1990) disputes the common view that with the advance of modernity economic 
calculation, the satisfaction of consumer demands will be the sole basis of society. He says that it 
is impossible for a consumer to be all that we are as humans. La Ferle et al. (2001) also stress that 
many of the similarities across youth cultures seem to be at the superficial level and that there are 
many important differences that TNCs have little or no effect on. This is undoubtedly true, but 
one need not talk in absolutes to see the importance of the consumerist mentality pervading 
society to tell that it has some effect on identity formation.
In order to be popular (and fulfil its institutional requirements) television must appeal to a widely 
diverse audience. A text must be 'open' before an audience will choose to consume it (Fiske,
1998). 'Open' here means that the text is sufficiently polysemic to allow various (sub)cultures to 
generate meanings that meet the need of their (sub)culture. This is not to say that the television 
text is anarchically open to any meanings, the multiple meanings of a text -  its opportunity for 
polysemy -  are similarly determined by the controlling interests. "The structure of meanings in a 
text is a miniaturization of the structure of subcultures in society -  both exist in a network of 
power relations, and the textual struggle for meaning is the precise equivalent of the social 
struggle for power" (Fiske, 1998:194). Central to this theory is the thinking that such texts, in 
order to be popular, must contain within them unresolved contradictions which the viewer 
rationalises in terms of her/his own social identity - the deconstructed, or what Hall (1980) refers 
to as decoded message, can only be understood in terms of power relationships.
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3.4 Summary of identity and late modernity
The rapidity of social change associated with late modernity demands that each individual 
develops a poly-dimensional, malleable self-identity that can adapt with the constant re-definition 
of her/his social world (Pietrass, 1999).
Much of the rapid change of the social institutions in late modernity is contextualised by trans­
national media corporations with capitalistic institutional goals. Although there are differing 
academic opinions as so to the extent to which capitalistic ideologies impact on personal identity 
(eg. Sachs, 1990; Thompson, 1998), that they have a significant effect is generally agreed.
The opportunities that each individual has in late modernity, to develop their identity in relation 
to a previously impossible number of social strata can be seen to encourage a more self-centred 
identity. This is due to a number of factors. Not only is every level that contextualises one's 
identity increasingly influenced by capitalist trans-national media corporations, but it is also less 
common for a groups of people to share common religious, media use or even national identities. 
As people have less in common with others in their communities (however defined), it follows 
that identities will be defined along more individual criteria.
The effects of this phenomenon are difficult to determine. Doing so is beyond the scope of this 
work. What this work is concerned with is discovering whether there is empirical support for such 
theories in relation to late modem Irish youth.
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4.1 Definition of youth
"Although we tend to believe that parents, friends and schools are the main socialization agents 
for teens, a simple look at the omnipresence of media suggests that media are equally powerful 
socialization agents" (La Ferle et al., 2001:8)
As with so much in modernity, it is difficult to arrive at precise definition of 'youth'. While there 
are many attributes or traits one can describe as youthful, youth is an especially rapidly changing 
phase of life and thus particularly sensitive to social transformations. "There is considerable 
evidence to suggest the experience of growing up in contemporary society has been radically 
transformed in recent decades and that the role the media plays as a purveyor of consumerism is 
particularly influential in this respect" (Anderson and Miles, 1999:107). Youth is culturally 
determined in a discursive interplay with musical, visual and verbal signs that denote what is 
young in relation to that which is interpreted as childish or adult (Wulff, 1995).
Individual young people operate within a number of habitus, each having a different set of'rules'. 
Looking at the emergence of the modem youth category and the history of youth research 
however can contextualise the young people who are the subject of this study.
4.2 History of youth
One could start a history of 'youth' from any date. The young have always been envied, and 
revered, and lost youth lamented. For the purposes of discussing the evolution of late-modern 
youth, it is useful to look at the development of the status of the concept of youth during the 
industrial revolution to the present. The current work is concerned with Irish youth, which as a
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concept, in many ways, can (and in many ways cannot) be seen as a culturally specific offshoot of 
the international phenomenon of more generalised Western youth
"Western societies, by prolonging the transition to adulthood and by segregating their youth, have 
given rise to an institutional youth culture -  more or less standardised ways of thinking, feeling, 
and acting that are characteristic of a large number of youths" (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:69).
Lapsley et al. (1985, cited Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:23) "view adolescence as a relatively 
recent cultural invention produced by economic and social conditions which prolong childhood -  
ostensibly for the benefit of the individual." These conditions have come about through the 
enactment of child labour laws, a minimum school leaving age, and laws designed to protect 
children from exploitation.
In pre-industrial Europe, it was normal for young people to be separated from their families and 
to live as servants or apprentices in other households in a state of semi-dependence until they 
were able to establish an independent household (Gillis, 1974). It was thus economically and 
socially impossible for young people to form a collective identity. Gillis (ibid.) suggests that the 
transition from this pre-industrial situation to the modem concept of youth occurred with the 
concurrent evolution of several factors around the time of (and often related to) the 
industrialisation of Western Europe, starting with the middle class, and usually with boys, before 
extending, often imperfectly, to the working class and girls.
Middle class families began to keep their children at home longer until a professional 
apprenticeship or university course (in the case of boys), or marriage (girls) could be negotiated. 
There was a problem however that the supply of educated middle class boys outstripping the 
demand of the professional and civil markets for them to graduate into. This led to a number of
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'moral panics' in the 1840s and 50s as parental control over their young was seen as inadequate. 
Consequently, institutionalised schooling was further developed and acted as a sort of patriarchal 
control over boys. By the end of the 19th century it was also becoming more common for middle 
class girls to attend a boarding school instead of being tutored in the family home and indeed for 
teaching to be seen as an acceptable occupation for women (Dyhouse, 1981).
With infant mortality, and thus the need for a larger family size, decreasing, more people from the 
middle classes were able to afford a longer period in education for their children. The years of 
schooling represented an extended period of dependence and subordination to the institution of 
education and associated religious hierarchy.
As the 19th century progressed, working class youth, who had previously progressed directly from 
the family home to marriage and adulthood, were also undergoing a transformation. The repeal of 
child labour laws and increased availability of education (for example by the Christian Brothers 
in Ireland) meant that for the working classes there was also an extended period of dependence to 
an institution outside the family home. A problem however developed in that, many working 
class young people were unable to find work or afford schooling. It was in fact the plight of such 
young people in Waterford which motivated Edmund Rice to start the Christian/Presentation 
Brother movement in 1802 (Presentation Brothers of Mary, 2000).
Magarey (1978) suggests that middle class concern for and fear of idle and delinquent working 
class youth of the mid 19th century, led to an investigation of working class child rearing 
practices. Normal working class child rearing practices were seen as inadequate and morally 
wrong by the middle classes. With the help of an expanding media sector a larger section of the 
middle classes voiced a more unified concern in this regard. Subsequently, laws were enacted in a
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number of countries to enable middle class standards to be maintained in urban areas (Pearson, 
1983).
Around this time there was a marked increase in references to the young in legal practice and 
statutes, including the establishment of correctional institutions specifically for the young 
(Magarey, 1978), and the 1899 British prohibition of imprisonment of juvenile offenders in the 
same prisons as adults (Gillis, 1974).
By the end of the 19th century the adolescent had been divided from the child and the adult 
through institutions such as schooling and correctional facilities. Both the extension of the 
availability of schooling to the working classes (which had begun by the end of the century with 
the 1870 introduction in Britain of compulsory universal education until the age of 13) and the 
establishment of correctional facilities resulted from middle class practices and concerns. There 
was also a related middle class sense of 'saving' the lower class youth from delinquency appearing 
around this time. The categories of 'punishment' and 'in need of care' were becoming increasingly 
blurred (Margarey, 1978).
During the early 20th century compulsory education was extended to 15 or 16 in most Western 
countries, and schools were often divided into age based class groups, further discriminating age 
groups from each other. This led to the establishment of secondary schools, which further 
separated the adolescent from the child, both physically and in common discourse. With the 
abolition of secondary school fees, the number of people staying at school longer further 
increased and an institutionalised period of adolescence became the norm.
These changes, while designed to allow a more gradual, improved transition into adulthood, 
placed adolescents in a stressful state of'status deprivation' (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993).
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Wulff (1995) cites Berger's (1971) list of youthful traits: youth are typically seen as spontaneous, 
energetic, exploratory, venturesome, vivacious, disrespectful, playful and erotic. Wulff adds that 
youth is also associated with what is new in culture, including new media and new uses of media. 
If these are indeed the typical expectations a society places on its youth, one would expect that 
there are societal pressures on young people to act accordingly and stresses involved in feeling 
that one is not fulfilling these expectations.
Although youth may be impossible to define unequivocally or to delimit, it can be seen as a 
psychological development phase commencing in puberty and ending when the body is more or 
less finished growing. It is also a psychological phase extending through the different phases of 
adolescence and post-adolescence. Youth is a social category, framed by social institutions -  
school, religion, legislation, home/family and employment (Wulff, 1995). These institutions can 
be seen having a major influence on the four developmental tasks Moore and Rosenthal (1993) 
see as being relevant to contemporary youth: identity, connectedness, power and hope/joy.
4.2,1 The emergence of the teenager
In the US, post war prosperity gave youth spending power which led to them being a significant 
consumer group, which led to distinct cultural identities and many sub-cultures, with their own 
systems of peer and self identification. According to Doherty (1988) the U.S was the first country 
to have a word for teenagers. "Before circa 1935 U.S. teenagers considered themselves as, and 
were considered, young adults and not a special group" (Doherty, 1988:44). After this time, 
teenagers, as an age-group began to experience a distinct place in the US consumer economy and 
were treated more often as a group divided from other age groups by school, media and business 
institutions.
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After World War II, "young people quite simply became more visible than they had been and 
could be more easily exposed to criticism from adults. At the same time, many working-class 
youths experienced their situation as unsatisfactory and frustrating" (Boethius, 1995:45). Cohen 
(1980) describes the situation at this time in England (and London in particular) as being 
characterised by immigrants (national and international), who were led to similar economic 
determinants of lifestyle such as housing price. These people formed subcultures. As children 
grew up in these subcultures, they often formed similar subcultural groupings, being brought 
together by the similarity of their family situation, even though they often rebelled against it. 
“Mods, parkas, skinheads, crombies all represent, in their different ways, an attempt to retrieve 
some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture, and to combine these 
with elements selected from other class fractions symbolizing one or other of the options 
confronting it” (Cohen, 1980:83).
Although the Irish context was significantly different to that in the UK and US during this time, 
the typically presented images of cultural isolation belie the trend towards a progressive 
redefinition and distinction of youth culture along lines in many ways parallel to those of other 
Western countries (Fallon, 1998). Similarly with the sexual revolution of the late 1960s, although 
the Irish situation was more conservative than the more famous and extreme examples of San 
Francisco and Woodstock, the emergence of more immediate international social reporting, and 
the beginning of the secularisation of the public sphere in Ireland can be traced to about this time.
Whatever the reasons, in Ireland as in much of the Western world, in recent times, the age of 
marriage is increasing and the age of puberty is decreasing. This "extension of the period between 
physical maturation and the taking up of traditional roles, together with the fact that contraception 
is freely available has led to an uncoupling of sexuality, marriage and child-bearing. As a result,
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prohibitions about premarital teenage sex are less easy to enforce so that there has been a need for 
society to rethink its views on adolescent sexuality... [although]... teenage and premarital sex 
have always been with us" (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:1).
4.3 History of youth culture research
Because of the multitudinous directions and pace of change in late modernity and the media 
driven cultural sphere, it is important to historically situate the young people being studied in the 
current work.
While the category of youth itself may not have been studied discretely until later, the subject of 
societal change through the succession of generations was discussed as early as the 1920s by 
Mannheim and his contemporaries. This led to the idea of the youthful or succeeding generation 
emerging as an important vehicle for social change (Mannheim, 1956; Keniston, 1968; Fomas, 
1995).
Youth subcultures have traditionally been referred to as being symbolic attempts to solve 
problems in adult culture, or trivialised and disarmed as 'jolly games', providing the necessary 
skills for adulthood (Fomas, 1995). The study of youth is often seen as a chance to examine the 
wider population in microcosm. Consequently, the study of the behaviour of non-deviant young 
people is rarely taken to be as important as the study of either children or adults (Wulff, 1995).
There are a number of traditional generalisations about youth culture research. Wulff (1995) cites 
the tendency of most major studies to be done in a context that regards Western males as the 
'norm', describing other groups in terms of how they are different to this norm (in terms of 
gender, history, ethnicity etc.). Musgrove's (1964) cross cultural study suggests that social change
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was driven by the level of inclusion of young in societal decision making and that the 
construction of an adolescent 'class' was the result of the exclusion of young adults from adult 
society.
In the past 15 years or so, there have been two major changes in youth culture research. The first 
involves the increase in studying youth in their own right -  as opposed to being either children or 
adults, The second change has been the move away from seeing young people as unengaged 
consumers, passively digesting cultural product. It also seems common, and is the case with the 
current work, that youth researchers have worked in the field outside academia.
Swedish researchers, such as Fomas and Bolin (1995), Boethius (1995) and Fomas et al. (1995), 
have distanced themselves from their more structuralist predecessors, (whom they see as 
including Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies). Recognising the complexity of 
both groups and individuals, they have tended to describe youth using an approach centred 
around individual young people, and attempted to explain the social world from the young 
person's perspective. Most previous research has used an approach based around seeing how 
young people fit into the existing world. The more traditional approach often studies young 
people as a problem or a definable 'square peg' trying to fit into the 'round hole' created for them 
by the myriad of factors acting to create their social environment.
4.4 Irish youth culture research
The discipline of cultural studies in Ireland is often seen as being dominated by the political 
situation in the north of the island. There is a perception that this has restricted studies in other 
areas, including youth research (Sharkey, 1997).
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While by the mid 1990s Swedish youth culture research had moved away from seeing the 
situation of young people as a 'problem to be solved', writing on the subject in Ireland was often 
much more traditional, pessimistic and problem based. In 1995, Fomas (1995:10) was writing 
about discussing the merits of a constructivist theoretical model for studying youth culture, which 
recognised young people's "infinitely multi-faceted reality and thereby reconstructed] the world 
as orderly and comprehensible". That same year in Ireland, Forde (1995:6) who was an advisor 
on youth affairs to the Irish government, published Growing Up in Ireland in which he described 
the situation of Irish youth thus: "The young to-day live in the worst of all possible worlds -  
unemployment, violence and hopelessness are everywhere".
Youth culture research, particularly in Ireland has been sporadic at best. Nevertheless it is useful 
to look at the general trends of previous research so that the present may be situated to some 
extent.
Hannan and O'Riain (1993) examined the main characteristics of the transition from adolescence 
to adulthood with a group of Irish adolescents who, 20 years ago, were of the approximate age 
(mid to late teens) of the current work's sample. Reynolds (1990) focused on the media use of 
Irish youth 15 years before the current work.
Hannan and O'Riain's objectives were to describe the main characteristics of the transition from 
adolescence into adulthood, employment, household formation, marriage and parenthood, and 
how the attainment of new status conforms to some overall transition pattern. Interviews were 
carried out retrospectively in 1987, five years after the subjects had left school. Subjects were 
asked to reflect on their hopes and behaviour, to account for 'success' or 'failure' in such 
transitions and to analyse the main well-being and welfare effects of such successes or failures.
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Hannan and O'Riain (1993) found that for their sample, the actual transition process to adulthood 
was very traditionally patterned, and strongly determined by economic and normative forces. 
There were strong links between the timing and exact nature of psychological changes and 
institutional, economic, moral and social influences. The strongest institutional norms and values 
were found in the attainment of stable adult sexual and family relationships, gaining employment, 
and achieving a separate household.
Living alternative lifestyles in Hannan and O'Riain's (1993) study was usually seen by those 
involved, as being the result of having failed to live a normal lifestyle, "tend[ing] to be 
explainable more in terms of reactions to persistent failure to find a normatively approved 
pathway rather than being initially freely chosen" (ibid.:xvi).
4.4.1 Difficulties with youth culture research
Any youth culture research should acknowledge the chronological, geo-linguistic and geo- 
cultural limitations of its findings. The infinite complexity of the make-up of youth culture means 
that continuous research is necessary to map these changes for any population over time. Another 
difficulty in studying youth culture is its necessarily transitory nature. Not only are individual 
identities being constantly reformulated, but the people in the 'youth' demographic are getting 
older. Although many of the psychological aspects of youth are prolonged for many people in late 
modernity (for example parent-supported people in third level education), all youth cultures are 
time limited, individuals are only in them for a limited time. One's age changes while one's 
generation remains constant (Fomas, 1996). Because of this, there is a highly transient nature 
attached to youth identity, individually and in sub-cultural groupings (Wulff, 1995; Anderson and 
Miles, 1999).
101
When dealing with youth at any level then, one is dealing with an artificially constructed group, 
defined by age, academic progress, physical maturity and/or a number of other demographics, 
constantly changing as subsequent generations move through adolescence. In the totality of what 
is considered to be youth there are huge ranges in practically all of its defining criteria. It is 
necessary to recognise youth's interacting dimensions, and to recognise that with the increase in 
the commercialisation of youth culture, young people are interacting with their world more often 
and at a more rapid pace. In a number of ways, from having independent purchasing habits to 
identifying themselves as a distinct group, youth can be seen as a 'class' separate to that of their 
parents. In addition to having developed independent consumer behaviour, young people decode 
polysemic media texts in distinct ways to adults or children, and can thus be seen as a separate 
cultural group, along similar lines to how Ang (1985) found that different cultural groups decode 
the same television text in different ways.
4.5 Late modern youth and mass media institutions
The cultural institutions of late modernity increasingly formulate the frameworks of youth 
identity. "Youth, culture and modernity impinge on each other. Young people are culturally 
orientated, express themselves to an unusual extent in texts, pictures, music, styles, and are 
considered by others to be publicly culturally significant" (Fomas, 1995:5).
"The commercialisation of children's culture was intensified throughout the 1980s, with television 
programmes themselves acting increasingly as advertisements for commercial products. 
Extensive psychological research, promotional campaigns and mass marketing have been 
employed by capitalist concerns in order to create easily identifiable characters" (Stevenson, 
1995:138).
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The transitory nature of youth is an economic concern for commercial enterprises concerned with 
the youth market. Extensive private enterprise surveys of youth are carried out to ensure that the 
product and the consumer are constantly matched, with a view to appealing to the young 
consumer in the short term and building purchasing loyalty over the long term. Today's 10-14 
year old demographic is tomorrow's 15-24 demographic. A common contemporary goal for TNCs 
is to develop a life-time brand loyalty in teenage consumers (La Ferle et al., 2001).
The media driven cultural sphere is central to much debate about youth culture, both within and 
outside of academia. Sites of debate are typically concerned with the unheralded pace of change 
of the media sector in social life and the rapidity of technological development. The fact that the 
media are a forum for such discussions militates against impartial debate in the public sphere.
Typically, young people are seen as helpless victims or 'dupes' of the popular media, and 
extremely vulnerable and impressionable. Both the Left and the Right side of politics typically 
denigrate the value of popular media to young people, the Left saying they are racist, sexist and 
consumerist, while the Right often cite the mass media as being the cause of moral depravity and 
violence (Buckingham and Sefton-Green, 1994). Such views, often supported by the media 
themselves, are overly simplistic. Hodge and Tripp (1986) support the suggestion that young 
people consume mass media messages (and television in particular) in active and complex ways. 
Far from a 'dominant' meaning of a television text being transcribed onto the young viewer, 
Hodge and Tripp (1986) found that meaning was processed according to many criteria, such that 
even for a seemingly simple programme such as a children's cartoon, more than thirty arenas for 
interpretation could be identified (eg. nature versus culture, animal versus human, old versus 
young etc.). Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1994) move away from an approach that sees 
consuming media as separate from other cultural activity and consider media consumption as part 
of social activity in a broader context.
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Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1994) and Reynolds (1990) found that British and Irish youth 
(respectively) have relatively rich media access (compared to average income/standard of living), 
with significantly more access to video, music and computer equipment than the average for their 
socio-economic class. Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1994) also found a high degree of 
commonality among the viewing of popular television. This was less the case for other media 
such as radio and books. In Buckingham and Sefton-Green's (1994) study, 64% of respondents 
were unable to name a single book that they had read. This contrasts with Fomas' (1995) assertion 
that young people are the main users of all media, including books, and Dresang's (1999) findings 
that there were almost twice as many books in print for children in 1998 than in 1990.
Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1994) found that media usage systematically varied with gender 
and ethnicity. Girls were found to be more interested in books than boys. Computer games were 
less gendered, used by 98% of boys and 78% of girls. Magazines were very gender divided, 
generally in favour of girls, but this depended on the subject matter of the magazine. TV shows 
exhibited much less of a gender divide in their teenage audience.
The current study will measure the degree to which various media usage patterns of Irish youth 
are correlated with gender and a number of other social institutions such as school, 'family 
situation' and media usage patterns. Asking a number of identical or equivalent questions to 
Reynolds' (1985) study of a similar group, any changes between 1985 and 2000 in patterns of 
media use should become apparent.
This study of the correlation between media usage patterns and social, peer sub-cultural 
groupings will highlight the context that creates Gramsci's hegemony for the sample group of 
Irish young people and provide a 'sketch-map' of their mass mediated cultural landscape.
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Many media are swapped among young people through the (often illegal) copying of movies, 
video games, etc. The act of doing so increases debate and social criticism of the media in the 
groups of friends involved in such activities. Reading materials, especially books, on the other 
hand, rarely change hands in such a manner (Buckingham and Sefton-Green, 1994).
Groups of youth tend to have a sense of 'ownership' of the cultural space of shared media. 
Television is often considered a family domain whereas watching videos and listening to music is 
often a peer-group activity. Books typically belong to school. Girls 'own' the cultural space of 
magazines which target young female readers -  even if boys read them, they are reading what 
belongs to girls, culturally as well as literally. Boys seem to display a similar ownership of 
computer game magazines (Buckingham and Sefton-Green, 1994).
Such 'ownership' is dependent on other contextual factors such as content of the medium and 
motivation for using it. Adolescents are active consumers who have a variety of motives, which 
can change every time they use a medium (Greenberg et al., 1993). Tensions between reading, 
viewing and listening to various media are superimposed upon social and cultural events (Ang, 
1996; Fomas, 1996). The social effects of these experiences will occur in the context of previous 
experiences of the medium. One might expect then that fluctuations would be more extreme in a 
younger reader with fewer previous texts to contextualise each mass media experience. This 
expression of the attitudes that adolescents have towards the mass media message, is experienced 
through what Fomas (1995:1) calls "the clear language of style".
The individual chooses which medium, genre and programme to experience. This is the consent 
Gramsci sees as necessary for ideological hegemony (Holub, 1992). "[Y]oung people choose 
styles from a contradictory, in part mass mediated market" (Fomas et al., 1995:256). They seek
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expressions that function and are usable in relation to their own social prerequisites. Hodge and 
Tripp (1986) argue that for young people, the subversive meanings of the mass media text often 
become preferred and used as an area of common interests in social situations.
4.5.1 SPIN FM
A practical, contemporary view of the commercial media sector's view of Irish young people, 
their media use, attitudes, styles and spending power has been forthcoming in the recent 
applications for a youth-oriented radio licence for Dublin which was awarded to SPIN FM in 
1999.
In their successful application, the London based Ministry o f Sound group, who control a 25% 
interest in the station, described their 'Programme Service' thus: "SPIN is a music radio station 
appealing to an audience of 15-34's whose radio tastes have previously been ignored. Credible 
Contemporary Hit Radio, playing a mix of Dance, R 'n' B, Hip-Hop, and Alternative Rock. SPIN 
will blend a relevant and credible news and lifestyle information service along with appropriate 
current affairs and entertainment packages. SPIN will be a station with a new face, a new focus, 
and a new format" (SPIN FM, 1999:3). Such statements are to be expected by a commercial bid, 
but this 'industry speak' is contradictory. If the target audience have had their 'radio tastes ... 
ignored' one could question how is it possible for them to have developed 'radio tastes' at all. 
Without passing judgement on the validity of the proposal itself, the commercial concerns 
essentially driving it are obvious.
Throughout the proposal terms such as 'brand personality' and 'image' are used repeatedly. SPIN 
attempts, quite overtly, to combine commercial success and delivering 'lifestyle information'. 
Anderson and Miles (1999) cite 'lifestyle advertising' as having become dominant in the 1980s.
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Young people in contemporary society are fully aware that "global brands and marketing have a 
particularly influential role to play in their lives" (ibid.: 109). The oxymoronic emphasis on 
freedom and individuality being associated with a brand (such as with the slogans 'Just Do it' and 
'Let UBU') and conformity to a pre-determined image is not lost on young people, but by the 
same token they are aware of the consequences of the potential decision to not associate with the 
right brand. "Aware of the ideological influence of the media representations of consumerism, it 
might well be argued that young people actively use those representations to their own everyday 
advantage" (ibid.: 109). The risk, or potential loss of social esteem, is counterbalanced by an 
awareness of the relatively powerful position of choosing the inclusion to the branded identity.
SPIN's style of presentation, in appealing to youth is also described as "hip, funky, clever, fresh 
and classy" (SPIN FM, 1999:30). These values are very similar to Berger's (1971, cited Wulff,
1995) list of youth values described above, and could place similar pressures on young people to 
act in accordance with such attitudes.
"The station will therefore be firmly built on the brand values the station espouses and not just the 
product description. In this way even if existing competitors or unlicensed stations attack the 
product positioning head on, SPIN will have taken the high ground on brand personality... SPIN 
will embrace the concept of "Cutting edge". The values it will strive to own and reflect are: (1) 
Young (2) Irish (3) Ground breaking (4) Contemporary (5) Vibrant (6) Relevant (7) Fun" (SPIN 
FM, 1999:43).
SPIN's market analysis concludes that "Most importantly a brand focused station, as proposed 
by SPIN, is seen to fill a clear gap in the marketplace" (ibid.:36, in bold). As with The Walt 
Disney Company's 'overriding objective' cited above, it is capitalist ideologies, not the interests of 
youth, that determine the construction of SPIN's media-cultural product.
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4.6 Late modern youth and the institution of school
"[PJotcnt societal-level variables are mediated by many institutions and social practices, 
including the family, peers, school and sometimes religion that we label immediate social 
contexts" (Greenberg et al., 1993:22). As each social context is different so too are 
interpretations. The commodity of youth is reinforced and redefined by these societal institutions. 
More traditional institutions that are involved in creating personal and societal identity must adapt 
to the environment of change themselves or risk becoming dated, irrelevant and ultimately 
obsolete.
The emergence of sophisticated youth orientated marketing and a new language of 
commercialism aimed at this consumer group has coincided with the relative disenfranchisement 
of traditional institutional influences such as church and family structure.
Schools are in the position of having to provide an appropriate education for young people in this 
climate, both academically and socially. Lynch (1989) believes that Irish schools tend to be 
universalistic in their more visible aspects, having similar syllabi, evaluation systems, teacher 
training, hours of schooling, buildings, etc. "The outer core of universalistic provision conceals 
the not-so-visible inner core of particularistic consumption" (ibid.:33), leading to the possibility 
of unseen inequalities. These inequalities will be visible to parents/outsiders, to different degrees, 
depending on their familiarity with the school system and will combine to form one, albeit 
important, social institution inextricably linked with countless others.
The meritocratic ideology of most Western schools, including Irish schools, presupposes that 
ability is primarily expressed in terms of measurable logical-mathematical and linguistic
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intelligence. It supposes that there is a finite 'pool of talent' which must be encouraged and 
rewarded for society to advance economically. Lynch (1989) sees the formula IQ + Effort = Merit 
as being accepted by almost all bodies who have interaction with the schooling sector and that 
this leads to certain academic skills being seen as more worthwhile than others. What Gardner 
(1983, cited Lynch, 1989) describes as bodily-kinesthetic, spatial and musical intelligences 
receive relatively little reward. Lynch goes a step further to say that 'love labour' (the labour 
required to produce caring relations) are not given any formal credence by the school sector at all.
Although the ideologies of individualism are present in Western style education systems 
throughout the world, the current research will look at the Irish situation, which, like every other 
country, is influenced by social, media, economic and historical influences interacting in a unique 
manner. There are however unique aspects of schooling in Ireland, most notably the strong 
influence that the Catholic Church still exerts over schools, especially primary schools (Breen et 
al., 1990; Drudy and Lynch, 1993). Alvey (1991) believes that this influence restricts the 
development of young people and that there is growing support for the secularisation of the 
educational sector.
In Irish schooling, Hannan et al. (1996) reported differences in single and co-educational school 
results, especially for girls. Girls were found to have a lower (academic) self-esteem, higher sense 
of fatalism and lower sense of control than boys. Irish girls also seem to have a lower academic 
self image, more negative body image and a slightly lower sense of control (ibid.). This would 
suggest a relatively higher sense of risk as described above. Boys in co-educational schools were 
found to have lower academic self image than their counterparts in single-sex schools. Hannan et 
al. (1996:87) conclude that "the gender imbalance in coed schools in favour of boys remains 
intact". Boys in single sex schools achieved significantly higher test scores than all other
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categories (co-ed and girls' schools). Girls in vocational/community schools did as well as the 
boys in these schools (Hannan et al., 1996).
These Irish findings differ from international studies (eg. Bryk et al., 1993, cited Hannan et al.,
1996) that have found the effects of mixed gender education negative for girls and broadly neutral 
for boys.
There is some indication that boys in their final (Leaving Certificate) year in co-ed schools have 
less traditional attitudes than their counterparts in single sex schools, and that there are strikingly 
high levels of stress among Junior and Leaving Certificate students. This is influenced by 
educational achievement pressures and the nature of interaction within the schools. Stress was 
linked with feeling constantly under pressure, low academic self-image, a feeling of a lack of 
control, negative body image, loss of self-confidence and an inability to concentrate. Girls were 
unilaterally more highly stressed than boys. Expectations from the institutions of school, family 
and peers were often seen as being more than the students could deliver, for example the 'points 
race' for university qualification (Hannan et al., 1996).
4.6.1 The institution of school for the current work
The current research is not concerned as to the nature of the differences between schools or the 
specific pressures that school places on Irish students. School will be investigated as a social 
institution, as will media-use, gender and family situation. It is not the aim of this research to 
propose reasons for any trends which correlate to the type of school a student attends. What will 
be important to the current research is whether there are correlations between the school that a 
subject attends and how s/he answers questions regarding her/his view of the world. Conclusions 
about the cause of such correlations are beyond the scope of this work.
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4.7 Deviance and resistance
Most writing about youth culture, both inside and outside of academia focuses on resistance or 
deviance and a certain amount of deviance is expected as a healthy part of adolescent behaviour. 
Acts of resistance are seen to be part of identity development, and can also be seen as creating an 
environment for societal development on a larger scale, an opportunity for norms to be re­
evaluated by the next generation of adults. Young people can take some or all of what they 
experience on board as relevant to them either to conform to or rebel against.
Ford and Phillips (1999:143) explore the question "Media may be global but is youth?" The 
social situation of local subcultures is infinitely complex. It is impossible to describe the entirety 
of factors affecting any one person's identity, not to mention the difficulty of attempting to 
explain the ever-changing interacting identities that form even a small alternative sub-culture. 
Local reactions to the globalised message are local, but the globalisation of the message will tend 
to make local reactions more like each other in that they are, at least in one dimension, relating to 
a similar cultural product. The direction of a locally specific reaction to a cultural product will be 
more likely to be similar to other sub-cultures reacting to the same message. Corporate forces 
identify and react to this in trying to maximise their market share. In turn, 'alternative' sub­
cultures, may be normalised to some extent. Individuals who choose exclusion from the norm and 
the 'alternative' are then further marginalised (being alternative from the 'alternative'). Those 
choosing inclusion, even in a sub-culture which exists in the context of trans-national corporate 
capitalism, are choosing to reify and legitimise the hegemonic structure which gains 
commercially from that culture identifying with a globalised cultural product.
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"As texts can never be totally controlled by the dominant, so subjectives can never be produced 
by the dominant ideology alone -  otherwise social change would be impossible" (Fiske, 
1998:201). In late modernity, the sites of the traditional struggle for identity in youth have 
shifted: the roles and expectations of young men and women are becoming more similar. The 
environment in which resistance takes place is heavily influenced by the globalised, media driven 
cultural sphere. If resistant or atypical sub-cultures become large enough to be commercially 
viable, then following the capitalistic logic of Western late modernity, the trend will be for 
globalised forces to maximise their market share of these groups and normalise their arena of 
resistance. An example of this can be seen in what Thornton (1995) describes as 'club cultures'. 
The dance-music medium of club culture is relatively constant internationally: the same cultural 
message is being distributed to young 'alternative' cultures in many countries.
While the cultural product being distributed to such alternative cultures is relatively consistent 
even beyond the Anglophone geo-linguistic region, the sub-cultures interpreting the message are 
municipal, firmly rooted in the local (Thornton, 1995; Ang, 1985). McCleod (1999) found that for 
hip-hop', another music-based 'alternative' culture, there was a complex means of establishing the 
authenticity, or truly alternative nature of music that claimed to be hip-hop'.
As Thornton (1995) points out, the most important thing for members of 'club cultures' is 
associating with people who have similar tastes, which in turn leads to consuming the same 
culture, the same media. Although most 'clubbers' define themselves against the mainstream, the 
act of becoming a group with significant spending power acts to help the globalised institutions 
providing for club culture achieve their corporate aims.
This is further exemplified in the Irish case by SPIN FM who, as discussed above, and as is usual 
in the industry, define 'alternative' as a genre of music. Part of SPIN FM's programme service is
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to offer broadcasts from the associated nightclubs in Manchester, London and Ibiza, provide 'club 
news' and a 'clubbing lifestyle newsletter' (SPIN FM, 1999). 'Alternative' is no longer that which 
doesn't fit into the categories, but is defined, with songs and 'lifestyle choices' according to the 
institutional concept of this 'non-mainstream' demographic, with the ultimate aim of profiting the 
institution's shareholders. To this end, SPIN FM will be providing 'specialist programme 
resources' for alternative tastes. So much has the alternative been defined, that for SPIN FM it 
includes sub-categories such as 'modem alternative', 'deep house' and 'trance'.
Given that the mainstream and 'alternative' genres are defined, a listener who doesn't choose 
inclusion in either of these categories is excluded from the station's marketing strategy, 'lifestyle 
information service' and 'lifestyle news'. It is a reasonable extrapolation to assume that these 
people are excluded from the choice of habitus provided by SPIN FM.
4.8 Consumer culture and a sense of risk in youth
"Adolescence is best defined not by the transition to new roles but by the exclusion from old 
ones" (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:23).
Sociologists have not paid a great deal of attention to the impact of the late modem culture of 
consumption, despite capitalism being the pervading economic force in late modernity (Warde, 
1990). One of the themes of the current research is how young people not only consume, but 
identify with or 'own', certain media or media uses. The act of consumption has become an 
expression of identity, an element defining the 'rules' applying to one's habitus. "Taste classifies 
and classifies the classifier" (Bourdieu, 1984, cited Featherstone, 1990:10-11).
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Pleasure, fantasy, desire and emotion are key in the experience of consumption (Featherstone, 
1990), so the act of commonplace capitalist consumption is more than the mere act of meeting 
one's needs, but an expression of desires and identity-defining behaviour. Featherstone (1990:8) 
suggests that there is a " 'consumption logic' which points to the socially structured ways in which 
goods are used to demarcate social relationships."
The utopian image of the freedom and expression of Western consumerism cannot be separated 
from its involvement in identity creation. Nor can it be separated from having the capacity for 
being ideologically influenced by those who regulate the consumption by creating and 
distributing the cultural product consumed in this environment. Goods are used to create social 
bonds or distinctions and the consumption of these goods cannot be removed from the ideological 
framework leading to their production and distribution (Featherstone, 1990).
Pietrass (1999) contends that the individualisation associated with the underlying trends of late 
modernity, such as Thompson's (1992) transition from fate to choice, leads to less of a reliance on 
institutions which promote a sense of belonging, such as church, neighbourhood and family. 
Pietrass continues that late modem social institutions, including schooling, the media and leisure 
industries, encourage further anonymity, isolation and individualisation.
This emergence of the society of capitalist consumption has coincided with a late modem 
tendency towards declassification and disorder. The relationship between culture, economy and 
society are being re-ordered with a new importance bestowed on "emotional and aesthetic 
satisfactions derived from consumer experiences" (Featherstone, 1990:6). It is the media which 
act as arbiters of this consumption (Anderson and Miles, 1999).
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"Modernity is a post-traditional order, but not one in which the sureties of tradition and habit have 
been replaced by the certitude of rational knowledge. Doubt, a pervasive feature of modem 
critical reason, permeates into everyday life as well as philosophical consciousness, and forms a 
general existential dimension of the contemporary social world" (Giddens, 1991:2-3).
"Modernity is a risk culture" (Giddens, 1991:3). While most people in the Western world are 
probably at less risk than in previous times (depending on the definition of risk), because of the 
late modem move towards a society organised more around the individual, with fewer 'sureties', 
the concept of risk has become fundamental to the way that the social world is organised.
Each social group that a young person is involved with can be a source of stress. Familial 
unemployment, peer bullying and aggression, scholastic expectations and the conflicts between 
various groups such as peer-church, school-family can all add to the sense of stress and a risk of 
loss. The media are often linked with previously non-existent sources of stress, such as the 
development of anxiety about food choice and body image (Dickenson, 1998).
Neo-Marxists would argue that the multinational corporations controlling consumerist tastes 
attempt to define, for the vast majority, the boundaries of the freedom which post-modern 
consumption brings (Craib, 1992). Trans-national corporations can be seen to give the 'freedom' 
to choose any form of consumption, as long as it is profitable for them. There is an element of the 
corporations following and supplying service for an existing demand, but it is in their interest to 
have a limit on the types of demand they are prepared to facilitate. If everyone had different tastes 
it would be unprofitable for a corporation to mass-produce cultural product. It is in companies' 
financial best interest to define a limit of choice, and for this choice to evolve, so that fashion 
changes and people keep consuming. That these trends are in accordance with local cultural
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traditions may influence their exact nature, but this in itself is of no commercial concern to the 
trans-national media corporations.
As early as the 1950s the inter-relationship between consumer goods and the newly emergent 
consumer class of youth was the subject of academic debate (see Abrams, 1959). It is encouraged 
as a 'young' thing to do to identify with the consumerism of new media. Deciding against such 
behaviour leaves a young person 'excluded', which can also increase a sense of risk (or peer 
pressure) for young people, whose buying power has improved but whose social power has 
remained low (Fomas, 1996).
In the context of youth culture, late modem capitalistic trends such as the commercialisation of 
the children's television sphere, the definition of mainstream and acceptable alternatives 
according to corporate agendas and the increasingly inter-related nature of popular media all 
contribute, not just to what young people might own (physically or culturally), but also to the 
sense of potential loss of not owning them.
One of the most commonly agreed upon consequences of the emergence of the consumer culture 
of late modernity and the accompanying redefinition of social space is that the sense of risk of the 
individual has increased, especially for young people (Giddens, 1990).
One of the ways in which advertisers have responded to the youth market becoming increasingly 
fragmented is to broaden the reach of a product by utilising various media and developing a 
product image at once consistent and multi-dimensional, to appeal to different sub-cultural 
groupings (Anderson and Miles, 1999). Increasingly the media product is itself a tool for the 
direct and indirect advertisement of a related line of products. This trend has progressed from off­
shoots like the Mickey Mouse Club (which itself has evolved according to commercial concerns)
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and cinema-related products such as Star Wars cards and toys, through to television cartoons such 
as Transformers, where there was an obvious and sustained link between the cultural production 
and merchandising, to the Pokemon phenomenon, where the merchandise preceded the television 
programme and later films, all of which blatantly encourage young people to purchase the 
associated products. What Buckingham et al. (1999) refer to as the 'thirty-minute commercials' of 
the eighties (of which cartoons such as Transformers and He-Man would be examples) have very 
much made it to feature-length on the T)ig screen'. Youthful habitus must be reconciled in relation 
to such production. Most Irish teenagers would have seen Pokemon related products (for 
example) and placed themselves socially in relation to them.
Mass media discourses are a significant factor in a sense of increased risk related to a 
commercialised agenda. Class divisions and other fundamental lines of inequality (gender, 
ethnicity, youth, etc.) can be partly defined in a modem context in terms of differential access to 
forms of self-actualisation and empowerment which are inextricably linked with late modem 
consumer culture. Personal meaninglessness -  the feeling that life has nothing worthwhile to offer 
becomes a fundamental problem in late modernity. There is a breakdown of traditional notions of 
trust and obligation. "Modernity, one should not forget, produces difference, exclusion and 
marginalisation" (Giddens, 1991:6).
4.9 Moral panics
The current study is an investigation of the relationship between Irish young people and the 
globalised media. Thus far, this chapter has discussed the construction of youth identity or habitus 
in terms defined by the mass media, and a number of other features of late modernity that make 
the conditions of contemporary identity formation unique. The chapter has discussed how youth
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are broadcast to, but as yet there has been little discussion as to how youth are represented by the 
globalised mass media.
Youth are seen as 'at risk' and also 'a risk' Fomas (1995). Young people can be seen, in many 
cases, to have taken the place of scapegoats from other groups such as immigrants, homosexuals, 
leftists and feminists so that the transgressions of youth are equated with problems of the modem 
world (Fomas, 1995; Thompson, 1998). Hujic (1999) however, found that though youth maybe 
seen as a scapegoat for the problems of modernity, broadcasting to young people is still very 
much a site of traditional stereotypes and marginalisation, reifying traditional white-male power 
structures. Notwithstanding this, Anderson and Miles (1999:110) found that "[i]n a world 
characterised by insecurity and uncertainty as to the future, as well as the present, young people 
use the global media as a 'window of stability' through which they can enter a whole new world; a 
world in which regardless of family background they are treated as equals".
Thompson (1998) describes the initial problems of late modem adolescent risk as stemming from 
the social/cultural position of contemporary youth being significantly different to even recent 
generations of youth. Media presentation and subsequent distortion, leads to sensitisation, 
dramatisation and stereotyping. This in turn leads to polarisation of subjects concerning young 
people, and increased deviant behaviour that serves to confirm the media created stereotypes. 
This event is often referred to as a 'moral panic'.
Before continuing this description of moral panics, it is important to point out that there are 
studies that recommend that the media can effectively be used to promote and reinforce positive 
messages to, and about, youth, for example in the promotion of drink-related health messages 
(Yanovitzky and Stryker, 2001; Andsager et al., 2001).
118
Stevenson (1997) sees the traditional structure of the ruling 'male-propertied elite' being 
transformed by new mechanisms of communication which are dependant upon privatised forms 
of reception and promotion of politicians, and other public figures, based on a media-related 
context removed from a policy-based reality.
From time to time societies appear to be subject to serious concern regarding the moral behaviour 
of their youth. Panic centred on the behaviour of, or a threat to, young people can occur as a 
perceived challenge to accepted societal values emerges (Cohen, 1972). In the late modem era 
these are often presented in a stylised and stereotypical manner by the mass media and have 
caused a number of 'moral panics' about the social make-up of the society, particularly as it 
relates to youth.
Cohen's (1972) work opened up the field of moral panic research. It highlights how the mass 
media provide a major source of information about societal norms. Popular culture is often 
considered a threat to young people, as it is associated with leisure, or an interim area between 
family, school and work where there is little control by guardians/supervisors (Boethius, 1995). 
Events are reported in a manner according to 'an unwritten moral agenda' where rumours, hearsay 
and extreme quotes are all legitimate if somewhat distorted means of communication.
The mass media can be seen as trying to create and broadcast to their audience as a unified 
natural 'subject' -  addressing them individually as normal, healthy-minded, right thinking 
commonsensical subjects. Newspapers in particular see an ideal audience of family units, 
surrounded by the 'mad', foreign, criminal and perverted (Thompson, 1998).
Before the advent of the mass mediated message, there are examples of generational conflicts in 
times of rapid social change (due to wars, migration or other factors) (Mead, 1970). While
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generational conflict and societal change are clearly inter-related, it is impossible to determine the 
extent of causality of one on the other historically. It is also important to remember that with the 
unprecedented rate of societal change in late modernity this inter-relationship is increasingly 
multi-dimensional and complex.
These inter-generational moral panics are often seen as 'boundary crises' (Beck, 1992), or what 
Thompson (1998) describes as responses to generational strains, redefining societal boundaries 
between right and wrong for the next generation of adults. That youth are often at the centre of 
such crises is therefore unsurprising. "[M]oral panics are often symptoms of tensions and 
struggles over changes in cultural and moral regulation ... [The field of moral panic research] 
deserves to be seen for what it truly is: a key sociological concept" (Thompson, 1998:142).
With the contemporary emergence of capitalistic media driven society (in addition to being the 
next generation of adults and being expected to rebel to a certain degree) youth form a kind of 
'avant-garde of consumption', pioneering the modem and making use of new media and media 
products (Boethius, 1995).
Many of the fears of adults may be a reaction to the adults' own experience of the persuasive 
power of the commercial mass media message as opposed to its direct effect on younger people. 
"[I]n actual fact, young people's scepticism and powers of analysis are far more developed than in 
older generations" (Anderson and Miles, 1999:108). Rossler and Brosius (2001) for example, 
found that the adolescent perceptions formed from watching one type of programme were 
restricted to the specific issues which were presented - a sense of risk about a particular topic 
would not be transferred to another. If this is indeed the case, moral panics regarding the 
protection of children from the consumerist messages of advertising and programming more 
generally, would be founded on misguided opinion, largely propagated by the media themselves.
120
Globalised corporations must attempt to offer products acceptable to young people as new and 
alternative to what existing society offers, giving them the perception that they are rebelling. At 
the same time they must assure parents, politicians, teachers etc. that what they offer is 
progressive, safe and desirable. While doing all of this they also must achieve the corporate goals 
of profit and market dominance.
Such interacting forces can have significant societal and ontological effects. These are reflected, 
for example, through changes in legislation based as much, if not more, on media coverage than 
factual events. Often, this media representation characterises, exaggerates and distorts negative 
images of youth, leading to inaccurate societal prediction and symbolisation of the young, as 
"[t]he media are competing for audiences and are tempted to sensationalize, personalize and even 
demonize in their eagerness to attract attention" (Thompson, 1998:88).
Processes by which this is achieved include using extreme quotes as headlines such as 'AIDS is 
the wrath of God, says vicar' (The Sun, 1985, cited by Thompson, 1998), and extrapolating 
figures to often illogical and certainly ill-founded ends.
The mass media can also create a sense of moral panic or decay, and a sense of risk by taking a 
truly shocking incident (eg. the murder of two-year-old James Bulger in 1993) and fitting it into 
the norms of society. Placing it as normal - or not unexpected in relation to the pre-established 
discourse leads to a much deeper sense of moral panic than a 'freak' incident.
Thompson (1998) describes the main difference between the James Bulger case in 1993 and the 
abduction and murder 5 years previously of Sharona Joseph by a 12 year old girl, as being the 
fact that the Bulger abduction was caught on videotape and thus extremely 'user friendly' for
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media producers. It physically showed a number of causes for alarm such as people not 
interfering, a very 'normal' looking day in a shopping mall etc. At the time of writing in 2001, the 
Bulger case was again causing alarm in the media as his killers were being released from custody.
Sensationalist errors in the mass media, such as The Sun (25/11/93) reporting a link found 
between violent videos and the Bulger killing have led to a discourse (to 'Ban Movie Nasties') and 
further sensationalism of a fairly normal aspect of life (such as watching a video and the decision 
to let one's children do the same). A lobby group, in the wake of this incident was able to raise 
£13,000 (Sterling) to amend a bill to tighten up video censorship. Later retraction of the claims of 
finding a link between violence in youth and that on videos, although given similar space in the 
paper, did not 'undo' the societal change caused by the sensationalism (Thompson, 1998).
4.9.1 Irish youth and moral panics
It is also possible for academic writing and government sponsored publications to affect decision 
making bodies in a similar way to moral panics. Forde's (1995) Growing Up in Ireland is an 
example of a publication that might do this. The Chief Executive of the National Youth 
Federation prefaced the volume by praising Forde's lifetime of work with young people. This 
commendation gives a sense of governmental support to Forde who then paints a very bleak 
picture of the life-world of Irish youth. Referring to, but not naming, marketing research which 
was eight years old (when Forde published it in 1995) as if it was still relevant to Irish youth 
services, Forde states that "[s]even out of ten young adults (70%) feel that Ireland does not offer 
them a good future" and that "[sjeven out of ten young Irish adults are broadly unhappy with 
the direction they see society moving in this country" (Forde, 1995:37 in boldface type). "One 
of the most disturbing features of Ireland today must be the extent of hopeless apathy and latent
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fear. There are daily crises, fears of war, of disasters, fear of want, fear of unemployment, fear of 
loneliness, of sickness, fear of what the young may be made to suffer" (Forde, 1995:58).
Although in this case it may not have, individual reports like Forde's could, by their tone and 
choice of statistics quoted (which may also have had market based as opposed to policy based 
aims) have the potential to adversely affect decision making, having a similar effect as a mass- 
media driven moral panic.
Sensationalist and ill-founded reporting can lead to a moral panic, as headlines such as "Youth 
and child suicide at crisis point" (Irish Examiner, 27/9/99) exemplify. The lead line of this article 
is clearly sensationalist "DEPRESSED and vulnerable children as young as 10 are at risk of 
taking their own lives, a study of youth suicide in Ireland shows". The article then cites a report 
on youth suicide which studied suicide rates in people between ten and twenty-four years of age. 
The article went on to say that approximately five percent (19 out of 368) of suicides in the 10-24 
year demographic in Ireland between 1994 and 1997 were in the 10-14 year old age group. There 
is no reference to how many, or if any, ten years old were found to have committed suicide during 
this time. This is not to say that youth suicide is not a problem, but that the method of reporting it 
is often sensationalist and typical of that type of reporting that leads to media driven moral 
panics.
The National Suicide Research Foundation (NSRF) describe the situation thus:
"In the past twenty years or so there has been a threefold increase in the Irish male suicide rate 
(approx. 7 to 21 per 100,000). The female rate has remained virtually unchanged throughout this 
time. When examined in broad age groups, it can be seen that men aged 15-24 years have 
exhibited the sharpest rise in suicide (from 7 to 27per 100,000) having had the lowest male rate
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until 1990. When the pattern o f male and female suicide is examined for the period 1993-1997, 
the striking difference between the young men and women becomes apparent with a sevenfold 
difference in the rates for those in their twenties. The male rate peaks at the 20-24 year-olds after 
which there is a more-or-less steady fa ll in the rate. Women are at highest risk when in their late 
forties and early fifties" (Corcoran, 2000).
4.9.2 Gender, sexual pressures and moral panics
Young people's sexual behaviour is often a cause for mass mediated public concern, and possible 
moral panics. Discourse about the sexual behaviour of youth tends to be polarised and can create 
stereotypes (Greenberg, 1993), where protagonists are often labelled or stereotyped as being 
'good' or 'evil' (Thompson, 1998), similar to the professional practice of 'telethon television' 
discussed in chapter 2. Peer influences for example are usually portrayed by the mass media as 
negative, when in fact most are positive. Positive peer influences however do not often make for 
commercially viable media product and are therefore rendered 'invisible' (Moore and Rosenthal, 
1993).
Gender divisions are manifest in the social structure of communities, life histories, family and 
work. While there have always been gender divisions in all levels of society their exact nature is 
fluid and with the increased pace and flow of images in late modernity the reassessment of sexual 
identity takes place over an ever decreasing time frame.
The private nature of sexuality, particularly in adolescence, makes the interpretation of responses 
extremely difficult to obtain. Most research into adolescent sexuality has focused on intercourse 
and has ignored social expressions of sexuality, which Greenberg et al. (1993) describe as being 
enormously important parts of adolescent socialisation, and rarely involve intercourse.
124
There is common concern in the public sphere about adolescent media consumption habits, 
knowledge and attitudes and how these impact on young people. The media's influence on young 
people's sexuality is a common arena for public debate among adults with political aspirations 
(Greenberg, 1993). Media content, such as rock music and videos, have often been linked to a 
breakdown of morality and problems such as a rise in teenage pregnancy rates. A common fear is 
that young people are being given ideas about how to be 'sexy', but not sexually responsible. This 
debate, which is impossible to hold without the mass media's co-operation influences 
governmental policy. At the same time, the media control the forum of debate about their own 
social role.
The mass media promotion of sexuality without responsibility also ignores gender differences in 
attitudes to sexual activity. Moore and Rosenthal (1993:85) give the example that "more girls 
than boys cite being in love as their main reason for being sexually active" as typical of many 
issues of adolescent 'socio-sexuality' which are completely beyond the scope of most mass media 
organisations to address. Instead, the media tend to concentrate on 'sexuality without 
responsibility' and sensationalism of youth sexuality issues in a manner that keeps with the 
tendency to 'dumb-down' and deliver 'least objectionable programming' to the youth market.
Gore's (1987) Raising PG Kids in an X-rated society exemplifies the inter-relationship between 
politics and the mass media in the debate about the mass media and adolescent sociability. 
Clearly, Gore's concerns can be seen as having a good deal of political and public acceptance as 
her husband was nominated for and elected US Vice-President. Her fears about society in general 
being 'X-rated' were therefore considered by the Democratic Party and the US public to be 
suitable for a potential First-Lady.
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4.10 Gender roles and the current study
Gender is an extremely significant factor in socialisation for young people, and will be examined 
for correlations with ideological 'modes of thought', just as schooling, family background and 
media usage are. The current work will attempt to highlight variations in the ways of thinking of 
young Irish boys and girls. While there will be a brief description of any differences found, media 
use is the focus of this study, and thus any discussion about gender will be in the context of media 
usage patterns.
Post modernity is linked with a trend that involves the roles and expectations of young men and 
women becoming more similar. The move away from clearly defined gender roles, while 
increasing the opportunities for girls, has also increased the crisis of identity for both girls and 
boys as the social expectations on each become less clearly defined.
As discussed above, Hannan et al. (1996) found that there seems to be a lower self-confidence 
among girls in all school types across Ireland and that there is a continuing transition of gender 
role expectation, especially of girls. As the expectations of boys and girls become more similar, 
feminine characteristics are being viewed more positively. Similarly, girls are expected to be self- 
confident and independent as well as being understanding, kind and expressive. Even so, there 
still seems to be an element of priming girls with the idea that selflessness and passivity will 
eventually lead to happiness through the actions of a male protagonist (Moore and Rosenthal, 
1993). There is the risk that while being given these new opportunities, girls are being expected to 
achieve these in addition to more traditional roles. This might have the effect of putting pressure 
on girls to succeed in more areas and making a feeling of fulfilment or actualisation more difficult 
to achieve.
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"Analysis of adolescent friendship patterns shows that, while girls and boys may have a similar 
number of friends at pre-adolescence and during their teenage years, girls' friendships are 
characterised by more self-disclosure, discussion of problems, sharing of emotions, and mutual 
support than boys' friendships. Boys tend to have activity-orientated friendships -  they do things 
with their friends (sport etc.). Girls also have activity-orientated friendships, but their talk is 
likely to be more intimate and relationship orientated -  being about who they are and how they 
feel" (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:95). The current research will look for evidence of such trends 
in the ways that young people interact with various media.
Sexual identity is a key site of social regulation, yet it has traditionally been the subject of little or 
no importance in the school curriculum. One in four British schools in 1992 had no policy on sex 
education yet many parents rely on teachers in this area. In the US at the same time 40% of 
students left high-school without any formal sex education (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993). Young 
people often have to create their gender-based identities outside of formal, family or religious 
instruction. With the increase in the prominence of the mass media in youth identity creation, and 
the commercial success of advertisements, music videos etc. with clear ramifications for sexual 
identity, it seems inevitable that a significant amount of sexual knowledge, attitudes and identity 
in youth will be influenced by these media. A young person need not see the ideals presented in 
the media as being appropriate to them, but will contextualise her/his own identity with regard to 
the mass mediated message. This ties in with a moral panic about the value and idealisation of the 
nuclear family. Moral decay has often been correlated with the breakdown in the 'traditional 
family'. "[T]he media have given prominence to a discursive formation that articulated together a 
combination of neo-liberal individualism and neo-conservative nostalgia for a moral golden age -  
an imagined national community unified by common values" (Moore and Rosenthal, 1993:141).
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4.11 Summary
This work has discussed and defined ideology, globalisation, identity, late modernity and youth 
historically, and in contemporary academic terms. Such definitions serve to situate both the 
current and future research investigating of the ideological relationship between Irish young 
people and the media they use.
The next chapter details a survey carried out on a sample of Irish youth to investigate their 
patterns of media use and compare it to a relatively recent previous generation of Irish youth. In 
accordance with the theory detailed thus far in this volume, this study also seeks to establish 
whether there is a connection between the media use of the current sample and their ideological 
modes of thought.
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Chapter 5. Methodology
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5.1 Introduction to methodology
Since it was proposed in 1969, one of the major arguments against Schiller's thesis of US led 
cultural imperialism has been a lack of empirical evidence to support it. This is only one of the 
common criticisms of the cultural imperialist model discussed in chapter 2, and theorists such as 
Tomlinson (1997) and Boyd-Barrett (1998) are divided as to the value of the concept of cultural 
imperialism, even disregarding the problem of evidence.
The current work is not an attempt to endorse or support the cultural imperialist model. It is an 
exploration of the relationship between mass media globalisation and the identity of Irish youth 
culture. In taking a step towards mapping this relationship however, the current research was 
designed to examine whether there was empirical support for the concept that the capitalist forces 
driving mass media globalisation can be shown to have a measurable impact in the identity 
formation or habitus of Irish youth. The relationship between the empirical findings of this work 
and the various theoretical concepts described in previous chapters, including cultural 
imperialism, will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
5.2 Three approaches to social science research
Neuman (2000) outlines three approaches used in social science research: positivist, interpretive 
and critical.
Positivism approaches social studies in a manner similar to the natural sciences. Positivists search 
for scientific explanations for social phenomena, and assume that there are 'truths' governing 
behaviour that can be discovered through a value-free scientific search for facts.
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The interpretive approach attempts to develop an understanding of how social life 'works' in 
natural settings. The meaning of social action, not just the behaviour itself, is the subject of study. 
In contrast to positivists, interpretive researchers see people as using 'common sense' to determine 
how to behave. Interpretive social research often has the aim of understanding this 'common 
sense' reasoning. Where positivists evaluate theories by setting up testable hypotheses that other 
researchers could duplicate, for interpretive researchers, a theory gains validity if it makes sense 
to the people being studied and encourages understanding from people outside their social 
situation.
While the critical social science approach agrees with many of the criticisms that interpretive 
social scientists have of positivism being "narrow, antidemocratic and nonhumanist in its use of 
reason" (Neuman, 2000:76), it is also critical of the interpretive approach as being inadequate in 
explaining social action. Bourdieu (cited Neuman, 2000) for example, argues that social research 
must be reflexive, criticising itself as well as its subject matter. Critical approaches to social 
science maintain that positivist approaches tend to defend the status quo because they assume an 
unchanging social order. For proponents of critical social science, the discipline should look 
deeper than the superficial explanations offered by positivism and interpretive social science to 
uncover the 'real structures' of the material world, in order to help individuals take control of their 
life-world.
The current research draws from all three of these approaches. It suggests two hypotheses that are 
tested by a methodology that could essentially be repeated by others following the procedure 
detailed below. Elements of the interpretive approach are evident, both in conversation with the 
two pilot groups, and through interaction with individuals from the main sample. The critical 
approach is also important to the current work. In measuring correlations between media use and 
ideological modes of thought, it is not an attempt to determine an inflexible social structure, but is
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a signpost of how young Irish people's habitus were constructed at the time that the survey was 
done. The current research attempts to historically situate young Irish people's identity formation, 
in relation to past findings (particularly Reynolds, 1985). Future research is invited to use the 
current research to explore the future direction of change of Irish youth habitus.
5.3 The hypotheses
This work is concerned with exploring the effects of globalised media forces on Irish youth 
culture, mapping them historically and within the ideological frameworks of contemporary young 
people's habitus.
Chapter 3 proposed that in studying late modem habitus, one might expect that, with the rapid 
pace of change in the social environment, an individual's life-world would be constructed in a 
social environment significantly different to even relatively recent generations.
More specifically, this work is concerned with establishing the validity of viewing the social 
environment in which contemporary young Irish people's habitus is formed as being significantly 
different to that of Reynolds' 1985 study. The study will also attempt to establish whether current 
patterns of Irish young people's media use correlate with their ideological modes of thought.
To this end, the following hypotheses were proposed:
Hypothesis A: That the media-related socialisation patterns of Irish youth have changed 
significantly over the past 15 years.
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Hypothesis B: That Irish youths' current patterns of media consumption are independently 
correlated with ideological modes of thought.
The first hypothesis draws on work by Reynolds (1990) who studied the media use of young Irish 
people in April and May of 1985. The current study was conducted exactly 15 years later in April 
and May of 2000. It asked 15 questions about media use that were either identical to Reynolds' 
1985 survey or slightly adjusted to include new technology such as compact disks, cable 
television and the Internet. A copy of the 2000 questionnaire is included in Appendix B of this 
work.
In attempting to find support for the second hypothesis, the questionnaires distributed to the 
sample in 2000 asked a series of questions about the social world of young people and the 
influence that the mass media have on it (Part B of the questionnaire). Responses were analysed 
for correlations between views about the organisation of the social world (which comprises an 
important part of personal ideology or habitus) and patterns of media consumption, as measured 
in the first part of the questionnaire.
5.4 Subjects and Schools
In 1985 Reynolds studied young people whom she spilt into 1 2 - 1 4  and 1 5 - 1 7  year old 
demographics. As there are relatively complicated questions in Part B of the questionnaire, it was 
decided to duplicate only Reynolds' older demographic which was comprised of 527 respondents.
Eight schools in the province of Leinster were contacted by the author. All agreed to take part in 
the study and were assured of confidentiality. Altogether 373 students (179 females and 194 
males) aged between 15-17 (average age 16.0) formed the sample for the 2000 study. To arrive at
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a similar sample of schools to Reynolds, 2 of the schools were community colleges, 2 were 
private, 3 were single-sex (2 female and 1 male - 91.1% of the respondents from a fourth school 
were male) and 3 were rural. In consultation with a professional person currently working in a 
senior position dealing with schools all around Ireland an attempt was made to survey students 
from schools in a broad range of socio-economic areas.
5.5 Pilot study
The final structure of the survey was altered after a pilot study. The pilot sample consisted of two 
groups of 15 students each, in the age range of the main sample. These groups, from schools in 
Dublin with which the author had a small degree of personal involvement, completed an earlier 
draft of the questionnaire approximately one month before the final version was distributed. In 
informal consultation with the author, the pilot group, who were independent of the final sample, 
suggested changes that might be made to the questionnaire. After consultation with the pilot 
group, the questionnaire was shortened. A number of questions were omitted and two questions 
(A37 and A45) were added. A small number of questions also had their wording changed slightly 
for improved clarity. The responses of the pilot group were not included in any statistical 
analyses.
5.6 The questionnaire
Part A of the questionnaire was designed to measure the respondents' access to, and use of, the 
mass media. Much of Part A was a follow-up to Reynolds' 1985 questionnaire. Part B of the 
questionnaire was designed to test Hypothesis B: "That Irish youths' patterns of media 
consumption are independently correlated with ideological modes of thought". Questions
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designed to gauge the subjects' opinions on a number of ideological issues were tested for 
correlation with the patterns of media usage measured in Part A.
The 30 questions in Part B of the questionnaire were written to gauge the respondents' attitudes 
towards various aspects of mass media socialisation. The order of the questions was randomised 
as shown below:
• Perceived gender differences in media product/focus (Questions 1,7, 11, 19, 22, 25).
• Attitudes to Irish versus imported media product (Questions 4, 8, 9, 20, 27, 30).
• The perceived effect of the media on an individual's identity (Question 5, 6, 12, 17, 18, 21).
• The perceived effect of the media on a group's identity (Question 3, 10, 13, 14, 15, 23).
• The mass media's view of and attitude towards the young consumer (Questions 2, 16, 24, 26,
28, 29).
Mass media socialisation and three other social institutions were to be correlated with the 
responses given to Part B of the questionnaire. These were gender, 'family situation' and 'school'. 
Gender is an obvious and vitally important factor in teenage socialisation. Respondents were only 
asked about one aspect of their family situation - the number of parents they lived with. 
Responses to this question were coded into two groups, those that lived with both their mother 
and father, and those who did not. Altogether, 85.0% of respondents lived with both their mother 
and father.
School was also simplified, to which of the eight schools surveyed the respondent attended. 
Factors such as family income, where the respondents lived, peer groups and teacher/student
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relationships would have all been significant in determining what the 'school' category actually 
measured in terms of socialisation.
Gender, 'family situation' and 'school', were not primary foci of the current research. Only single 
aspects of these complex social institutions were tested for correlations with the questions in Part 
B. This was done to indicate whether more traditional social institutions correlated with the 
'ideological modes of thought' that Part B measured. As with the correlations between media use 
and 'ideological modes of thought', it is the existence of significant correlations that the 
questionnaire sought, the direction, cause and meaning of the correlations that were found were 
largely irrelevant.
The questions testing Hypothesis B were distributed at the same time to the same students as 
those testing Hypothesis A, to form one questionnaire (included as Appendix B of this work).
Written after the last question was an invitation to provide feedback about the questionnaire. The 
last page was over 50% blank to allow for subjects' responses.
5.6.1 Distribution of the questionnaire
The author personally delivered the questionnaires to class teachers who distributed them in a 
normally scheduled class. Subjects were given 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire, those 
who required more time were allowed up to a further five minutes. Because the author has a non- 
Irish accent and a number of the questions in the survey ask about attitudes towards foreign media 
product and people, it was decided that the author would not have any personal contact with the 
subjects until after they had completed the questionnaire.
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5.7 Collation of results
The data from the questionnaire were coded for a small number of questions (as is detailed in the 
next chapter) and were input into the SPSS (version 8.0) statistical package by the author. In 
order to ensure that the data was coded and input reliably, a colleague of the author independently 
entered a random selection of 5% of responses for a second time. Over 1000 input data were 
checked with no discrepancies between the author and his colleague.
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6.1 Introduction to chapter
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part A and Part B present and discuss the results 
concerning hypotheses A and B (respectively). Part C discusses findings that were not 
specifically sought by the two hypotheses, but were of interest to the study. Unless otherwise 
noted, a significance level of o =0.01 was used for all correlations or differences referred to as 
'significant'.
Many correlations are presented in Part B of this chapter. This study is concerned with trends of 
significant correlations as opposed to the magnitude of individual pairs of linked data. Indeed, 
because the attitudes surveyed in Part B of the questionnaire are not comparable, it would be 
misleading to publish the magnitudes of correlations between ideological modes of thought and 
mass media consumption. For example, two questions from the attitude survey - one regarding 
attitudes to gender representation and one regarding multiculturalism - might both correlate 
significantly with watching television. However, one cannot compare the magnitudes of these 
correlations (i.e. how strongly people agreed with each question) because the attitudes being 
measured are not equivalent. Answering that one 'Agrees' with the question on gender 
representation might be more important to an individual than answering that one 'Strongly agrees' 
with the statement on multiculturalism.
6.2 Part A: 1985-2000 comparison
Part A compares the media use of the 1985 and the 2000 samples. The data relating to each 
question is presented and briefly explained. This is followed by a more general discussion 
comparing the two samples.
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Question (A ll) Have you more than one television at home? [__] Yes [__] No
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
50% of Reynolds' 15-17 year old respondents had more than one television in their home. 95.1% 
of the current sample reported more than one television in their home. There is obviously a 
significant difference here. In 2000, 78.0% of respondents reported having access to 9 or more 
television stations (A5). In 1985 the most number of stations available in Ireland was 6, and many 
respondents would have only had access to the two national stations.
(A13) Do you think what you learn at school is relevant to ordinary life?
[_] Yes [_] Some of it
|_] No [_] Don't know
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
Although this question does not directly explore media use, it was repeated so that any 
differences in media consumption patterns could be discussed in terms of attitudes to another 
important social institution, school.
In 2000, 16.4% answered 'Yes' while 4.6% answered No'. In 1985 16% answered Yes' while 7% 
answered 'No'. Significantly fewer females (2.9%) than males (6.2%) answered No' to this 
question in 2000. This gender difference was not present in 1985. For Part B of the questionnaire, 
answers of 'Don't know' were ignored so that the question would be polar ('Yes' and No' 
separated by 'Some of it').
(A14) Do you learn from television?
[_] A lot [_] A certain amount
[_] Very little |_] Nothing
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This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
There is no significant difference between the 1985 and 2000 results for males and females 
combined. In 1985 there was a significant gender difference evident, with 14.8% of males 
reported learning 'A lot' from television compared to 9.9% of females (in the age group of the 
current study). As Table 1 and Figure 1 (below) demonstrate, the percentage of female 
respondents answering 'A lot' has fallen to 8.4% while the percentage for males has risen to 
19.5%.
One reason for the increase in this divide could be that the television channels that have become 
available to the Irish consumer since 1985 have catered more to the interests of males than 
females. This theory is supported by the fact that in the 2000 study, gender differences were 
found in the preferences of some stations, while Reynolds reported that this was not the case in 
1985. Significantly more males chose the cable stations Sky Sports (6.7% to 0%) and Sky 1 
(37.1% to 25.7%) as the station they watched most, while significantly more females chose the 
terrestrial Network 2 (RTE 2) as their favourite (18.4% to 9.3%). Further, in 2000, males were 
found to have access to more television stations (A5) at home than females, and those with more 
television stations were more likely to think that television made for teenagers was primarily 
aimed at boys (B7).
Females
1985
Females
2000
Males
1985
Males
2000
Combined
1985
Combined
2000
A lot 9.9% 8.4% 14.8% 19.5% 12.2% 14.2%
A certain amount 79.3% 81.5% 70.9% 66.5% 75.4% 73.7%
V ery little 9.5% 8.4% 13.8% 12.4% 11.4% 10.5%
Nothing 1.4% 1.7% 0.1% 1.5% 1.0% 1.6%
Table 1. Comparison of 1985 and 2000 answers to the question "Do you learn from television?"
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Figure 1. Do you learn from television?
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(A15) How many books have you read in the last month?
[ ] More than 4 [_] 2 to 4
[ ] 1 only [_] none
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
Reynolds found that 15-17 year old males reported reading fewer books than females. In the 
current study the breakdown was as shown in Table 2 (below).
More
4
than 2 to 4 1 None
Females 2000 7.8% 34.1% 36.9% 21%
Males 2000 6.7% 24.9% 31.1% 37.3%
Combined 2000 7.3% 29.3% 33.9% 29.6%
Combined 1985 18% 27% 26% 28%
Table 2. Books read in the past month (2000)
Table 2 (above) shows that although the number of frequent readers (more than 4 books in the 
past month) is similar for males and females, there is a significant difference in the distribution of 
less frequent readers. In accordance with Reynolds' 1985 group, males reported reading 
significantly fewer books than females. Significantly fewer respondents in 2000 reported reading 
■More than 4' books in the past month than in 1985.
(A16) Do you belong to a library other than your school library? (__] Yes [__] No
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
Reynolds found that gender was an important factor in library (apart from school library) 
membership, with males in the age group of the present study significantly less likely than 
females to belong to a library outside of school.
143
For the 2000 study, in contrast to Reynolds' (1985) findings, there was no significant gender 
difference in library membership with 72.1% of females and 72.4% of males reporting that they 
belonged to libraries outside of school. There is a significant increase in library membership 
across both genders, especially for males. In 1985 Reynolds reported 48% of her 1985 
respondents as being a member of a library outside of school.
The increase in library membership does not correspond with an increase in reading. There are 
many other possible causes for this increase, including using new technologies, such as the 
Internet and CD ROMs at libraries. In 2000 8.6% of respondents (8.9% of females and 8.2% of 
males) reported using the Internet in libraries outside of their school library (A10). Obviously, in 
1985 this figure was 0%.
(A17) Do you buy books?
[ ] Very often [ ] Often
[ J Sometimes [_J Never
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
As Table 3 (below) shows, the breakdown of how this question was answered is remarkably 
similar between the 1985 and 2000 samples.
V ery Often Often Sometimes Never
Females 2000 7.8% 13.4% 51.4% 27.4%
Males 2000 3.6% 12.4% 44.3% 39.7%
Combined 5.6% 12.9% 47.7% 33.8%
2000
Combined 6% 8% 52% 34%
1985
Table 3. Comparison of book buying between 1985 and 2000
Reynolds found that gender was an important factor in book buying, with more males saying that 
they never bought books. This result was repeated in 2000, as shown in Table 3 (above),
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significantly more males reported never buying books (39.7% compared to 27.4% for females). 
Males in the 2000 sample also reported buying books 'Very Often' significantly less than females 
(3.6% and 7.8% respectively).
(A18) Do you buy comics or magazines?
[ ] Very often [_] Often
f 1 Sometimes [_] Never
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
As can be seen in Table 4 (below), comic and magazine buying has not changed significantly 
between the 1985 and 2000 group. Reynolds did not provide figures for the gender breakdown of 
this question. In 2000, significantly more females reported buying comics or magazines 'Very 
often' (26.4% compared to 11.3% for males), while significantly more males reported Never' 
buying comics or magazines (28.9% compared to 10.1%).
1985 2000
V ery Often 18% 18.5%
Often 12% 17.7%
Sometimes 45% 43.8%
Never 24% 19.9%
Table 4. Do you buy comics or magazines?
(A19) If you do buy comics or magazines, name your favourites
The words "buy comics or magazines" were added to this question. This was implied in Reynolds' 
1985 survey, coming immediately after question A18 (above).
As with Reynolds' 1985 survey, choice of comics or magazines was almost completely gender 
divided. Using the same categories for magazines as Reynolds, females reported titles in the 
Teenage Girls' Magazines (62.3%), Pop Music Magazines (50.1%) and Computer Magazine
145
(5.3%) genres to be their favourites. Males reported Sports Magazines (61.1%), Computer 
Magazines (27.9%) and Pop Music Magazines (10.3%) as their favourites. No male respondents 
listed any Teenage Girls' magazine titles in their list of favourites.
NB. In both 1985 and 2000, subjects were given space to list their three favourite comics or 
magazines, so cumulative percentages could be higher that 100.
(A20) How often do you go to the cinema?
[__] Once a week [__] About once a month
[__] Less than once a month [__] Never
This question was changed slightly from Reynolds' 1985 survey as the pilot group were unclear 
as to the meaning of Reynolds' 'Occasionally' category. Consequently it was decided that only the 
'Once a week' and Never' categories could be compared.
Figure 2 (below) shows a clear rise in weekly cinema attendance, with the percentage of all 
subjects attending cinema weekly rising from 3.1% in 1985 to 24.2% in 2000. Similarly, the 
percentage of all respondents who reported never going to the cinema dropped from 10.6% to 
3.2%.
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Figure 2. Frequency of cinema attendance 1985/2000
Females
1985
Females
2000
Males
1985
Males
2000
Combined
1985
Combined
2000
Once a 2.7 29.8 3.9 19.1 3.1 24.2
week
Never 9.9 2.2 11.4 4.1 10.6 3.2
Table 5. How often do you go to the cinema?
Table 5 (above) shows a significant gender bias in both the 'Once a week' and 'Never' categories 
for the 2000 group. This difference was further investigated on advice from a colleague of the 
author who suggested that the gender bias might be linked to whether a subject went to a co­
educational or single-sex school. When separating the subjects by type of school, it was found 
that in co-educational schools there was a significantly larger gender bias in the 'Once a week' 
response than in single-sex schools. In co-educational schools 35.3% of female respondents 
reported going to the cinema 'Once a week' compared to 21.7% of males. In single-sex schools 
this difference was only 2.0% with both females and males significantly less likely go to the 
cinema weekly (11.5% and 9.5% respectively). These results were the opposite of what was 
expected.
(A22) How many hours per day do you spend listening to the radio?
[ ] Less than 1 hour [_] 1 to 2 hours
[ ] 2 to 3 hours [_] 3 hours or more
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
Reynolds reported that girls tended to listen to significantly more radio than boys. This was found 
to also be the case in the current study with 22.3% of females reporting that they listened to the 
radio for less than one hour per day compared to 45.1% of boys. Similarly, 20.1% of girls 
reported listening to 3 hours or more of radio per day compared with 11.4% of boys.
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(A23) Name the radio station you listen to most often.
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
There are many factors militating against comparing the 1985 listening figures to the 2000 data. 
There have been many new licences issued since 1985, with a number of previously 'pirate' 
stations becoming licensed commercial stations. Although Reynolds' and the present study have a 
similar proportion of rural subjects, the fact that Reynolds' study was nation-wide might also 
make a significant difference in the availability of stations. In 1985 pirate stations were most 
popular with 59% of Reynolds' subjects. The current results were coded by 'type of station' (this 
coding was labelled as question A23.5).
As Figure 3 (below) shows, commercial stations were most popular with 52% of the 2000 group, 
followed by pirate (33%), government (12%) and foreign (3%).
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Figure 3. Preferred radio station by type (2000)
In 1985, RTE 2 was the most popular station overall, preferred by 28% of respondents. In 2000 
the commercial station FM 104 was the most popular with 31.7% of all respondents listing it as 
their favourite, compared to 9.9% for 2 FM (RTE 2 had since changed its name to 2 FM). RTE 1, 
which was preferred by 3% in 1985, was not preferred by any of the 2000 respondents.
(A25) How much time would you spend on Saturday or Sunday watching television?
[__] 1 hour or less [_] 1 to 2 hours
[ ] 2 to 3 hours [_] 3 hours or more
Reynolds' questions regarding the length of time spent watching television proved difficult to 
answer in the 2000 pilot study. Reynolds' question read "How much time would you spend on 
Saturday or Sunday watching television?" The possible responses were 1 hour or less, 2 hours, 3 
hours or 4 or more hours. After consulting with the subjects who took part in the pilot study, it 
was decided to include the question with more definite periods for the answers, although this 
meant that only the first category (1 hour or less) could be compared.
In 1985, Reynolds found that 14% of females and 9% of males reported watching 1 hour or less 
of television on Saturday or Sunday. In 2000 the corresponding figures were 9.6% for females 
and 11.5% for males. These results suggest that more girls are spending at least 1 hour watching 
television on weekends, and that girls and boys are now about the same in this. The percentage of 
females watching 1 hour or less of television had decreased significantly. In 2000 there was no 
gender significant gender difference in any of the four categories for this answer, as shown in 
Table 6 (below).
1 hour
le ss
or 1 to 2 hours 2 to 3 hours 3 hours or more
Females 9.6% 29.7% 26.4% 34.2%
Males 11.5% 25.0% 25.5% 38.0%
Combined 10.5% 27.3% 25.9% 36.2%
Table 6. Time watc aing television at weekends (2000)
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(A28) Do you think teenagers need their own special TV programmes? 
f | Yes [ _ |  No
This question was repeated exactly as it was asked by Reynolds in 1985.
Reynolds found that 82% of her subjects thought that teenagers needed their own special TV 
programmes, with no significant difference between females and males. In 2000 this figure was 
significantly lower (57.9%), again with no significant gender difference.
(A29) Where do you usually get most information about what is going on in this country 
and in the world today?
[__ ] School [_] Radio
[__ | Newspapers [_] Friends or relations
[__ ] Television. [_] Internet
[__ ] Other, please specify
This question was identical to the question asked by Reynolds, except that the 'Internet' and 
'Other, please specify' options were added.
Reynolds reported that 89% of her sample relied on the media as their main source of 
information. Answers, as shown in Figure 4 (below) were divided between TV (37%), 
Newspapers (29%), Radio (23%), School (8%) and Friends (3%). In 2000, 93.5% listed the 
combined media, including the Internet, as their main source of information. As shown in Figure 
5, the figures for 1985 and 2000 are similar, although there is a significant increase in the reliance 
on friends (12%) and school (12%) in 2000. Obviously, the Internet at 4% in 2000 was 0% in 
1985.
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Figure 4. Where do you usually get most information about what is going on in this country and in the
world today (1985)?
Newspapers
29%
Figure 5. Where do you usually get most information about what is going on in this country and in the
world today (2000)?
Other
1%
Internet
4% ~ l
(A30) Which television station do you watch most? |
The question 'Which television station do you watch the most?' was asked by Reynolds in 1985. 
At that time there were only 6 television stations available to the Irish public. On Reynolds' 
questionnaire the six stations were listed with the respondent marking which corresponded to 
their favoured station. Due to the multitude of stations available in 2000, The question was asked 
as shown above and the respondent was required to write the name of their favoured station.
Table 7 (below) shows the 1985 sample's responses to this question and the percentage of 
respondents who, in 2000 preferred these stations. The preference for all stations surveyed in 
1985 fell significantly except for RTE 2, which rose significantly.
Channel 1985 2000
RTE 1 36% 3.7%
ITV 29% 4.2%*
B BC 1 24% 2.8%
R TE 2 5% 14.4%**
BBC 2 2 % 0 .8%
Total 96% 25.9%
Table 7. Comparison of the popularity in 2000 of TV stations polled in 1985 
* In 2000 Answers of HTV and UTV were included in figures for ITV.
** RTE 2 is now known as Network 2.
Figure 6 (below) shows the stations listed as watched most by the 2000 sample. The 'Other' 
category consisted of 6 channels that polled 2% or less. These were TV3 (2.0%), Trouble (1.1%), 
BBC 2 (0.8%), Nickelodeon (0.8%), National Geographic (0.6%) and Bravo (0.3%). 
Indecipherable answers (0.6%) and answers specifically indicating no favourite channel (2.0%) 
were also included here.
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As mentioned above, significantly more males chose Sky Sports (6.7% to 0%) and Sky 1 (37.1% 
to 25.7%) as the station they watched most, while significantly more females (18.4% to 9.3%) 
chose RTE 2 (Network 2).
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Figure 6. Which television station do you watch most (2000)?
RTE 2 
14%
other
8%
Channel 4 3%
BBC 1
RTE1
4%
Sky Sports 
4%
MTV
27%
6.2.1 Discussion of Part A
In short, there is strong support for Hypothesis A: That the m e d ia -re la ted  so c ia lisa tio n  p a tte rn s  o f  
Irish  you th  h ave ch an ged  s ign ifican tly  o v e r  the p a s t  15 years . There are a number of significant 
changes in media use between the 1985 and 2000 samples.
6.2.1.1 Television
A number of aspects of television consumption have changed. Many of these can be attributed to 
the advent of cable television and the opportunity to access many more television stations.
The availability of more than one television in most households suggests that television viewing 
is becoming more autonomous, with young people having more control over the choice of what to 
watch. This might also be an effect of the increase in television stations available to watch. As the 
number of stations has increased, individuals have had the chance to be more discerning in their 
viewing habits, again leading to the possibility of separate viewing patterns from their family and 
peers.
This segregation of viewing and increase in choice of what to watch may be reflected in the 
increased gender divide in whether people report learning a lot from television. Similarly, the fact 
that fewer young people now think teenagers need their own television programmes might be a 
result of these needs to some extent being satisfied by the availability of television channels 
devoted to programming for young people.
The emergence of cable television is a result of trans-national media corporations tapping into 
foreign markets (in this case Ireland). In 1985, the two Irish stations (RTE 1 and RTE 2) counted
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for a third of the number of stations available and 41% of the stations viewed most often by 
respondents. In 2000, although the number of Irish stations had increased to 4 (with the advent of 
TG4 and TV3), many respondents had access to many more television stations. The 4 Irish 
stations in 2000 accounted for a total of 19.1% of the stations cited as viewed most by 
respondents. This is evidence that obvious globalising forces are affecting patterns of media 
consumption in 2000 in ways that they were not in 1985.
The relative strength of the Irish economy (in 2000 compared to 1985) is also a possible factor in 
the higher rate of television ownership. The influence of increased Irish integration into Europe 
and the positive effect European funds have had on the Irish economy, and thus the ability of 
people to access new media technologies, while significant, is beyond the scope of this work to 
quantify.
It is important to remember that although television is undoubtedly an important part of young 
people's lives, and that young people are the primary users of television, Fornas (1985) found that 
they are also the most common users of books, magazines, radio and cinema.
6.2.1.2 Reading
Patterns of book buying, book reading and comic and magazine buying have remained relatively 
consistent. Young Irish males buy fewer books, comics and magazines and read less than 
females. Although computer magazines have become more popular and the number of 
respondents who had read 'More than 4' books in the last month had decreased, most aspects of 
reading for Irish youth are stable and seem relatively unaffected by the continued and growing 
domination of trans-national corporations in other media.
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6.2.1.3 Radio
The gender divide in radio listening, with girls listening to significantly more radio than boys has 
also remained relatively stable since 1985. The type of radio station young people listen to most 
often has changed significantly. Pirate stations were significantly more popular in 1985 than 
2000.
Reynolds points out that even between the time she conducted her survey (1985) and publishing 
its results (1990) many pirate stations had already become 'legitimate' commercial stations. The 
trend of more commercial stations being licensed in Ireland has continued, including the granting 
of a licence in 2000 for SPIN FM, a Dublin-based youth orientated station, as discussed in 
chapter 4. However, the transition to broadcasting as a commercial station has consequences for 
what is broadcast. As SPIN FM's proposal states, the station is concerned not only with providing 
'lifestyle news', but "[m]ost importantly a brand focused station, as proposed by SPIN, is 
seen to fill a clear gap in the marketplace" (SPIN FM, 1999:36, in bold). Furthermore, "[t]he 
financial and business strategy of SPIN is to attain operating profit by year 3 and to attain positive 
reserves by year 5" (ibid.:44). This typical commercial philosophy is far removed from the pirate 
sector, which is incapable of legally creating profit or having shareholders for those involved in 
broadcasting.
SPIN FM is also an example of a trans-national media corporation with international cross-media 
resources. In achieving its institutional objectives, SPIN FM intended to use these resources to 
maximise its share of the Irish youth audience and thus maximise its profits.
"The M in istry  O f  Sound [2 5 %  ow n ers o f  SPIN  F M ] is a  L ondon  b a se d  m edia  com pany that 
sp e c ia lise s  in a ll a sp ec ts  o f  con tem porary  you th  culture. They a re  a le a d in g  au th ority  on dance
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m usic. They run clubs an d  bars, they m arket fa sh io n  w e a r  an d  m erchandise, th ey p ro d u c e  radio  
syndica tion , re lea se  com pila tion  record in gs a n d  th ey p ro m o te  tou rs an d  events.
We in ten d  to  b ro a d c a st liv e  v ia  IS D N  fro m  The M in is try  o f  S oun d club  in L ondon  on F rid a y  and  
S a tu rday nights. A n o th er live linkup opportu n ity  du rin g  th e su m m er in clu des tak in g  an au dio  f e e d  
v ia  The M in istryfrom  [sic] P a ch a  the m ost fa m o u s  club in Ibiza. In ad d itio n  The M in istry's tw o  
h our ra d io  syn d ica tion  offers us fu r th e r  regu lar p ro g ra m m in g  opportu n ities. They a lso  p u b lish  a 
p e r io d ic a l yo u th  m agazin e o f  high qu a lity  en titled  'Ministry'. We w ill tap  in to  the m agazin e as a 
reso u rce  f o r  a  num ber o f  p ro g ra m m in g  fe a tu re s  in clu din g life s ty le  news, film , fashion, 
technology, D J  a n d  club  news"  (SPIN FM, 1999:10).
Clearly then, the fact that young people are listening to commercial stations, broadcasting in the 
environment in which SPIN FM (for example) is competing, is linked to a consumption of a 
media-cultural message in a more globalised context.
6.2.1.4 Cinema
Cinema-going has shown the most marked increase since 1985.
For young people, it not just the content, but the 'movie-going experience' that makes cinema- 
going attractive (Barker and Brooks, 1998). Both the cinema content and the cinema going 
experience are becoming increasingly globalised in Ireland.
Day-Lewis (1990) quotes 1984 as being the poorest on record (in 1990) for world-wide cinema 
attendance, and cites the late 1980s as having seen a revival in cinema-going. More recently, 
Grant (2001) has cited the Irish cinema industry as being particularly healthy, both in terms of
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product and attendance. Grant attributes a large part of this upturn to funds provided by the 
European Media Program in producing Irish films "as a fist against the dominance of Hollywood 
films in Europe", arguably trading off one form of globalisation against another.
Production and attendance are not directly related however. Grant (2001) reports that there has 
been a significant rise in films produced in Ireland, and Eurostat (2001) confirm that Ireland has 
the highest rate of cinema attendance in Europe, with an average of 3.4 visits per individual per 
year. Ireland however also has a higher rate of US production share of new films than any other 
EU country. In 1998 73% of new films released into cinemas in Ireland were produced in the US, 
compared to an average of 51% across the EU (Eurostat, 2001).
Another globalised aspect of the cinema industry in Ireland is the emergence of US-style multiple 
screen 'multi-plexes', increasingly owned by large trans-national corporations, such as the many 
UCI cinema complexes throughout Ireland which are controlled by two major US film companies 
(Universal and Paramount). It is difficult to quantify the effect that such ownership has on cinema 
going, but the increase in numbers of youth attending the cinema has coincided with cinema- 
going in Ireland being modelled on successful US marketing trends, primarily by trans-national 
US media corporation. The context of media consumption is globalised, both in the 'cinema 
experience' and film content.
6.2.1.5 New patterns of media use
There is evidence that there are many new patterns of media use emerging. Library membership 
has increased though it is not correlated with an increase in book reading. There is evidence that 
the libraries are being used to use new media, such as CD ROMs and the Internet. 8.6% of all 
respondents in 2000 reported using the Internet in a library not connected with their school. Also,
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29.5% listed friends' houses, or other social places, such as Internet cafés or relatives' houses as 
places that they used the Internet. 55.0% said that they used the Internet at school. Only 10.8% 
reported never using the Internet. Clearly, this use of new media, in social settings that did not 
exist before it came into being would be linked to new patterns of socialisation, new perspectives 
of one's social world, and thus new habitus.
In addition to the 4% of subjects who listed the Internet as a place where they learned about the 
world, a significantly higher percentage of respondents in 2000 listed school and friends as where 
they get such news. While reasons for these changes can only be the subject of conjecture at this 
point, the fact that they exist is itself significant to a study such as this which examines changes in 
the social factors which contribute to the creation of young people's life-world.
In summary, some aspects of media consumption, such as book buying and the amount young 
people report learning from television have remained relatively unchanged over the past 15 years. 
Nevertheless, the young Irish people who took part in this survey exist with habitus constructed in 
the context of media frameworks that are significantly different to those which existed in 1985. 
These frameworks, which have a largely globalised aspect will be examined in Part B for 
correlations with 'ideological modes of thought'.
6.3 P a r t  B: C o rre la tio n s  betw een  m edia  use an d  'ideo log ical m odes o f th o u g h t1
Hypothesis B is concerned with establishing whether patterns of Irish youths' media use can be 
viewed as a 'social institution' for the formation of habitus/identity similar to, but independent 
from, established social institutions such as gender, school and 'family situation'. Each of these 
institutions was examined for correlations with each other and with responses to questions 
regarding patterns of media use. Then, the social institutions, including patterns of media use,
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were examined for correlations with answers to the attitude survey (Part B) included in the 
questionnaire.
In order to support Hypothesis B and show that Irish young people's patterns of media 
consumption were linked to ideological modes of thought, analysis of the survey would be 
required to show significant correlations between questions about media usage and attitudes as 
measured by the survey. Independent correlations would also be expected between the traditional 
social institutions and the modes of thought measured in the attitude survey.
More simply, if media use is, like gender, school or family situation, linked with ideological 
thought, this would be shown by media use correlating with responses to the attitude survey. If 
this was shown to be the case, then this work will conclude that there is empirical support for 
discussing patterns of media use in terms of individual ideological identity or habitus.
Unless stated otherwise, every correlation discussed in this work has up to a 1% chance of 
occurring by chance (o =0.01). The direct focus of this section is to explore correlations between 
patterns of media use and ideological modes of thought. Ten questions in Part A directly measure 
patterns of media use (A5, A9, A15, A17, A18, A20, A22, A24, A25 and A30). To provide a 
broader picture of how these correlate with the 'modes of thought' surveyed in Part B, a 5% 
chance of random error (o =0.05) was allowed for these questions.
Numbers in parentheses, for example (B24), refer to the questions from the survey which are 
being correlated.
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6.3.1 The correlations
The descriptions that follow are a list of significant correlations relevant to the hypotheses being
tested. A discussion of this list follows.
(A2) Gender
• Males reported having access to a larger number of television stations at home (A5) than 
females.
• Males reported using the Internet (A9) more than females.
• Females reported reading more books (A15) than males.
• Females reported buying comics or magazines (A18) more often than males.
• Females reported listening to the radio (A22) for longer than males.
• Males were more likely to agree that different groups of teenagers own different styles of 
music (B3).
• There was a significant gender divide in how respondents answered when asked if TV 
programmes made for teenagers were aimed more often at boys or girls (B7), with 
respondents more likely to answer that the balance was in favour of their own gender.
• There was a significant gender divide in how respondents answered when asked if teenagers 
who read magazines are more often boys or girls (B ll). Respondents of each gender were 
more likely to answer that the balance was in favour of their own gender.
• Males agreed with the statement "Most movies made for people my age don't appeal to me" 
(B12) more strongly than females.
• Males agreed with the statement "You can sometimes tell what magazines a group of people 
read by the way they look or act" (B14) more strongly than females.
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• Males agreed with the statement "Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what 
they see on television" (B23) more strongly than females.
• Females agreed with the statement "Telling young people about what is going on in the world 
is important to a television station" (B24) more strongly than males.
(A3) School
The school that respondents attended correlated with:
• The number of television stations the respondent had access to at home (A5)
• Their frequency of Internet use (A9).
• The number of books they reported reading in the past month (A15).
• Whether they belonged to a library other than their school library (A16).
• How often they bought books (A17).
• The radio station they listened to most often (A23), but not the type of radio station listened 
to (A23.5).
• The degree to which they dis/agreed with the statement "Different groups of teenagers own 
different styles of music" (B3).
• The degree to which they thought TV programmes made for teenagers were aimed at boys or 
girls (B7).
• The degree to which they dis/agreed with the statement "Television treats men and women 
equally" (B25).
(A5) At home how many television stations do you have access to?
[_ ]  None [_ ]  1-4 [_ ]  5-8 [_ ]  9-12 [_ ]  More than 12
• Respondents who have access to fewer television stations at home agreed with the statement 
"It is good that there are more people from different countries in Ireland than there used to
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be" (B30) more strongly than those who reported having access to more television stations at 
home.
Correlations at □ =0.05:
• When asked to complete the sentence "TV programmes made for teenagers are aimed at [... 
girls or boys]" (Bl), respondents who had access to more television stations at home believed 
that TV programmes made for teenagers were aimed at boys more so than people who have 
access to fewer television stations at home.
• Respondents who reported having access to more television stations at home agreed with the 
statement "Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what they see on television" 
(B23) more strongly than those who had access to fewer television stations at home.
(A7.4) Respondents who reported living with both their mother and their father (coded 
from question A7. Who are the adults you live with?).
• Respondents living who did not live with both their mother and father reported learning more 
from television (A14) than those who lived with their mother and father.
• Living with both one's mother and father correlated with one's favourite radio station being of 
a different type (A23.5) than respondents who did not live with both their mother and their 
father. Commercial stations were significantly less popular (26.7% compared to 52.1%) and 
pirate stations were significantly more popular with respondents who did not live with both 
their mother and father (42.9% compared to 28.1 % for those who lived with both their mother 
and father).
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• Respondents who reported not living with both their mother and father agreed with the 
statement "Young people don't really matter to TV and radio companies" (B28) more strongly 
than those who reported living with both their mother and father.
(A9) How often do you use the Internet?
[_] Most days [__] About once a week
[_] Less than once a week [__] Almost never
|_] Never
• Respondents who use the Internet more reported buying books more often (A17).
• Respondents who reported using the Internet less agreed with the statement "The music I like
is the same as most of my friends" (B21) more strongly than those who reported using the 
Internet more.
• Respondents who use the Internet less agreed with the statement "Women and men are shown
as equals in magazines" (B22) more strongly than those who reported using the Internet
more.
Correlations at o =0.05:
• Respondents who use the Internet less agreed with the statement "The companies that make 
magazines think young people are intelligent" (B2) more strongly than those who reported 
using the Internet more.
• Respondents who use the Internet more agreed with the statement "You can sometimes tell
what magazines a group of people read by the way they look or act" (B14) more strongly than
those who reported using the Internet less.
• Respondents who use the Internet less agreed with the statement "Television treats men and 
women equally" (B25) more strongly than those who reported using the Internet more.
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(A 14) Do you learn from television?
[_] A lot [_] A certain amount
[_] Very little [_] Nothing
• Respondents who reported learning more from television also reported watching more 
television on weekends (A25).
• Respondents who reported learning less from television agreed with the statement "Women 
and men are shown as equals in magazines" (B22) more strongly than those who reported 
learning more from television.
(A15) How many books have you read in the last month?
[_] More than 4 |_] 2 to 4
[_] 1 only [_] none
• Respondents who reported reading more books in the past month also reported buying books 
more often (A17).
• Respondents who reported reading fewer books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "Most people usually like the same television programmes as their friends" (B13) more 
strongly than those who had read more books.
• Respondents who reported reading fewer books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "The music I like is the same as most of my friends" (B21) more strongly than those who 
had read more books.
• Respondents who reported reading fewer books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "Women and men are shown as equals in magazines" (B22) more strongly than those 
who had read more books.
• Respondents who reported reading fewer books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "Television treats men and women equally" (B25) more strongly than those who had 
read more books.
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• Respondents who reported reading more books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "It is good that there are more people from different countries in Ireland than there used 
to be" (B30) more strongly than those who had read fewer books.
Correlations at » =0.05:
• Respondents who reported reading fewer books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "I think radio in other countries would be worse than Irish radio" (B4) more strongly than 
those who had read more books.
• Respondents who reported reading more books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "Most TV programmes made in Ireland are copies of programmes from other countries" 
(B8) more strongly than those who had read fewer books.
• Respondents who reported reading more books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "You can sometimes tell what magazines a group of people read by the way they look or 
act" (B14) more strongly than those who had read fewer books.
• Respondents who reported reading more books in the past month agreed with the statement 
that "Some teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines" (B18) more strongly than 
those who had read fewer books.
(A17) Do you buy books?
[ ] Very often [__] Often
[ ] Sometimes [__] Never
• Respondents who reported buying fewer books agreed with the statement that "Television 
treats men and women equally" (B25) more strongly than those who had bought more books.
Correlations at » =0.05:
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• Respondents who reported buying fewer books agreed with the statement that "The 
companies that make magazines think young people are intelligent" (B2) more strongly than 
those who bought more books.
• Respondents who reported buying fewer books agreed with the statement that "Women and 
men are shown as equals in magazines" (B22) more strongly than those who bought more 
books.
• Respondents who reported buying more books agreed with the statement that "Groups of 
friends wear different clothes because of what they see on television" (B23) more strongly 
than those who bought fewer books.
• Respondents who reported buying more books agreed with the statement that "It is good that 
there are more people from different countries in Ireland that there used to be" (B30) more 
strongly than those who bought fewer books.
(A18) Do you buy comics or magazines?
[ ] Very often [_] Often
[ 1 Sometimes f__ ] Never
• Respondents who reported buying comics or magazines more often also reported spending 
more time listening to the radio (A22).
• Respondents who reported buying more comics and magazines agreed with the statement that 
"The music I like is the same as most of my friends" (B21) more strongly than those who had 
bought comics and magazines less often.
Correlations at c =0.05:
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• Respondents who reported buying more comics and magazines agreed with the statement that 
"Sometimes it is easy to tell what sort of music certain groups of teenagers will like" (B17) 
more strongly than those who had bought comics and magazines less often.
(A20) How often do you go to the cinema?
[__ ] Once a week [_] About once a month
[__ ] Less than once a month [_| Never
• Respondents who reported going to the cinema less often agreed with the statement "Most 
movies made for people my age don't really appeal to me" (B12) more strongly than those 
who went to the cinema more often.
• Respondents who reported going to the cinema more often agreed with the statement that 
"Women and men are shown as equals in magazines" (B22) more strongly than those who 
went to the cinema less often.
Correlations at o =0.05:
• When asked "Are movies aimed at teenagers mainly for girls or boys?" (Bl), respondents
who went to the cinema more often, believed the cinema was more female orientated than did
respondents who went to the cinema less often.
• Respondents who reported going to the cinema more often agreed with the statement "I think 
radio in other countries would be worse than Irish radio" (B4) more strongly than those who 
went to the cinema less often.
• Respondents who reported going to the cinema less often agreed with the statement "It is 
important that Ireland remains different from other countries" (B20) more strongly than those 
who went to the cinema more often.
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• Respondents who reported going to the cinema more often agreed with the statement 
"Television treats men and women equally" (B25) more strongly than those who went to the 
cinema less often.
(A22) How many hours per day do you spend listening to the radio?
[__| Less than 1 hour [__] 1 to 2 hours
[ ] 2 to 3 hours [__] 3 hours or more
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer also reported listening to CDs, 
records and tapes (A24) for longer than those who listened to the radio for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer, also reported watching television 
at weekends (A25) for longer than those who listened to the radio for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement "I think 
radio in other countries would be worse than Irish radio" (B4) more strongly than those who 
listened to the radio for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to less radio agreed with the statement "Most movies 
made for people my age don't really appeal to me" (B12) more strongly than those who 
listened to the radio for longer.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement "Some 
teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines" (B18) more strongly than those who 
listened to less radio.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement "Irish 
bands are usually better than bands from overseas" (B27) more strongly than those who 
listened to less radio.
Correlations at o =0.05:
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• Respondents who reported listening to less radio agreed with the statement "Most TV
programmes made in Ireland are copies of programmes from other countries" (B8) more
strongly than those who listened to the radio for longer.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement "Young 
people influence what music is in the charts" (B16) more strongly than those who listened to 
the radio for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement "People 
who make movies for teenagers usually have a good idea about what teenagers are like" 
(B26) more strongly than those who listened to the radio for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to the radio for longer agreed with the statement
"Teenagers are important to radio stations" (B29) more strongly than those who listened to
the radio for less time.
(A24) How much time every day would you spend listening to CDs, records or tapes?
[ ] Less than 1 [_] 1 to 2 hours
[ ] 2 to 3 hours [_] 3 hours or more
• Respondents who reported listening to CDs, records and tapes for longer agreed with the
statement "Different groups of teenagers own different styles of music" (B3) more strongly
than those who listened to CDs, records and tapes for less time.
• Respondents who reported listening to CDs, records and tapes for longer agreed with the
statement "Some teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines" (B18) more
strongly than those who listened to CDs, records and tapes for less time.
Correlations at o =0.05:
There were no further correlations for this question at o =0.05,
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(A25) How much time would you spend on Saturday or Sunday watching television?
[ ] 1 hour or less [_] 1 to 2 hours
[ ] 2 to 3 hours [_] 3 hours or more
Correlations at o =0.05:
• Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends agreed with the 
statement "I sometimes feel that I should change the way I am because of something I see on 
television" (B29) more strongly than those who watched television for less time on weekends.
• When asked to complete the sentence "TV programmes made for teenagers are aimed at [... 
girls or boys]" (Bl), respondents who watched more television on weekends believed that TV 
programmes made for teenagers were aimed at boys more so than people who watched less 
television on weekends.
• Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends agreed with the 
statement "Most people usually like the same television programmes as their friends" (B13) 
more strongly than those who watched television for less time on weekends.
• Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends agreed with the 
statement "Young people influence what music is in the charts" (B16) more strongly than 
those who watched television for less time on weekends.
• Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends agreed with the 
statement "Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what they see on television" 
(B23) more strongly than those who watched television for less time on weekends.
• Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends agreed with the 
statement "Telling young people about what is going on in the world is important to a 
television station" (B24) more strongly than those who watched television for less time on 
weekends.
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(A30) Which television station do you watch most? |
• The television station that the respondents reported watching most correlated with how 
strongly they answered the question "What is the main reason that television and radio 
stations have programmes aimed at people your age?" (A37).
• The television station that the respondents reported watching most correlated with how 
strongly they agreed with the statement "Young people don't really matter to TV and radio 
companies" (B28).
Correlations at o =0.05:
• The television station that the respondents reported watching most correlated with how 
strongly they agreed with the statement "Television treats men and women equally" (B25).
• The television station that the respondents reported watching most correlated with how 
strongly they agreed with the statement "Irish bands are usually better than bands from 
overseas" (B27).
(A 37) What is the main reason that television and radio stations have programmes aimed
at people your age?
[ ] To educate [_] To make money
[ ] To entertain [_] They have to
[__] Other, please specify
• How respondents answered the question "What is the main reason that television and radio 
stations have programmes aimed at people your age?" was correlated with how strongly they 
agreed with the statement "Telling young people about what is going on in the world is 
important to television stations" (B24).
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(A 45) Are the pressures on people your age the same for girls and boys?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
• Respondents who thought that pressures on people their age were about the same for teenage 
girls and boys agreed with the statement "I think television shows would be about the same in 
all countries that speak English" (B27) more strongly than those who listened to less radio.
6.3.2 Discussion of Part B
The first outstanding aspect of the results of Part B is that the social institutions of gender, school, 
'family situation' and media use are inter-related. Media usage patterns are, however, as distinct 
and independent from the other institutions as they are from each other.
Gender, which correlated with 7 of the 30 questions in Part B, was confirmed empirically as an 
important factor in determining one's 'ideological modes of thought' as measured by the 
questionnaire. School correlated with 3 of the questions and whether respondents live with both 
their mother and father correlated with one.
There is strong statistical support showing that the social institutions, as defined by this work, are 
correlated in discrete, independent ways with the 'modes of thought' measured in Part B. This 
supports Hypothesis B: That Irish youths' current patterns o f media consumption are 
independently correlated with ideological modes o f thought.
A number of consistencies in media use and the attitudes surveyed in the questionnaire emerged. 
In addition to more general themes which ran through most of the media studied, there seemed to 
be a number of themes divided into three relatively distinct patterns of media consumption. These 
groups are labelled (by the author) 'Music Lovers', 'Readers' and 'Cinema-goers. Music Lovers'
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are frequent users of television, radio and magazines, and seem to use these media for their music 
related content. 'Readers', who are frequent book readers and Internet users seem to question 
gender roles in the media, are sceptical of the motives of media institutions and more positive 
about multiculturalism. 'Cinema-goers' were a third distinct group that emerged and were of 
particular interest due to the enormous increase in cinema attendance over the past 15 years.
Most subjects, of course, were consumers of the media used by all three of these groups. In 
dividing them, one must appreciate that, like any other social institution, while independent trends 
may emerge, they are not mutually exclusive. The discussion below concerns the preferences of 
the subjects and in no way presumes exclusive use of a limited number of media.
6.3.2.1 Media use - general
A correlation repeated across all three of the groups described above, is that the young people 
surveyed believed that the media they preferred as individuals were more relevant to young 
people in general. They also had firmer opinions about, and assumed a more intimate knowledge 
of, the media they used more often. This seems an obvious statement, but showing this through 
the statistics presented above serves two purposes.
By media usage trends being correlated with individuals' perceptions of these media, the 
questionnaire itself gains validity. Just as the predictable correlation between book buying (A17) 
and book reading (A15) shows that subjects were answering the questionnaire consistently, so too 
correlations between reporting a high use of a medium and holding it in high regard shows that 
the questionnaire is measuring real attitudes.
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The second purpose of showing that young people hold their favoured media in higher esteem, is 
to highlight that a number of media uses show consistent, interrelated responses. Patterns of 
media use emerge and can be discussed. For the current research three distinct clusters of media 
usage patterns were found. 'Music Lovers', 'Readers' and 'Cinema-goers', in addition to having 
media use in common also were found to have distinct perceptions about their social 
environment, as discussed below.
6.3.2.2 Music Lovers
Music seems to a major focus of a group that is defined by a number of correlations. People who 
listened to the radio for longer (A22) also watched television for longer on weekends. Radio 
listening was also correlated with listening to CDs, records and tapes (A24) and magazine buying 
(A18).
That the media used by 'Music Lovers' is seen as more relevant to young people than other media 
is evidenced by the fact that respondents who listened to CDs, records and tapes more (A24) were 
more likely to think that different groups of teenagers own different styles of music (B3).
Respondents who reported watching television for longer on weekends (A24) were more likely to 
agree with the statements "I sometimes feel that I should change the way I am because of 
something I see on television" (B29), "Most people usually like the same television programmes 
as their friends" (B16) and "Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what they see on 
television" (B23). These people obviously think that television has a large impact on the identity 
formation of young people. People who reported watching more television were more likely to 
believe that young people are important to television stations and were more likely to agree that
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"Telling young people about what is going on in the world is important to a television station" 
(B24) than those who watched less television.
That weekend television watching is linked with music (and thus radio listening and use of CDs, 
records and tapes) is further evidenced by the fact that people who watch more television at 
weekends believe that young people have more influence on what music is in the charts (B16).
Similarities in thinking amongst 'Music Lovers' are further evidenced by the fact that comic and 
magazine buying is correlated with the statements "The music I like is the same as most of my 
friends" (B21) and "Sometimes it is easy to tell what sort of music certain groups of teenagers 
will like" (B17). Also, listening to radio for longer corresponded to having a higher opinion of 
Irish bands (B27) and feeling that some teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines 
(B18).
6.3.2.3 Readers
The group being labelled as 'Readers' saw themselves as independent thinkers and media users. 
'Readers' displayed a number of distinct characteristics, including the feeling that the sexes were 
not treated equally by the mass media. 'Readers' were also more positive towards foreign cultures 
in Ireland. Although they were sceptical of other mass media, especially magazines, which they 
saw as clearly distinct from book reading, they felt that these media had a significant effect on 
teenage identity.
'Readers' were linked by frequency of book reading (A15) and Internet use (A9) both being 
correlating with buying books (A17). 'Readers' were separated from 'Music Lovers' by the fact 
that those who used the Internet less (A9) and those who read fewer books (A15) were both more 
likely to report that "The music I like is the same as most of my friends" (B21).
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'Readers' were distinguished from both Music Lovers' and ’Cinema-goers’ by the answers they 
gave to questions in the attitude survey. People who read more books (A15) were less likely to 
agree that "I think radio in other countries would be worse than Irish radio" (B4) in direct contrast 
to people who listened to the radio more (A22) and people who attended the cinema more (A20). 
Cinema attendance and radio listening both correlated with this question, but in the opposite 
direction to book reading.
'Readers' were more likely to think that there were gender inequalities in the mass media. All of 
the media uses that defined 'Readers' (A9, A15 and A17) were correlated with respondents being 
less likely to agree with both the statements "Women and men are shown as equals in magazines" 
(B22) and "Television treats men and women equally" (B25).
This group also thought that the mass media, particularly those used by 'Music Lovers' had a 
significant effect on young people's identity. Internet use (A9) and book reading (A 15) correlated 
with respondents believing that "You can sometimes tell what magazines a group of people read 
by the way they look or a c t" (B14). Respondents who read more books (A15) were more likely 
to think that "Most people usually like the same television programmes as their friends" (B13) 
and that "Some teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines" (B18). Those who bought 
more books felt that "Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what they see on 
television" (B23) more strongly than those who bought fewer books.
'Readers' were more sceptical of the motives of mass media companies, again particularly those 
preferred by 'Music Lovers'. People who read more books (A 15) were more likely to think that 
"Most TV programmes made in Ireland are copies of programmes from other countries" (B8). 
Those who used the Internet more (A9) and those who bought more books (A17) were both less
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likely to agree that "The companies that make magazines think young people are intelligent" 
(B2). From the results, one cannot say definitively why reading books and magazines were 
separate social activities, but this correlation seems to indicate that 'Readers' viewed magazines as 
being associated with a less intelligent use of the media.
The final and most outstanding feature of Readers' is that they are positive towards multi- 
culturalism in Ireland. Those who read books (A15) and those who bought books (A17) more 
frequently both agreed with the statement that "It is good that there are more people from 
different countries in Ireland than there used to be" (B30) more strongly than others involved in 
the study.
Although there was no correlation between the number of television stations one had access to at 
home (A5) and book reading, book buying or Internet use, it is in keeping with the attributes 
displayed by 'Readers' that people who reported having access to fewer television stations at 
home were also more likely to agree with the statement that "It is good that there are more people 
from different countries in Ireland than there used to be" (B30).
6.3.2.4 Cinema-goers
Of particular interest to this study is the emergent group of 'Cinema-goers', since there has been 
such an enormous increase in the cinema attendance in Irish youth over the past 15 years.
As with the other groups described above, 'Cinema-goers' (A20) were more likely to hold their 
medium in high esteem. Thus, they disagreed with the statement "Most movies made for people 
my age don't really appeal to me" (B12) more than people who went to the cinema less often.
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In general, both male and female 'Cinema-goers' tended to agree that movies made for teenagers 
were more for girls than boys (Bl). Although it seems curious that males who attended the 
cinema frequently would think that the films they go to see are mainly for girls, as Barker and 
Brooks (1998) cite, the experience of movie-going itself is a major attraction. For teenage boys, 
the fact that girls like movies is a reason to go. Quoting one of Barker and Brooks' respondents 
talking of why he goes to the cinema: "I know why I'd be there ... CHICKS! There's loads of em, 
they hang around in the lobby" (Barker and Brooks, 1998:218).
'Cinema-goers' in contrast to 'Readers' were less likely to think that there were differences in the 
way that men and women were represented in the media. Those who went to the cinema more 
regularly were more likely to agree that "Women and men are shown as equals in magazines" 
(B22), and "Television treats men and women equally" (B25). They were also more likely to 
disagree that "It is important that Ireland remains different from other countries" (B20) as much 
as those who attended less frequently.
6.3.2.5 Other correlations
Statistically significant correlations that were not discussed in this chapter are listed in Appendix
6.3.3 Summary of the results of Part B
In Part B, media use, while to some extent dependent on other social factors, has been shown to 
be independently correlated with the modes of ideological thought, as measured by the attitude 
survey given to the sample of 373 high school students. The fact that the three distinct groups of
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'Music Lovers', 'Readers' and 'Cinema-goers', are largely independent of the each other, show that 
media use is linked with a number of ways of thinking.
It is difficult and possibly counterproductive to attempt to measure the relative size of each of 
these groups. Although the questionnaire was constructed and distributed according to a 
structured and largely repeatable 'scientific' methodology, the current research does not attempt to 
delimit or categorise its sample. Positivist research is often criticised for doing just this.
The 'Readers' classification ties in with Dodge's (2000) findings that "Tech-Sawy teens still read 
books". Internet use, book reading or the use of any other medium can be seen as an arena for the 
expression of one's habitus. That book reading and Internet use are interrelated with similar 
'modes of thought' suggests that the use of these media involve similar social meaning (or 'rules' 
for Bourdieu's habitus) for the young people in the study.
It is important to remember that the three classifications of media users by no means account for 
all teenagers. Young people would almost certainly not classify themselves with such labels, nor 
would it be useful to quantify and delimit the three groups. The groupings show trends in media 
use and trends in attitudes, and that these overlap to a significant degree. At their most useful, the 
correlations displayed by 'Music Lovers', 'Readers' and 'Cinema-goers', provide examples of the 
durable and disposable systems of perception, thought, appreciation and action that make up the 
habitus of the young people it surveyed, at a particular point in time. It is important not to 
extrapolate other assumptions from this, which attempting to quantify the groups in terms of 
percentages of the total sample or population would tend to do.
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The overall aim of the questionnaire was to determine whether it could be shown empirically that 
Irish young people's ideological modes of thought are influenced by mass media globalisation. 
Discussion as to whether this aim was achieved is at the end of this chapter.
6.4 Part C: Qualitative findings
6.4.1 Anticonformers and MTV
There was further evidence that Internet users regard themselves as independent thinkers than that 
cited in Part B. Five male respondents from one school, at the end of the questionnaire, when they 
were asked to give comments about the survey independently wrote "Support 
anticonformers@[something],[something]" or words to that effect (the actually email address has 
been withheld by request).
In (electronic) correspondence with the author, a spokesperson for the group described it as "a 
real alternative", saying that in many parts of their life young people "only have a choice between 
Coke and Pepsi" and that this is "no real choice at all". The 'anticonformers' spokesperson said 
that he had been part of the questionnaire, which he cautiously welcomed, although he was wary 
that it might be used by marketing companies to further classify young people for profit.
According to this spokesperson, the group, which was comprised of people from around the 
world, who had 'met' through the Internet (and personal school friends), actively supported 
protesting against globalisation processes and "everyone doing the same thing as everyone else all 
the time". "Not thinking" was described as a typical activity of the mainstream. The spokesperson 
listed activities that he thought were "against the mainstream". These included watching 
independent films, protesting about globalisation, not watching MTV, not eating at large
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hamburger chains and not feeling one had to wear clothes or act in a way that "society made 
you". When asked if he was not just making another set of guidelines for people to follow, he 
insisted that he was merely listing things that he and his friends did. His primary aim was in 
attempting to make sure people knew that they had a choice, even if they chose to act in ways that 
he disagreed with, it was better than being a "Britney-clone".
In contrast to the 'anticonformers', and indeed, according to their spokesperson, typical of what 
they were resisting against, 21.3% of respondents who listed MTV as the television station which 
they watched most (5.3% of all respondents) drew the MTV logo instead of writing MTV'. An 
example of this is shown in Figure 7 below. This did not happen with any other choice of station. 
Firth (1978) suggests that young people's allegiance to a particular channel is like belonging to a 
club. SPIN FM (1999), in their successful application for an Irish youth based radio licence, 
continually refer to the commercially exploitable 'lifestyle choices' and associated 'station 
branding'. MTV can be seen to have defined a brand or identity, which many young people 
choose to subscribe to. Quite clearly this can be seen as consenting to an ideological position, or 
habitus defined by a globalised, capitalist driven, mass media corporation.
Figure 7. Example of respondent using the MTV logo in their answer
Which television station do you watch most? i
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6.4.2 Engaged graffiti
In one of the schools surveyed, 20 of the 34 (31 male and 3 female) respondents, having 
completed the questionnaire, drew symbols and slogans supporting their favourite band, type of 
music, or general comments about 'Scumbags' or 'Rockers'. This figure constituted 58.8% of 
respondents from this school, while no other school had more than 5% of respondents display 
similar behaviour. All of the 20 respondents had completed their questionnaire in a legitimate 
way. They had the same time and supervision conditions as the other groups. The implications of 
this graffiti, as exemplified in figure 8 (below), in the context of this work can only be guessed at.
Figure 8. Examples of'engaged graffiti'
Tfcanks for completing this questionnaire, please feel free to write any coiomimtB you would like, to make 
abo&t it below.
I ^)OSfc t o
Cfo faoo m u c h
• r* • % '
.... .*A -
• i.s,v .
r .. W . r" ' ■ .
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6.4.3 W h y  b ro a d c a s t  to  te en ag e rs?
In discussion with the respondents in the pilot study, the author asked "What is the main reason 
that television and radio stations have programmes aimed at people your age?" The 
overwhelming response from both pilot groups was that money was the main reason for such 
broadcasts.
As a result of these discussions question A37 was included in the questionnaire given to the main 
sample:
(A 37) W h a t is th e  m a in  rea so n  th a t  te lev ision  a n d  ra d io  s ta tio n s  h av e  p ro g ra m m e s  a im ed  a t 
peo p le  y o u r  age?
[ ] T o  ed u c a te  [_] T o  m ak e  m oney
[ ] T o  e n te r ta in  [_] T hey  h av e  to
[__ ] O th e r , p lease  specify
Overall, 67.7% of respondents listed making money as the main reason for broadcast media 
institutions targeted young people. Included in this figure are 27.3% of respondents who listed
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making money and some other motivating factor. 'To entertain' was chosen the second most 
popular choice, cited by 46.2% of respondents including 21.6% stating 'To entertain1 and some 
other reason.
Throughout the entirety of the current research, from the pilot study, to responses to the 
questionnaire and informal discussions with the participants, there was a repeated sense that large 
media corporations valued profits over the interests of young people and that teenagers were 
simply a source of income. This was exemplified by a number of respondents who made notes on 
their questionnaire, for example one respondent, in answering question B28, Young people don't 
really matter to TV and radio companies', changed his answer from 'I strongly agree' to 'I strongly 
disagree' and wrote "but only for their money" next to his answer.
In spite of this awareness of the capitalistic nature of media corporations there was equally a 
sense of appreciation of what the globalised media corporations provided, and not wanting to 
'miss out' on it. As one respondent made clear in conversation with the author about watching 
English football on cable television "They're all just after your money, like everywhere else, but 
it's worth it because you can't see it anywhere else ... you can't get into pubs ... so there's no 
choice". Respondents seemed to hold a similar view about other globalised products. While 
recognising that the companies involved were only producing the merchandise to make profits, 
many individuals did not was to be 'left out' by not having the right shoes, clothes or music. In 
general these discussions were about teenagers in general, using the third person.
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7.1 What do the results of the questionnaire show?
This study demonstrates empirically that contemporary Irish youth identity is linked with the 
consumption of the globalised mass media. Part A of the results clearly shows that patterns of 
media use for young people have changed significantly over the past 15 years. Some of these 
changes were entirely predictable, such as the access to more television stations and use of the 
Internet. Others, such as the phenomenal increase in cinema attendance, the increased relative 
popularity of commercial radio and the increase in the number of televisions per household do not 
correspond with an obvious technological advancement. Some media usage patterns, such as 
book reading and comic and magazine buying were relatively consistent.
All of the changes in the patterns of mass media use between 1985 and 2000 could be related to 
socialisation - the mass media are social phenomena. It is difficult to determine the exact effect of 
specific findings, such as the fact that more family members have the option of watching separate 
televisions, or that 15-17 year olds attend the cinema more frequently. What was clear, is that 
many of the changes in media usage were in the context of internationalised forces, such as the 
increased popularity of radio stations that subscribe to a globalised, capitalist driven professional 
practice, to the proliferation of foreign owned multi-screen cinema complexes.
In chapter 2 of this work, ideology was defined as those bodies o f thought which serve to position 
and reify one's social place. By this definition, the results in chapter 6 show that for the young 
Irish people who took part in the study, ideologies (as measured by Part B) are related to patterns 
of media use (as measured by Part A). Assuming that respondents' reported media use is 
representative of their actual media use and that the attitude survey accurately measured 
ideological modes of thought, the data shown in Part B supported the hypothesis That Irish 
youths' current patterns o f media consumption are independently correlated with ideological
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modes o f thought. Ideological modes of thought, as tested by this work, are to some extent cross­
correlated with gender, school, family situation and media use. It is in relation to the myriad of 
socially significant factors, that an individual or a group contextualises its own identity 
(Thompson, 1998).
That a number of correlations between media use and ideological modes of thought were not 
independent of other social institutions such as gender, school and family situation is also to be 
expected. Indeed it is nonsensical to imagine that media use might be completely independent of 
other social forces.
7.2 C onclusions in  th e  co n tex t o f  th e  th eo ry  p resen ted  in c h a p te rs  2. 3 an d  4
7.2.1 M ed ia  g lo b a lisa tio n
In a number of ways, the results presented in the previous chapter can be seen to be consistent 
with Schiller's more recent thinking about cultural imperialism. The media that young Irish 
people consume has become more globalised in terms of subject matter (there are more images 
from around the world than there used to be), ownership (TNCs control more of the media 
product consumed by young Irish people) and target audience (less of the media product 
consumed by young Irish people is created specifically for an Irish audience). For Schiller 
(1998b), these factors would make Irish culture more susceptible to the influence of US 
dominated capitalist-driven globalisation of the popular culture sphere.
Although the media experienced by preceding generations of Irish youth (eg. in 1985) was also 
produced with a capitalist agenda, the media currently used by contemporary Irish youth is more 
globalised and consolidated - the profits increasingly go to fewer, and larger, trans-national
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corporations.
As individual identities are defined in a more internationalised context, so too the relationship 
between the individual and traditional identity forming institutions such as family, school and 
nationhood will be made in relation to these international modes of thinking.
The increased globalisation of the life-world of Irish youth found in this work is linked with 
advancements in communications technology. As such it can be seen to be a logical progression 
of historical globalisation processes which, as explained in chapter 2, were also linked with 
technological advancements.
7.2.2 H eg em o n y  a n d  co n sen t
The young people who took part in the current survey can be seen to consent to their ideological 
position. Young people identify with certain types of media use. 'Readers', 'Music Lovers' and 
'Cinema-goers' have been shown to identify with certain media preferences that were found to 
correlate with ideological modes of thought. By young people displaying an affiliation with (or 
'ownership' of) certain media institutions and media uses, they can be seen to be consenting to the 
hegemonic relationship constructed by the media institution. Those who used the MTV logo to 
indicate which television station they watched most, displayed a similar allegiance to the MTV 
brand and presumably the capitalist driven 'ideologies as presented' by MTV.
The fact that distinct patterns of media use emerged among young people who had little else in 
common (eg. gender, family situation or school), could be seen as support for Fiske's (1989b) 
theory that each individual uses and interprets the globalised mass media in a unique and self­
empowered way. As cited in chapter 2, Stevenson (1995) and Curran et al. (1996, cited Chandler,
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2000a) criticise Fiske as being unreasonably confident of the power of the consumer to determine 
the ideological content of the media which they consume.
The current research suggests that Irish young people experience a sense of choice over the media 
messages they consume. Interpretation is based on unique social situations, but these situations 
exist in the context of a limited number of media frameworks. The three distinct clusters of media 
use that emerged in the current research support Curran et al.'s (1996, cited Chandler, 2000a) 
description of Fiske as celebrating unfeasible 'rituals of resistance'. Defining 'Music Lovers', 
'Readers' and 'Cinema-goers' in terms of numbers would have involved the author arbitrarily 
imposing limits on inclusion or exclusion from each of the clusters. It is the correlation between 
patterns of media use and ideological thinking that suggests that Fiske's theory is inadequate. 
Interpretation is certainly an individual activity to some extent, but the power of institutions to 
delimit the arena of ideological argument cannot be ignored.
The exclusive 'ownership' of 'Teenage Girls' Magazines' by females suggests that there is a set of 
ideologies experienced, and consented to, by young women which is not a part of young men's 
socialisation. To consent to the habitus portrayed in these magazines, young women must situate 
themselves and act from within frameworks in part defined by these magazines. These 
frameworks are typically comprised of a narrow range of stereotypical female social and sexual 
roles (Gamer et al., 1998), and to operate outside of these would be to reject the habitus provided 
by 'Teenage Girls' Magazines'. One could speculate that people who have done this might be 
more likely to subscribe to the habitus of 'Readers', who have been shown to be sceptical of 
magazines in general.
Even those individuals who expressly denounced the ideologies presented by trans-national 
media corporations (i.e. the 'anticonformers' described in the previous chapter) had the limits of
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their argument defined by these media - much of what they knew about like-minded people's 
action against globalisation for instance, they learn through the globalised mass media.
It is important to reiterate that while the current study does reveal a number of trends associated 
with Irish youth habitus, that one should not try to predict the behaviour of any individual from 
these results. Habitus and ideologies allow for disagreement on specific issues (Bourdieu, 1990a; 
Hall, 1980). That is to say that one cannot predict specific attitudes or behaviour by identifying 
that an individual operates from within a certain habitus.
7.2.3 Habitus
Assuming that the results from the current sample can be generalised for a larger population of 
Irish youth, one could assume from the results shown that the media-related habitus of Irish youth 
has continued to become more globalised.
Chapter 3 discussed how late modernity has seen a tremendous increase in the number of 
interactions requiring cultural communication and classification in relation to one's habitus. For 
contemporary Irish youth, as with many others in late modernity, the increasingly globalised 
media, technological developments in communication and an increase in purchasing power have 
all ensured that having a clear sense of taste -  the discriminatory judgement of cultural capital 
which enables people to classify new goods as appropriate to their habitus (Featherstone, 1990) -  
is vital to 'success' in the 'game' of habitus.
This work clearly show that contemporary Irish youth habitus, though complicated and composed 
of many inter-related social frameworks, is defined in a more global context than was the case for 
the preceding generation. Through the globalised media, Irish young people experience a large
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number of habitus and thus form their identity in relation to social realities that did not previously 
exist. The present conditions constructing Irish youth habitus are fluid and will have certainly 
changed within a few years as a new group of people comprise the demographic investigated in 
this volume.
Social behaviour makes sense from within particular habitus (Rogers, 1998). For Irish youth, the 
consumption of mass media, and thus the contextualisation of their life-world has become less 
reliant on traditional institutions such as family, church and school. With the availability of more 
media product (eg. the increased number of televisions stations available in Ireland) and a greater 
autonomy in choosing which of these to experience (eg. young people have more disposable 
income), the construction of the young Irish person's habitus is becoming a more individual 
concern.
Thompson (1992) believes that this individualised construction of meaning leads to a more self- 
centred identity. As 95.1% of the young people surveyed had more than one television in their 
home (compared with 50% in 1985), it is not unreasonable to assume that television viewing has 
become a more individualised behaviour. Therefore habitus formed in relation to television 
viewing will be more individualised than previously.
7.2.4 N ew  a re n a s  o f socia lisa tion
Although identity development in late modem Irish youth is less reliant on traditional social 
institutions, and in general there seems to be a trend towards a more self-centred socialisation, 
there are a number of new interpersonal socialisation processes linked with new media. In 
addition to new social contact made possible through email, electronic 'chat-rooms' etc., the 
young people surveyed in the current study also reported using new media in new social
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situations. With 29.5% of all respondents reporting using the Internet at friends' houses, Internet 
cafés or relatives' houses, 8.6% reporting that they used the Internet in a library not connected 
with their school and 55.0% reporting that they used the Internet at school, in addition to any 
socialisation done 'on-line', the act of using the Internet can itself be seen to take place in social 
situations which would not have previously existed. The medium itself is an arena of 
socialisation. Only 10.8% of respondents reported having never using the Internet. Therefore 
89.2% had engaged in some socialisation involving this medium and many used it regularly in 
social situations which would not have come into being without it.
Just as he sees the acceptance of the world capitalist economy as determining so much in the way 
of Western socialisation, Bourdieu (1998a) sees television, with its enormous penetration in the 
social world of people globally as being the mass medium with the most influence in determining 
habitus.
In the current study there was a sense that the medium of cable television, like the Internet, 
created social situations that would not have existed otherwise. A number of respondents, while 
complaining about the expense of accessing all of the possible channels (particularly sport), said 
that they got together with friends to watch certain programmes in a central location where there 
was access to the required channel. Presumably if all stations were free-to-air, this physical 
socialisation prompted by the nature of the medium itself would not be as frequent.
Young people are the most common users of all media, and are heavily involved in the 
consumption of new media (Fomas, 1995; Boethius, 1995). Dresang (1999) suggests that this has 
led to a 'radical change' in the interrelated use of media. She explores the changes in young 
people's books that have come about in response to changes in socialisation associated with the 
dominance of television and computers. Dresang (1999) found that young people are active
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consumers of the Internet, similar to Hodge and Tripp's (1986) findings that children are active in 
their consumption of television. Dresang (1999) has also found that new media environments 
have forced a change in the content of other media; traditional and new media are often used in 
the context of each other. In particular, Dresang has found that books offer 'digital age 
connections', and that book reading and computer use have strong and evolving links. This is 
consistent with the current study's findings, which found Internet use and book reading to be 
related activities for a significant number of respondents (who were labelled 'Readers').
It is difficult, and beyond the scope of this work, to theorise what the effect of new forms of 
socialisation such as Internet 'chat rooms' and email may be, but they are certainly significant, as 
the 'anticonformers' cited above demonstrate. It seems absurd that electronic socialisation will 
replace physical socialisation. More likely, for Irish youth, having an 'electronic identity' will (or 
has already) become yet another aspect of their habitus, which along with other new and 
traditional social institutions, will be subject to continual re-evaluation as the young person and 
the social institutions themselves constantly change.
7.2.5 L a te  m o d e rn  p ace  o f  ch an g e  a n d  a sense o f  r isk
"Modernity is a risk culture" (Giddens, 1991:3). This work has shown, for a number of Irish 
young people, certain patterns of media use are correlated with ideological modes of thought. 
There are other ramifications of the importance of new media in the lives of Irish young people 
however.
Youth have a unique and ever-changing 'risk profile' (Beck, 1992). In accordance with youth 
being associated with what is new in culture, "[y]oung people are clearly fully aware of the role 
played by the media in trying to influence the ways in which they consume" (Anderson and
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Miles, 1999:108). Nevertheless, there is social pressure on young people to use media in a 
'youthful' fashion. From fads such as Pokemon, which involves groups of friends expecting each 
other to watch the same cartoons, see the same movies and own similar merchandise, to youth 
television programmes telling their listeners to send them an email, there are expectations placed 
on young people to use media in certain ways. If they cannot, for example if their family does not 
subscribe to the channel which shows Pokemon or if they do not have Internet access, then it will 
be difficult for them to fully subscribe to a habitus which includes these media uses. The 
individual will not be 'included' in the media organisation's view of the idealised audience 
member and may have associated feelings of alienation. Hannan and O'Riain (1993) found that 
alternative lifestyles were often chosen by young Irish people after they felt they had 'failed' to 
find an acceptable 'normal' lifestyle. Individuals forced to form their identity in a slightly 
alternative social situation to their peers, due to a lack of access to the required media, or any 
other reason, may be subject to feelings of failure.
7.2.6 Y o u n g  I r is h  p eo p le 's  m ed ia  use a n d  ideology
Groups tend to have a sense of 'ownership' of the cultural space of shared media. Television is 
often considered a family domain (although the current study showed that this may be decreasing) 
whereas watching videos and listening to music is often a peer-group activity. Books typically 
belong to school. Girls 'own' the space of 'Girls' Magazines' and boys seem to display a similar 
ownership of computer game magazines. Tensions between reading, viewing and listening to 
various media are superimposed upon social and cultural events (Fomas, 1996). The social aspect 
of these experiences will happen in the context of previous experiences of the medium.
199
7.3 Motivations, influences and limitations of the current research
Bourdieu (cited Neuman, 2000) believes that social research must be reflexive. Motivations for 
conducting research and the various influences on the direction of study should be made clear to 
contextualise the research environment which led to a piece of academic writing being produced.
7.3.1 M o tiv a tio n
Dublin City University had made available a modest stipend for a researcher to produce a work 
on the subject of 'globalisation and Irish youth culture'. The author applied for this stipend 
motivated by a number of factors. Firstly and most importantly, over a number of years, the 
author has had a professional and personal interest in both the media industry (primarily radio) 
and with people in the age range of the sample. The opportunity to explore the inter-relationship 
between youth and media made the current research attractive to the author. Otherwise the 
motivations for producing this work were typical of those to complete an MA thesis.
7.3.2 In flu en ces
Although the advice of his academic supervisor was invaluable throughout the entire process of 
producing this work, the author was free to choose the direction and substance of the research, 
within the confines of the university system. The author never felt pressure from any outside 
force for the research to include or exclude any item, theory or proposal for any reason besides 
achieving the aims of the author and improving the academic quality of the finished thesis.
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7.3.3 Limitations
The most obvious limitation of the current work is that it was done using a time-limited sample. 
As has been stressed throughout, youth and late modernity are both subject to frequent and multi­
dimensional change. The individual young people studied in this work are constantly changing. 
So too the group of people who make up the demographic being studied is also continuously 
being re-defined as people age. At the time that the questionnaire was completed the average age 
of respondents was 16.0. By the time this research is published these same people will have an 
average age of over 17. Within 3 years, a completely different set of people make will comprise 
the 15-17 year old demographic that this work was focussing on. The people who took part in the 
2000 questionnaire will have a vastly different social world to when they filled out the 
questionnaire, and may not be representative of the people who are then 15-17 years old.
The value of this research then, is to provide a 'signpost' of the media use of Irish youth, and 
provide some indication of the ways that various mass mediated socialisation patterns are 
changing. The comparison with Reynolds' 1985 study highlights some of the significant changes 
in the past 15 years. Regular follow-up research would be required to adequately map changes in 
the cultural landscape of Irish youth over time.
7.4 C o n c lu d in g  com m en ts
A major difference between cultural groups is their modes of communication (see Burke, 1945; 
Foucault, 1986). Distinct language and media use separates youth from older and younger 
generations (Mody, 2001), and as shown in Part A of the empirical research in this volume, 
contemporary Irish youth use the mass media in a significantly different way to previous 
generations.
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The frameworks in which young Irish people make sense of their 'life-world' has changed. The 
breadth of messages available to the individual has resulted in the possibility of groups based 
around similar communication experiences (Fomas, 1995). Strauss and Howe (1991) refer to the 
similarity in 'worldviews' which result from similarly aged people having similar sociological 
experiences as a 'cohort generation' effect. In the current study a number of cohorts were seen to 
emerge as 'groups' of young people who used the same, or related, mass media experienced 
similar information and formed similar ideological opinions about their social world. These 
'groups' or cohorts, were to some extent defined by similarities in media usage, and in many cases 
would not have formed a physical group at all. The evidence presented in this volume suggests 
that there are many such interacting cohorts of young Irish people, who are distinct from previous 
constantly evolving in response to each other, the globalised frameworks presented in the mass 
media and technological developments in communications technology.
The increasingly globalised sphere of mass media socialisation is just one, albeit important, 
aspect of Irish youth habitus. Frameworks of socialisation are increasingly formed in the context 
of capitalist driven trans-national media forces which encourage (or demand) a more globalised 
habitus. There seems to be little opportunity for Irish youth to influence global media product or 
ideologies. 'Alternative' arenas for socialisation operate outside of the dominant commercial 
model. If they become sufficiently popular that they can be seen to attract a significant and 
distinct commercial demographic, such as has happened with 'hip-hop' and other 'alternative' 
music forms in the US and UK, globalised professional practice will include these 'alternatives' in 
the form of specialist programming or perhaps a dedicated magazine, radio or television station. 
These will be designed to deliver the largest possible audience share and thus profit, and will tend 
to deliver 'least objectionable programming' for this demographic. In Ireland, the purchasing 
power of the 'youth' demographic has become large enough for specialist television programming,
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and more recently a specialist commercial radio station. The cultural product broadcast by these 
media is produced according to globalised professional practice that tends to comprise of a 
programming style and content proven to be profitable elsewhere. The input of indigenous Irish 
youth into this programming is minimal, and less profitable aspects of Irish culture (eg. Irish 
language and religion) are typically excluded in such broadcasting.
Despite this lack of 'contra-flow', the 'global' is still very much 'localised' by Irish young people. 
That is to say that in light of the complexity of youth identity, the global media are contextualised 
within a local habitus. The exact definition of the local is also subject to change as traditional 
institutions, such as religion, become less dominant and new institutions, such as the globalised 
mass media and 'electronic communities' gain significance.
Although Cunningham et al. (1998) believe that smaller countries can resist the domination of 
globalised media forces, Boyd-Barrett (1998) sees these countries as being overwhelmed by the 
globalisation process. He believes that there is little evidence to suggest that alternative media 
have had a significant impact on mainstream media, within either a national or international 
context. The resultant forces or 'globalised influences', for countries such as Ireland with strong 
historical, economic and linguistic ties with the US and UK, are similar to the effects Schiller's 
(1991, 1998b) cultural imperialist model predicts.
This study has shown that for the young Irish people who took part in the survey detailed in 
chapters 5 and 6, 'ideological modes of thought' are linked with patterns of media use. Globalised 
mass media use has been shown to influence the interaction of the individual with her/his social 
surroundings, similar to any other 'social institutions' such as family, religion or school. The 
findings of this work support the view that any sociological or anthropological study of late
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modern youth must take their ever-changing media usage patterns into consideration when 
discussing the formations of young people's life-world.
If the political and deterministic insinuations or 'ideological baggage' of the concept of cultural 
imperialism could be removed, the theory would become less problematic in studying youth 
socialisation in small Anglophone countries like Ireland. Instead of talking about the domination 
of one class by another, groups could be classified with less stigmatic and more descriptive labels 
based on, for example, behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, there are elements of hegemonic 
domination and consent to one's subordinate position, and the writing of people such as Gramsci, 
Stevenson and Schudson amongst others discussed in chapter 2 continue to be useful in 
understanding inequalities in communication and to detect instances of media 'colonisation'.
This work finds a certain amount of support for many aspects of the cultural imperialist theory. It 
has also found that for the respondents to the survey outlined in chapter 5, certain media usage 
patterns were linked with 'ideological modes of thought'. These correlations however, simply 
indicate related trends. People, such as politicians, parents and teachers, who make decisions on 
behalf of young Irish people should be aware that media use and 'ideological modes of thought' 
are both complex social activities. The clusters of related media use and attitudes highlighted in 
this work should not be taken as predictors of behaviour. They are evidence that the globalised 
media are important in the construction of the life-world of Irish youth who, as a group and as 
individuals, are active in the consumption and interpretation of the messages broadcast by these 
media. The effective limits of argument about the life-world of young Irish people is, to a 
significant degree, determined by the mass media, but within these limits there are countless 
opportunities to use the media in distinct ways.
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The individuals who comprise the three groups explored in this work, share a common habitus of 
'Music lovers', 'Readers' or 'Cinema-goers'. It is important to remember that it is the individuals 
who define these clusters and not the clusters that define the individuals. For example, two people 
who displayed the characteristics of a typical 'Reader' would almost certainly have different 
media usage patterns and 'ideological modes of thought' in many other ways, it may well be that it 
is only in reading and the specific associated attitudes measured by this work that they are similar 
at all, and even this is far from guaranteed.
7.4.1 F u r th e r  re se a rc h
This study differs from typical previous examinations of young people in Ireland as it views 
youth as a distinct and important developmental stage in its own right, and does not focus on the 
problems that young Irish people have or cause. Also, this work does not attempt to define or 
delimit young people by the significant, yet limited, conclusions that can be drawn from the 
empirical research. Instead, it shows that Irish youth socialisation is defined in terms that are 
delimited by globalised media product and practices. It encourages that its specific findings be 
seen as individual and time-limited trends, which in the context of future study will create a fuller 
understanding of the life-world of Irish youth. Such work could create a database of the ways in 
which the limits of Irish youth identity and social knowledge is changing over time with the 
continuing changes in late modem social institutions such as family, gender roles, school and the 
media.
Gender, while not a primary focus of this study, was confirmed to correlate with many of the 
'ideological modes of thought' measured in the attitude survey. Because the creation of a 
foundation for future study was one of the principal aims of this work, the details of cross­
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correlations for gender included in Appendix C could be used by further work investigating Irish 
youth to discuss the results of future studies with the current sample.
Similarly, chapters 2, 3 and 4, in their detailed discussion of a number of key terms useful in 
studying youth culture, while proving a theoretical background for this work, also provide a 
possible foundation for similar investigations in the future. The empirical research which 
highlighted changes in the media use of Irish youth, and measurable links between ideologies and 
globalised media use, could be used as 'signposts' for future research examining the directions of 
change of media oriented socialisation in Irish youth.
The current research is a step towards answering one of the common criticisms of the cultural 
imperialist model. It provides empirical support linking the globalisation of the mass media with 
identity formation in Irish youth. Evidence of contra-flow was not sought. Further research might 
explore opportunities that Irish youth have to influence the media organisations that they use.
7.4.1.1 E ffec t o f  g lobalised  p ro fessio n a l m ed ia  p ro d u c tio n  on in d iv id u a l socia lisa tion
Higgins and Moss (1982:216) suggest that the mass media broadcast to a perceived audience that 
is "lacking in subtlety, private depths and intensities, and who are totally incapable of being 
serious". The current study concurs with previous research (for example by Hodge and Tripp, 
1986) that this perception is overly simplistic. Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1994) warn 
against using terms such as 'common culture' in describing youth, but it serves little purpose for 
media institutions to investigate youth identity more closely than their capitalist agenda dictates. 
For globalised programming targeting the youth demographic, this leads to 'least objectionable 
programming' aimed at an idealised or 'average' young person who does not, in actuality, exist.
2 0 6
The impact that this might have on the identity development of actual young people is untested at 
this stage and would be an interesting area for further study.
7.4.1.2 In d iv id u a lisa tio n  a n d  cap ita lis t ideologies
Boethius (1995) describes youth as forming an 'avant-garde of consumption'. They pioneer the 
modern and make use of new media and media products. With the pace of technological 
advancement in late modernity, Irish youth are required to constantly re-define their identity as 
they experience a wider variety of habitus. Self identity is continuously 'dissolved' or 
'dismembered' in relation to a wide range of ever-changing factors, from traditional social 
institutions such as family and school, to mass media socialisation and the use of new media 
products (Giddens, 1990).
A number of ideological criteria must be reconciled before one feels that they belong to a social 
group. For example, "[territory, language, religion, race etc., are all sources of dispute and have 
to be ideologically constructed, or interpreted, in order to produce a sense of belonging to a 
national community" (Thompson, 1992:352). The transition to a culture more dependent on the 
electronic media involves the reception of cultural images and ideological social information that 
one would not experience otherwise. This results in a society's cultural formations being based 
upon a broader range messages, each less important to survival. The breadth of messages and 
choice of what to receive results in the possibilty of subcultures based around similar 
communication experiences (Fomas, 1995), as is the case with Internet 'chat rooms' and cohorts 
of 'Music Lovers', 'Readers' or 'Cinema-goers'. Whether this diversification of individuals' 
identities and reliance on capitalist driven social institutions can be shown to equate with a more 
individualistic construction of identity for Irish youth, as Pietrass (1999) suggests it does for late 
modem Western identity in general, would also be a valuable arena for further research.
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7.4.1.3 A final word
The results presented in this volume stand on their own. The comparison between contemporary 
youth and their predecessors shows important and relevant changes in the media-related 
socialisation patterns of Irish youth. However, as discussed in the introduction to this work, this 
investigation was designed to form a basis for a sustained investigation into the construction of 
the life-worid of Irish youth. The theory detailed in chapters 2, 3 and 4 and the empirical results 
presented and discussed in chapters 5 and 6 invite further investigation to continue the 'mapping’ 
of Irish youth socialisation, with the aim of increasing an understanding of the forces affecting the 
construction of youth identity in this country. As it was with this work, the ultimate aim of future 
investigations invited by the current research, would be to provide the people who make decisions 
affecting the lives of young people with a clearer understanding of the globalised factors affecting 
their socialisation.
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Appendix A- Advertisement for this project's funding
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY - School of Communications are inviting applications for Funded 
Research in Globalisation & Youth Culture in Ireland. This project will open up an 
anthropology of Irish youth that foregrounds the media-driven cultural sphere & focus attention 
on understanding the life-world of Irish youth, with all the networks of imagery, icons, attitudes, 
habits, memories, moods & heroes that give it coherence & meaning. This mapping of youth 
culture will lay the foundation for sustained investigation concentrated on the impact of 
globalisation on Irish youth in all its aspects. Funding is available for MA or PhD. Interested 
candidates should contact...
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Appendix B - Questionnaire
This is the questionnaire distributed to the respondents.
Note: Question numbers were not included on the questionnaire. They are included here for ease 
of reference. There are a number of question numbers missing in Part A. This is because a 
number of questions were omitted from the final version of the questionnaire after discussions 
with the pilot group and colleagues of the author.
Please answer all questions.
Part A
1- Age: [_______ ]
2. Gender: [ ] Female [ ] M ale
3. Nam e o f  School: [_______________
4. Year at School: [_________________
5. A t hom e how  many television  stations do you have access to?
[__ ] N one
L_] 1-4
[ ] 5-8
L_] 9-12  
[__ ] More than 12
6. D o you intend to go to university? [__ ] Y es [ ] N o
7. W ho are the adults you live w ith (tick all appropriate boxes)?
[ ] Mother
[ ] Father
[__ ] Other relations (uncles, aunts, grandparents)
[__ ] Other, please specify [_____________________________________
9. H ow  often do you use the Internet?
[ ] M ost days [_] About once a week
[ ] Less than once a w eek [_] A lm ost never
[__ ] Never
10. If you do use the Internet, where do you use it (tick all appropriate boxes)?
[__ ] Hom e [__] School
[__ ] Friends’ houses [__] Library (not school libraiy)
[__ ] Other, please specify [___________________________________________________
11. H ave you more than one television at home? [_] Y es [__ ] N o
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13. D o you think what you learn at school is relevant to ordinary life?
[__] Y es [_] Som e o f  it
[__] N o [_] D on’t know
14. D o you learn from television?
[__] A  lot [_] A certain amount
[__] Very little [_] Nothing
15. H ow  m any books have you read in the last month?
[__] More than 4 [_] 2 to 4
[ _ ]  1 [ _ ]  none
16. D o you belong to a library other than your school library? [__ ] Y es [__ ] N o
17. D o you buy books?
[__] Very often [_] Often
[__] Som etim es [_] N ever
18. D o you buy com ics or m agazines?
[__] Very often [_] Often
[__] Som etim es [_] N ever
19. I f  you do buy com ics or m agazines, name your favourites
[ ][ ][___________________
20. H ow  often do you go to the cinema?
[ ] M ost w eeks [ ] About once a month
[__ ] L ess than once a month [ ] N ever
21. I f  you do go to the cinem a what are your favourite types o f  film s (tick all appropriate boxes)?
[__] C om edy [__] Horror
[__] A ction/Adventure [__] Romance
[__ ] Other, please specify [__________________________________________]
22. H ow  much tim e per day do you spend listening to the radio?
[__] Less than 1 hour [__] 1 to 2 hours
[__] 2 to 3 hours [__] 3 hours or more
23. What is the radio station you listen to m ost often? [__________________________________ ]
24. H ow  much tim e every day w ould you spend listening to C Ds, records or tapes?
[__] Less than 1 [__] 1 to 2 hours
[__] 2 to 3 hours [__] 3 hours or more
25. H ow  much tim e would you spend on Saturday or Sunday watching television?
[__] L ess than 1 hour [__] 1 to 2 hours
[__] 2 to 3 hours [__] 3 hours or more
28. D o you think teenagers need their own special T V  programmes? [__ ] Y es [__ ] N o
29. W here do you usually get m ost information about what is going on in this country and in the world
today?
[__] School [__] Radio
 ] N ewspapers [__] Friends or relations
[__] T elevision . [__] Internet
2 2 7
[ ] Other, p lea se  sp ec ify  [ J
30. W hich television station do you watch most? [__________ ]
37. W hat is  the main reason that television and radio stations have programmes aim ed at people your age?
[ ] To educate [__] To make m oney
[ ] To entertain [__ ] They have to
[ ] Other, please specify [_____________________________________________________________________________ ]
45. Are the pressures on people your age the sam e for girls and boys? [ ] Y es [_] N o
46. I f  you answered ‘N o ’ for question 45 explain briefly how  the pressures on girls and boys are different.
I_______________________________________________________________________________ 1
[_______________________________________________________________________________ 1
[_______________________________________________________________________________ 1
Part B
(1) Are m ovies aimed at teenagers m ainly for girls or boys?
[ ] A lm ost always girls
[ ] More often girls
[ ] About the same
[ ] More often boys
[ ] A lm ost always boys
(2) The com panies that make m agazines think young people are intelligent.
[ ] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(3) Different groups o f  teenagers own different styles o f  music.
[_] I strongly agree
[ J I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
r 1 1 strongly disagree
(4) I think radio in other countries w ould be worse than Irish radio 
[__] I strongly agree
[__] I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(5) I som etim es feel that I should change the w ay I am because o f  som ething I see on television. 
[__] I strongly agree
[_] I agree
[__] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[__] I strongly disagree
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(6) Adverts put pressure on me to act in certain ways.
[__] I strongly agree
[ ] I agree
[ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[__] I disagree
[__] I strongly disagree
(7) TV Programmes made for teenagers are aimed at 
[ ] Almost always girls
[ ] More often girls
[__] About the same
[ ] More often boys
[ ] Almost always boys
(8) Most TV programmes made in Ireland are copies of programmes from other countries 
[ ] I strongly agree
[ ] I agree
[ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
(9) I think television shows would be about the same in all countries that speak English 
[ ] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
[ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
(10) Some groups of teenagers copy what they see in movies 
[ ] I strongly agree
r 11 agree
[__] I neither agree nor disagree
[__] I disagree
[__] I strongly disagree
(11) Teenagers who read magazines are 
[_] Almost always boys
[_] More often boys
[_] About the same
[_] More often girls
[_] Almost always girls
(12) Most movies made for people my age don’t really appeal to me 
[__] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(13) Most people usually like the same television programmes as their friends.
[_] I strongly agree
[_] I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
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(14) You can sometimes tell what magazines a group of people read by the way they look or act 
[__] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
[ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
(15) It is easy to tell what sort o f films some groups o f teenagers will like.
[__] I strongly agree
[ 11 agree
[__] I neither agree nor disagree
[__] I disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
(16) Young people influence what music is in the charts.
[__] I strongly agree
[__] I agree
[ ] I neither agree nor disagree
r 1 1 disagree 
[__] I strongly disagree
(17) Sometimes it is easy to tell what sort of music certain groups of teenagers will like.
[ ] I strongly agree
r 11 agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(18) Some teenagers try to look like people they see in magazines 
[ ] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
[__ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[__ ] I disagree
[__ ] I strongly disagree
(19) People on the radio sound like they are talking to 
[ ] Almost always girls
[_] More often girls
[_] About the same
[_] More often boys
[ ] Almost always boys
(20) It is important that Ireland remains different from other countries 
[__ ] I strongly agree
[__ ] I agree
[__ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[__ ] I disagree
[__ ] I strongly disagree
(21) The music I like is the same as most o f my friends.
[__ ] I strongly agree
L  J  I agree
[__ ] I neither agree nor disagree
[__ ] I disagree
[__ ] I strongly disagree
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(22) Women and men are shown as equals in magazines 
[_] 1 strongly agree
[_] I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] 1 disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(23) Groups of friends wear different clothes because of what they see on television.
[_] I strongly agree
[_] 1 agree
[_] 1 neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(24) Telling young people about what is going on in the world is important to a television station.
[__] I strongly agree
I- 1 1 agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(25) Television treats men and women equally 
[_] I strongly agree
[_] I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(26) People who make movies for teenagers usually have a good idea about what teenagers are like. 
[ ] I strongly agree
r 1 1 agree
r 1 1 neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] 1 strongly disagree
(27) Irish bands are usually better than bands from overseas 
[__] I strongly agree
[ 1 1 agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(28) Young people don’t really matter to TV and radio companies 
[__] I strongly agree
L_] I agree
[_] 1 neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
(29) Teenagers are important to radio stations.
[_] I strongly agree
[_] I agree
[_] I neither agree nor disagree
[_] I disagree
[_] I strongly disagree
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(30) It is good that there are more people from di fferent countries in Ireland than there used to be 
[ I I strongly agree 
[__] I agree
[ ] I  neither agree nor disagree
[ ] I  disagree
[ ] I strongly disagree
Thanks for completing this q uestionnai re, please feel free to write any comments you would like to make 
about it below.
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Respondents who did not intend to go to university (A6) agreed with the statement "The music I 
like is the same as most of my friends" (B21) more strongly than those who did intend to go to 
university.
The school that respondents attended (A3) correlated with the degree to which respondents 
thought TV programmes made for teenagers were aimed at boys or girls (B7).
The school that respondents attended (A3) correlated with the degree to which respondents 
dis/agreed with the statement "Television treats men and women equally" (B25) (not correlated 
with gender).
Cross-correlations for gender.
• For males, whether respondents intended going to university (A6) is correlated with the 
school they attend.
• For females, frequency of Internet (A9) use is correlated with the school that they attend 
(A3).
• For females, the answer to "Do you learn from television" (A14) is correlated with the school 
that they attend (A3).
• For females, the number of books read in the past month (A15) is correlated with the school 
that they attend (A3).
• For females, the frequency of buying books (A17) is correlated with the school that they 
attend (A3).
• For females, the frequency of attending the cinema (A20) is correlated with the school that 
they attend (A3).
• For females, the amount of time spent watching television on weekends (A25) is correlated 
with the school that they attend (A3).
• Females with access to more television stations at home (A5) reported learning more from 
television (A14).
• Females who intend to go to university (A6) reported learning more from television (A14).
• Males who intend to go to university (A6) had read fewer books in the last month (A15).
• Males who intend to go to university (A6) reported buying comics and magazines less often 
(A18).
Appendix C - Other statistically significant correlations
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• For males, weather they lived with both their mother and father (A7.4) correlated with the 
type of radio station they listened to most (A23.5).
• Males who use the Internet more (A9) reported that what they learnt at school was more 
relevant to ordinary life (A13.5).
• Males who use the Internet more (A9) reported reading more books (A15).
• Males who use the Internet more (A9) reported buying more books (A 17).
• Males who reported learning more from television (A14) also reported listening to the radio
more (A22).
• Males who reported learning more from television (A14) also reported watching more 
television on weekends (A25).
• Males who reported reading more books in the last month (A15) also reported buying more 
comics or magazines (A 18).
• For males, reading more books in the last month (A15) correlated with the type of radio 
station they listened to most (A23.5).
• Males who reported buying comics or magazines more often (A 18) also reported to listening 
to CDs, records and tapes more (A24).
• Males who went to the cinema more (A20) also spent more time listening to the radio (A22).
• For females, listening to the radio more (A22) correlated with what type of radio station they 
listened to most (A23.5).
• Females who reported listening to the radio more (A22) also reported watching television at 
weekends more (A25).
• For females, the type of radio station they listened to most (A23.5) correlated with how much 
time they reported spending listening to CDs, records or tapes (A24).
• For males, the type of radio station they listened to most (A23.5) correlated with how much 
time they spent watching television on weekends (A25).
NB. All questions in Part A about patterns of media use were tested for cross-correlations for
gender. Only those listed above showed a significant gender divide. The above imply that the
same correlation did not apply for the opposite sex, though they might have applied for the entire
sample, in which case they would also be included in chapter 5.
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